Suárez Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-1-4020-9904-5
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 347, 266 Seiten

Reihe: Synthese Library

This volume defends a novel approach to the philosophy of physics: it is the first book devoted to a comparative study of probability, causality, and propensity, and their various interrelations, within the context of contemporary physics -- particularly quantum and statistical physics. The philosophical debates and distinctions are firmly grounded upon examples from actual physics, thus exemplifying a robustly empiricist approach. The essays, by both prominent scholars in the field and promising young researchers, constitute a pioneer effort in bringing out the connections between probabilistic, causal and dispositional aspects of the quantum domain. The book will appeal to specialists in philosophy and foundations of physics, philosophy of science in general, metaphysics, ontology of physics theories, and philosophy of probability.

Mauricio Suárez is a philosopher of science specialising in philosophy of physics. He has published widely in the philosophy of quantum mechanics, modelling and representation, and scientific epistemology in journals such as Erkenntnis, Studies in History and Philosohy of Modern Physics, Foundations of Physics, Philosophy of Science, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, History of the Human Sciences. He is the editor of Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modelling and Idealisation (London: Routledge, 2009) and co-editor of the Proceedings of the founding conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), which he organised in Madrid in 2007.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Suárez, Mauricio

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;5
2;Contents;6
3;Contributors;8
4;1 Four Theses on Probabilities, Causes, Propensities;9
4.1;1.1 Overview of the Book;9
4.2;1.2 Probabilities;10
4.2.1;1.2.1 Transition Probabilities and Time-Symmetry;10
4.2.2;1.2.2 The Principle of Indifference;13
4.2.3;1.2.3 Typicality in Statistical Mechanics;16
4.3;1.3 Causes;18
4.3.1;1.3.1 From Metaphysics to Physics;19
4.3.2;1.3.2 Causal Loops in Retro-Causal Models;20
4.3.3;1.3.3 Causal Completeness of Probability Theories;22
4.3.4;1.3.4 Robustness and the Markov Condition;23
4.4;1.4 Propensities;24
4.4.1;1.4.1 Dispositions in the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics;25
4.4.2;1.4.2 The Propensiton Theory Revisited;26
4.4.3;1.4.3 Derivative Dispositions;27
4.5;1.5 Transition Versus Conditional Probabilities;28
4.5.1;1.5.1 Transition Probability: Take One;28
4.5.2;1.5.2 Transition Probability: Take Two;29
4.5.3;1.5.3 Transitions are Not Conditionalisation Processes;30
4.5.4;1.5.4 Biased and Unbiased Samples;30
4.6;1.6 Propensity as Probability;31
4.6.1;1.6.1 Long Run Versus Single Case Propensities;31
4.6.2;1.6.2 Humphrey's Paradox;34
4.6.3;1.6.3 Conditional Propensities;36
4.7;1.7 Propensity as Dispositional Property;38
4.7.1;1.7.1 Propensities Display Probabilities;38
4.7.2;1.7.2 Absolute Propensities;40
4.7.3;1.7.3 Humphreys' Paradox Revisited;42
4.8;1.8 Causal and Dispositional Presuppositions in Physics;43
4.9;References;44
5;Part I Probabilities;46
5.1;2 Probability and Time Symmetry in Classical Markov Processes;47
5.1.1;2.1 Introduction;47
5.1.2;2.2 A Few Essentials About Markov Processes;48
5.1.3;2.3 Definitions of Time Symmetry;52
5.1.4;2.4 Probability and Time Symmetry;56
5.1.4.1;2.4.1 Arguments for Asymmetry;56
5.1.4.2;2.4.2 Time-Directed Behaviour and Time-Symmetric Probabilities;58
5.1.4.3;2.4.3 Interpretation of Probability;61
5.1.5; Appendix;63
5.1.6;References;65
5.2;3 Probability Assignments and the Principle of Indifference. An Examination of Two Eliminative Strategies;66
5.2.1;3.1 Introduction;66
5.2.2;3.2 The Poincar -- Reichenbach Strategy;68
5.2.3;3.3 The Gillies Strategy;73
5.2.4;3.4 Conclusion;78
5.2.5;Appendix 1;79
5.2.6;Appendix 2;80
5.2.7;References;80
5.3;4 Why Typicality Does Not Explain the Approach to Equilibrium;82
5.3.1;4.1 Introduction;82
5.3.2;4.2 Classical Boltzmannian SM;83
5.3.3;4.3 Typicality and the Approach to Equilibrium;85
5.3.4;4.4 Further Qualms;92
5.3.5;4.5 Conclusion;96
5.3.6;References;97
6;Part II Causes;99
6.1;5 From Metaphysics to Physics and Back: the Example of Causation;100
6.1.1;5.1 Introduction;100
6.1.2;5.2 Prolegomena on Causation and Quantum Nonlocality;102
6.1.3;5.3 Nonlocality, Supeluminal Influence and Causation;106
6.1.4;5.4 Causation in Quantum Mechanics with State Reduction and in Its GRW Formulation;110
6.1.5;5.5 Causation and Spacetime Foliation in Bohmian Mechanics;113
6.1.6;5.6 Conclusions;114
6.1.7;References;115
6.2;6 On Explanation in Retro-causal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics;117
6.2.1;6.1 Retro-Causal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: Background and Motivations;117
6.2.2;6.2 Causal Loops in Retro-Causal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics;122
6.2.3;6.3 Causal Loops: The Basic Concepts;124
6.2.4;6.4 Arguments for the Impossibility of Backward Causation and Causal Loops;127
6.2.5;6.5 On Causal Loops in Bell-like Retro-Causal Models;129
6.2.5.1;6.5.1 Deterministic Models;129
6.2.5.2;6.5.2 Indeterministic Models;133
6.2.6;6.6 On Probabilities and Predictions in Indeterministic Causal Loops;137
6.2.7;6.7 Retro-Causal Theories and the Measurement Problem;140
6.2.7.1;6.7.1 The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics;141
6.2.7.2;6.7.2 Causally Symmetric Bohmian Model;144
6.2.8;6.8 Are Retro-Causal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics Explanatory Vacuous?;148
6.2.9;6.9 Conclusions;151
6.2.10;References;155
6.3;7 Causal Completeness in General Probability Theories;158
6.3.1;7.1 Informal Formulation of the Problem of Causal Completeness;158
6.3.2;7.2 General Probability Spaces Definitions and Notations;159
6.3.3;7.3 A General Notion of Reichenbachian Common Cause;161
6.3.4;7.4 Notions of Causal Completeness of General Probability Theories;165
6.3.5;7.5 Some Results on Causal Completeness;167
6.3.6;7.6 Closing Comments;169
6.3.7;References;171
6.4;8 Causal Markov, Robustness and the Quantum Correlations;173
6.4.1;8.1 Introduction;173
6.4.2;8.2 EPR and Quantum Correlations;175
6.4.3;8.3 Redheads Robustness;176
6.4.4;8.4 Healey on Robustness;178
6.4.5;8.5 The Causal Markov Condition;180
6.4.6;8.6 Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition;181
6.4.6.1;8.6.1 Total Causes and the Causal Markov Condition;181
6.4.6.2;8.6.2 Internal Robustness, Partial Causes and the Causal Markov Condition;182
6.4.6.3;8.6.3 Robustness Updated;182
6.4.7;8.7 EPR and the Causal Markov Condition;183
6.4.7.1;8.7.1 Causal Markov, Interventions and Modularity;184
6.4.7.2;8.7.2 Interventions in EPR;185
6.4.7.3;8.7.3 Causal Markov and Other Interpretations;187
6.4.8;8.8 Conclusions;191
6.4.9;References;192
7;Part III Propensities;194
7.1;9 Do Dispositions and Propensities Have a Role in the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics? Some Critical Remarks;195
7.1.1;9.1 Dispositions and the Interpretive Task of Quantum Mechanics;195
7.1.2;9.2 Is the Distinction between Dispositional and Non-Dispositional Properties Genuine ?;197
7.1.3;9.3 Dispositions and Categorical Properties in QM;201
7.1.3.1;9.3.1 Clifton and Pagonis on Dispositionality as Contextualism;203
7.1.3.2;9.3.2 Suárez on Dispositions;204
7.1.4;9.4 Adding Dispositions and Propensities to GRW;206
7.1.5;9.5 Dispositions in (some) Non-Collapse Models: Bohrs Interpretation;211
7.1.5.1;9.5.1 Su'rez's Selective Approach to the Measurement Problem;213
7.1.6;References;215
7.2;10 Is the Quantum World Composed of Propensitons?;218
7.2.1;10.1 Defects of Orthodox Quantum Theory;218
7.2.2;10.2 Fundamental Defect: Failure to Solve Wave/Particle Problem;220
7.2.3;10.3 Probabilism as the Key to the Solution to the Wave/Particle Problem;221
7.2.4;10.4 Two Kinds of Fundamentally Probabilistic Entity;222
7.2.5;10.5 Guiding Principle: Stay Close to OQT;224
7.2.6;10.6 Can the .-Function be Interpreted as Specifying the Actual Physical States of Propensitons?;225
7.2.7;10.7 Precise Quantum Theoretic Conditions for Probabilistic Transitions to Occur;228
7.2.8;10.8 PQT Recovers all the Empirical Success of OQT;231
7.2.9;10.9 Crucial Experiments;233
7.2.10;10.10 What PQT Achieves;234
7.2.11;10.11 The Problem of Developing a Relativistic Version of PQT;234
7.2.12;10.12 PQT Has Its Roots in Old Quantum Theory;236
7.2.13;10.13 Why Has PQT been Ignored?;238
7.2.14;10.14 Conclusions;239
7.2.15;References;239
7.3;11 Derivative Dispositions and Multiple Generative Levels;241
7.3.1;11.1 Introduction;241
7.3.2;11.2 Beyond Simple Dispositions;242
7.3.2.1;11.2.1 Changing Dispositions;242
7.3.2.2;11.2.2 Rearrangement Dispositions;242
7.3.2.3;11.2.3 Derivative Dispositions;243
7.3.3;11.3 Examples of Derivative Dispositions;243
7.3.3.1;11.3.1 Energy and Force;243
7.3.3.2;11.3.2 Sequences, or Levels?;244
7.3.3.3;11.3.3 Hamiltonians, Wave Functions and Measurements;245
7.3.3.4;11.3.4 Virtual and Actual Processes;246
7.3.3.5;11.3.5 Pregeometry and the Generation of Spacetime;246
7.3.3.6;11.3.6 Psychology;247
7.3.4;11.4 Analytical Scheme;248
7.3.4.1;11.4.1 Generative Sequences;248
7.3.4.2;11.4.2 Principal, Instrumental and Occasional Causes;248
7.3.4.3;11.4.3 Causal Sequences in Physics;249
7.3.4.4;11.4.4 Conditional Forward Causation;250
7.3.5;11.5 Reductionism and Dispositional Essentialism;251
7.3.6;References;252
8;Name Index;254
9;Subject Index;257