Game Theory and Economic Analysis

A Quiet Revolution in Economics
Erscheinungsjahr 2002
ISBN: 978-0-415-25987-3
Verlag: Routledge

Buch, Englisch, 204 Seiten, Format (B × H): 161 mm x 240 mm, Gewicht: 476 g

Reihe: Routledge Advances in Game Theory

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:

*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schmidt, Christian

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftsphilosophie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Ökonometrie
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Betriebswirtschaft Wirtschaftsmathematik und -statistik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction PART I Historical insight 1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern in historical perspective 2 Rupture versus continuity in game theory: Nash versus Von Neumann and Morgenstern PART II Theoretical content 3 Bluff and reputation 4 An appraisal of cooperative game theory 5 The coalition concept in game theory 6 Do Von Neumann and Morgenstern have heterodox followers? 7 From specularity to temporality in game theory PART III Applications 8 Collective choice mechanisms and individual incentives 9 Team models as a framework to analyze coordination problems within the firm

Über Autor(innen)

Christian Schmidt is Professor at the University of Paris-Dauphine. He has recently published La théorie des jeux: essai d’interprétation (PUF, 2001).