Ryan Battlefield Afghanistan

1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-0-7509-8059-3
Verlag: Spellmount
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 192 Seiten

From interviews with his numerous contacts among the coalition forces stationed in Afghanistan, Mike Ryan has done what journalists have so far been unable to do.Battlefield Afghanistan is the first thorough-going account of the war in the former Taliban state: not the politics behind the conflict, but the actual situation for the men on the ground. Far from simply 'keeping the peace,' coalition forces in Afghanistan are currently involved in full-scale warfare with both al-Qaeda militants and the forces of the resurgent Taliban. Battlefield Afghanistan tells the real, inside story of the men under fire, based upon first-hand evidence from members of 3 Para, 16 Air Assault Brigade, the Royal Marines and the Special Forces community, together with the views and experiences of the US and French troops. As their accounts indicate, the hostilities faced have proved to be far greater than was anticipated, and the situation in Afghanistan far more serious than the politicians would like the public to realise.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ryan, Mike

Leseproben

I

Baiting the Bears

To understand and fully appreciate the current position of our forces in Afghanistan, it is instructive to know something of the Russian experience during their occupation of this extraordinary country in the 1980s. In fact, from a military perspective, it is imperative: lessons learned from the shedding of their blood yesterday will save that of our soldiers today. Why? Because the armed forces of the then Soviet Union were immense and powerful, and yet they lost. They had armour, attack aircraft, bombers, helicopters, special forces and a massive conventional army. On paper at least, it should have been a cake-walk. For the Russians, Afghanistan was their Vietnam. The political and military fall-out of their bitter experience in the 1980s lives on to this day. For them, it all started to go wrong in 1979 – when they made the fatal decision to invade.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stemmed from a desire to control – following the disastrous reaction of the Afghan people to the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan government – the destiny of a new socialist state, governed by a communist party. The Soviets felt that they had no choice but to come to the aid of the new government and felt compelled to act immediately. The need for quick, robust action was urgent because the state only controlled some of the cities, and even there, the position was parlous. Outside the cities, it was the tribal elders and clan chiefs who ran the countryside; and sensing that their new government was totally ineffective, they quickly exploited the situation to their own advantage. The primary reason for this government’s failure was simple. They were split down the middle, and were so engrossed with infighting that they took their eye off the ball, stalling the very purpose of their mission: the spreading of the gospel of socialism. Worse still, their message of creating a new egalitarian society by means of equal land distribution, the emancipation of women and the sweeping away of traditional Afghan values found little support amongst the Islamic tribes. Ironically, the only good thing to come from this government was the fact that they were so hated by the Afghan people that they actually succeeded in galvanizing all the factions and power bases at the same time, bringing them together, a feat that nobody else had managed in centuries. The final straw came when the President of Afghanistan was murdered by his prime minister, an illustration, if any were needed, of how bad the faction fighting had become. (Now political infighting.) The prime minister quickly became the new president, but was worse than the previous one, which is saying something. The army mutinied, law and order broke down, and villages and cities revolted, culminating in civil war.

Russian BTRs form up in convoy prior to an operation in Afghanistan.

THE SOVIET INVASION

It was 1979, and the Soviet General Secretary Leonard Brezhnev had seen enough. He decided to act before his client state of Afghanistan disintegrated before his very eyes. He gathered his General Staff together, and they recommended using the intervention model that was used in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but with some variations. Their plans however, were seriously flawed; as they were to discover later in the mission phase. The key truth that had been overlooked was that Afghanistan was embroiled in an all-out civil war: so a would only take control of the central government, and not that of the mainly rural population. Thus the intervention was doomed from the very start.

To the Soviet Union’s credit militarily, the initial invasion of Afghanistan went extremely well, especially so as many of the participating units were only briefed days before the Christmas Eve commencement of the operation. The military invasion itself was masterfully planned, and well executed and the seizure of the government and termination of the president’s authority were quickly accomplished. Within days, the Russians had their own president in place and quickly set about the business of restoring order. Their plan was threefold: to restore order nationally by means of the Democratic Republic Army; to strengthen and restructure it for long-term stability; and then withdraw their own support forces after three years. However, there was one insuperable problem: the Democratic Republic Army was broken and totally dispirited, and in no position to suppress an all-out revolt.

For the Russians, losing face is everything and the thought of a total defeat was just too much to contemplate. But this was the most likely scenario, once they withdrew their own forces. To put this situation into context, one must remember the Russian psyche for warfare, which during the 1980s was geared up and trained for fighting large-scale, high tempo operations, and not guerrilla warfare. It is indeed most odd that it never occurred to them that they may one day face the same nightmare that the Americans had faced in Vietnam – and possibly even the same fate! Like a lumbering giant, they were slow to react to the unpredictability of unconventional warfare, and paid a heavy price for that failure. This is in contrast to the British Army in Afghanistan today, which trains and fights at section level – and gives a lot of tactical and command autonomy to its junior ranking soldiers – making them far better equipped to fight small groups or individuals. The Russians were at the time just the opposite, constrained by the need to refer every significant decision up the chain of command for approval.

Further complicating the situation for them was the long and convoluted process of making a decision, even when the situation had been sent up the chain, as there was no one person who could take a view on anything. Instead, everything had to be agreed by a committee of the collective leadership that had been put in charge, following General Secretary Brezhnev’s severe decline in health in 1980. This sorry state of affairs went on until his death in 1982 – only to be repeated when he was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, who barely lasted two years in the post.

At this time, the Russian military leadership was recommending withdrawal, as they could see the writing was on the wall, but alas, their political masters could not. A situation not too dissimilar to ours today, vis-à-vis our involvement in Iraq. By 1984, the situation in Afghanistan was desperate, yet the politicians refused to budge. (During this period, the Soviet Union’s General Secretary was Konstantin Chernenko, but like his predecessors he didn’t last long in the job, as he died in 1985.) The final closure for Russia in Afghanistan eventually came about after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. Prior to his arrival, the attitude was basically plod on and let’s see what happens. But Gorbachev wanted a conclusion – one way or the other. Instinctively, his first thought was to increase the tempo of operation and thus Russia had the bloodiest year of the war so far: a situation not a million miles away from what is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2007.

Russian Spetsnaz prepare for a mission.

Unlike his former Politburo mates, Gorbachev was a realist, and it farly quickly dawned on him that there was no victory for Russia in Afghanistan, with the current military strategy; and anything more drastic risked alienating him on the world stage. His only way forward now, was to order a withdrawal; and a dignified avenue for this to be carried out was provided courtesy of the United Nations. By mutual agreement, half of the Soviet military force in Afghanistan had withdrawn by October 1988 and a steady draw-down continued until the last element of this once mighty military beast returned to Russian soil on 15 February 1989.

Soviet T-55s sit rusting near Bagram air base.

If a man fears death, he will accept fever – Afghan proverb

LEARNING THE LESSONS

It would be very easy to dismiss the Russian experience in Afghanistan, as being irrelevant to that being endured by our forces today – but foolish. Why? Because in many cases, the Taliban are using virtually the same tactics, weapons, equipment – even the same kill zones – as those used by the Mujahideen againt the Russians. Our forces are taking casualties in regions of Afghanistan where, if only the lessons of the Russian experience were studied and learned, those losses could be reduced significantly or even eradicated. The Afghans are creatures of habit, and an ambush site that was good enough for use by the Mujahideen against the Russians in the past is still basically deemed good enough for use by the Taliban against us now – and that is their Achilles’ heel. The sheer fact that they are predictable in many ways makes them vulnerable, so we need to be more pro-active in Afghanistan, rather than reactive. That way, we can use their tactics as a weapon against them. Contrary to popular belief, there were Russian strategists and tacticians who realised this also, but by the time they did, it was too late, as they had already lost the ‘hearts and minds’ battle with the Afghan people. And to win in guerrilla warfare, you must have the population at large on your side.

Where and why, did it all go so wrong for the Russians in Afghanistan? It is a question that has long been debated by ‘Armchair Generals’ the world over. On Christmas Eve 1979, when most of the world was relaxing and in festive spirit, who would have thought of invading another...