Tan / Lee Voting in a Time of Change

1. Auflage 2022
ISBN: 978-981-18-0711-4
Verlag: Ethos Books
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 406 Seiten

GE2020: an election that should not be forgotten for yielding startling outcomes, including the appointment of the first Leader of the Opposition.
Voting in a Time of Change is part of a longitudinal study by editors Kevin YL Tan and Terence Lee, who have been assembling trenchant analyses of each General Election by leading academics and commentators since GE2011. Their long game makes possible specific and unique insights. Of GE2020, this is what they have to say:
“The major political shift in Singapore that started in 2011 is marching on, even amidst a Covid-19 pandemic that was to have been a great disrupter. Whether we call this a ‘New Normal’ – as many did back in 2011 – or otherwise is not as important as the momentum for change that has built up since then. Covid-19 thus became a political backdrop to a social and political shift that was merely searching for a catalyst.”
What insights and lessons can we carry forward to the next General Elections? This is an indispensable milestone publication for citizens who wish to commit to even more informed choices, and for political observers who are keeping close tabs on the evolution of our political landscape.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tan, Kevin Yl

Lee, Terence

Leseproben

PAP’S PANDEMIC BACKFIRE : THE COVID-19 FACTOR IN SINGAPORE’S 2020 POLLS

Bridget Welsh

When Singapore held its 14th general election on 10 July, 2020, the People’s Action Party (PAP) returned to power by securing 83 of the 93 seats. While a convincing majority with 61.2% of the popular vote, the result was one of the worst performances for the party in its history. The popular vote dropped by 8.7% from 69.9% in 2015 and the share of seats dropped below 90% for the first time since 1968. The election was deemed a ‘pandemic election’, one in which, I argue, ultimately worked against the PAP rather than in a ‘flight to safety’ presumed in their favour.1

Covid-19 loomed large over the GE2020 polls. Not only was this the first pandemic election that had been called in Southeast Asia, Covid-19 shaped the timing of the polls, the campaign and, ultimately, the results. Below, I show that Covid-19 did not provide the ‘crisis’ boost in support that the PAP had expected. In fact, Covid-19 exposed many of the weaknesses of PAP governance, highlighted many of the challenges of the PAP’s Singapore developmental model and ultimately brought to the fore sharp differences within Singaporean society regarding how the PAP governs. In fact, Covid-19 acted as a catalyst to bring inequality, displacement and demands for empowerment centre stage and ironically, rather than strengthen the mandate of the PAP, calling for an election amidst the pandemic backfired against them. Undoubtedly, GE2020 has transformed the relationship between the PAP and Singaporean citizens, making the challenges ahead not just about managing the pandemic and the public’s expectations of the pandemic response but also the managers themselves.

To assess how Covid-19 affected the election, I rely on two different sources. The first is material published about Covid-19 in Singapore, including material on social media such as Twitter. The second source is drawn from focus group interviews conducted virtually in July after the election.2 Through snowball sampling of 30 voters, split evenly into three groups between those who (1) supported the PAP in the last two elections; (2) supported opposition parties in the last two elections; and (3) changed their vote to or from the PAP in GE2020. Voters were asked about the factors that contributed to their voting, with special attention to how Covid-19 influenced their political participation. While not a large nor a representative sample, these interviews provide insights into voting behaviour. What emerged from the interviews, developed below, is that Covid-19 did affect voting but by primarily reinforcing preexisting political outlooks and loyalties. For voters who moved away from the PAP, Covid-19 was a catalyst to bring some of these concerns about governance to the forefront. The GE2020 crisis polls thus offer insights into how political engagement in Singapore is changing, and not changing.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS: COVID-19 IN SINGAPORE

To understand how Covid-19 played a role in GE2020 one has to appreciate that, from the onset, Covid-19 was politicised in Singapore. The pandemic touched a chord, reminding Singaporeans and the PAP of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic and so provoking a strong proactive reaction on the PAP’s part right from the start. On the one hand, Covid-19 was a relived trauma involving an economic downturn and the vulnerability of the Singapore public to health-related threats. At the same time, the virus allowed the PAP to tap into its state capacity, harness fear and uncertainty and showcase its governance and resources to its advantage. Covid-19 provided, it seemed, an ideal context for ‘flight to safety’ public responses.

On 23 January, 2020, Singapore became one of the countries outside of China to report cases of Covid-19. In the initial wave of the virus, the majority of reported cases were tied to individuals living in Wuhan, China. Despite this, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong received international praise for his public communication to reassure and engage the public3 and, through March, Singapore became lauded as a global example of prudent and sound intervention in its public health response toward Covid-19. The PAP leadership acknowledged the global and holistic implications of the virus on society, the economy and global relations. Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishan was feted for his analytical remarks, tying Covid-19 to the economy, governance, public health care systems and social capital.4

Even as local clusters emerged and anxiety within Singapore rose, the PAP’s science-based and common-sense public health interventions gained international recognition. Balakrishnan’s widely circulated remarks to CNBC on 11 March set the bar high for Singapore, as he noted:

You know the Singapore government. We take things very very seriously. We prepare for the worst and we get all our measures lined up, coordinated and we communicate with our people and people understand what we are doing. ... In fact, this is an acid test of every single country’s quality of health care, standard of governance, and social capital. And if any one of these tripods is weak, it will be exposed and exposed quite unmercifully by this epidemic.5

It was around mid-March that concerns about the PAP’s management began to be openly raised within Singapore itself. The leak of the discussion involving fourth generation (4G) leader Chan Chun Sing concerning face masks served as an initial catalyst to question the PAP.6 This was the first major crack in the Government’s positive public response as some in the public began to ask about the allocation of supplies and whether face masks were needed. The ‘government knows best’ PAP brand took a dent. Unlike the handling of SARS, the Government was to face a more sceptical and demanding public 17 years later. Many of the Government’s decisions were questioned, such as not closing schools, forcing government ministers to explain their rationale.7 What was to become clear was that, as Covid-19 evolved, more Singaporeans would come to challenge the Government’s responses more openly than had been the practice in the past.

As March progressed, the case numbers began to rise, as shown in Chart 1.8 Singapore was initially careful to distinguish between local and foreign cases and, as the pandemic evolved, would further compartmentalise non-Singaporeans who became infected in Singapore from Singaporeans.9 The careful classification of Covid-19 cases served to minimise the reported numbers, reduce public anxiety and at the same time reduce potential criticism towards the Government for the rising numbers. At the same time, the Government tapped into its strong government capacity and robust healthcare infrastructure. The latter strengths gained the most attention of scholars examining Singapore’s initial Covid-19 response.10

In March, countries around the world began deepening their lockdowns, with neighbouring Malaysia introducing a mandatory lockdown in mid-March and European countries facing both high deaths and strict movement measures. Singapore’s Government worked to keep the economy open as long as possible. This would change in early April. The total tally of cases reached over 1,000 when Prime Minister Lee introduced the ‘circuit breaker’, requiring all Singaporeans to stay home. This was essentially a lockdown, but one labelled with a Singapore brand. Many citizens had been asking for weeks why the lockdown had not been introduced earlier; arguably, the PAP had resisted this measure as it would be seen as a sign of failure.11

On 5 April, after a spike of 120 cases, the Government sealed off two dormitories housing over 20,000 foreign workers. This was the straw that broke the lockdown wall. Singapore’s circuit breaker began on 7 April and would last eight weeks through 1 June. There was a gradual easing of restrictions, but essentially Singaporeans were required to stay home to help ‘flatten the curve’. The Government implemented the measure emphatically, relying on both voluntary and enforced compliance through administering warning notices and fines to assure the regulations were followed.12

Throughout this period, however, elections were in the background, as a flattening of the curve would provide the PAP an opportunity to hold polls. Preparations had been underway for general elections since 2019, with the crisis of Covid-19 providing another potential pivotal moment for the PAP to win a strong mandate. At the same time, Covid-19 militated against holding elections earlier, given its uncertainty and health risks. A flatter curve would give the PAP an electoral opportunity.

Beyond managing the health dimensions of Covid, the PAP responded to the socio-economic effects of the virus with the power of the purse, announcing a February election budget and subsequent stimulus and relief spending Covid-19 budgets. In GE2015, clientelist government spending was an essential tool used to shore up political support, following a long tradition of use of the budget and other financial incentives before polls.13 The Pioneer Package for seniors was seen to be especially effective in the previous election. In the 2019 budget, the PAP Government continued this trajectory with the Merdeka Generation Package geared for those born in the 1950s with modest offsets of medical expenses.14 The 2020 Covid budgets—actually four different budget allocations under the rubric of unity, solidarity, resilience and fortitude—broke a record in public spending from the national reserves. By the fourth pre-election announcement, the Fortitude Budget, a total of S$93...