Windsperger / Cliquet / Hendrikse Design and Management of Interfirm Networks

Franchise Networks, Cooperatives and Alliances
1. Auflage 2019
ISBN: 978-3-030-29245-4
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 384 Seiten

Reihe: Contributions to Management Science

Interfirm networks include franchising, retail and service chains, cooperatives, financial networks, joint ventures, strategic alliances, licensing, public-private partnerships and new network forms in the digital economy. This book gathers the latest research studies that approach these networks - and the creation of innovation under the conditions of a complex, dynamic, knowledge-intensive and digital economy - from an interdisciplinary perspective. 
The studies, all of which were written by respected experts, explore how firms can improve their competitiveness by securing access to innovation, knowledge, complementary resources and capabilities otherwise not available to them. In addition, they highlight how, driven by an unpredictable environment, firms embedded in inter-organizational networks are increasingly transforming from co-operators to collaborators and valuable co-creators of innovation.  



Gérard Cliquet is emeritus professor at the University of Rennes 1 (France) where he was a professor of marketing and retailing at the School of Business Administration (IGR-IAE). He has published 70 articles in peer-reviewed journals, and 20 books as an author or editor on several topics, including geomarketing, retailing, franchising, intercultural marketing, and retail branding.
George Hendrikse is full professor in Economics of Organizations at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University (Netherlands). His research and teaching focus is on the internal and industrial organization of enterprises, with a special interest in cooperatives. He has published 15 books, more than 125 scholarly articles, and supervised 14 PhD theses.
Marijana Sre?kovi? is senior scientist at the Department of Industrial Building and Interdisciplinary Planning, Vienna University of Technology (TU Wien,  Austria). She holds a PhD in Social and Economic Sciences from TU Wien, and her current research deals with innovation and networks, capabilities, and business models in the digital economy.
Josef Windsperger is professor of Organization and Management at the University of Vienna (Austria). His research and teaching focus is on the governance of interfirm networks and strategy of the international firm. His major publications are in economics and management of networks, such as franchising, joint ventures and clusters, and the theory of the firm.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Windsperger, Josef

Cliquet, Gérard

Hendrikse, George

Sreckovic, Marijana

Sre?kovi?, Marijana

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents;6
2;Contributors;8
3;Design and Management of Interfirm Networks: An Introduction;11
3.1;1 Franchise Networks;12
3.2;2 Cooperatives;14
3.3;3 Alliances;17
3.4;References;19
4;Part I Franchise Networks;20
4.1;Innovation Climate in Plural Form Franchise Networks: The Mediator Role of Mutual Learning;21
4.1.1;1 Introduction;21
4.1.2;2 Literature Review;23
4.1.2.1;2.1 Innovation Within the Plural Form Model;23
4.1.2.2;2.2 Plural Form Networks and the Innovation Process;24
4.1.3;3 Plural Form and Innovation Climate;26
4.1.3.1;3.1 Innovation Climate and PCO;27
4.1.3.2;3.2 Mutual Learning Within a Network: A Mediation Hypothesis;28
4.1.4;4 Methodology;29
4.1.4.1;4.1 Measurement Procedures;29
4.1.4.2;4.2 Innovation Climate;30
4.1.4.3;4.3 Mutual Learning;31
4.1.5;5 Results;31
4.1.6;6 Discussion;34
4.1.7;7 Conclusion;35
4.1.8;Appendix Initial Items of the Innovation Climate Scale (14 Items);36
4.1.9;References;37
4.2;They Are Jolly Good Fellows! A Framework for Antecedents and Consequences of Peer Trust in Franchise Networks;41
4.2.1;1 Introduction;42
4.2.2;2 Defining Peer Trust and Linking It to Coworker Trust;43
4.2.3;3 A Systematic Literature Review on Antecedents and Consequences of Coworker Trust: Methodology;44
4.2.3.1;3.1 Selection of Studies;44
4.2.3.2;3.2 Summary of Studies;45
4.2.4;4 An Integrative Framework on Antecedents and Consequences of Coworker Trust;46
4.2.4.1;4.1 The Concept of Coworker Trust;46
4.2.4.2;4.2 Antecedents of Coworker Trust;46
4.2.4.2.1;4.2.1 Type A Antecedents: Employee (i.e. Trustor) Characteristics;47
4.2.4.2.2;4.2.2 Type B Antecedents: Coworker (i.e. Trustee) Characteristics;48
4.2.4.2.3;4.2.3 Type C Antecedents: Leadership Characteristics;49
4.2.4.2.4;4.2.4 Type D Antecedents: Organizational Characteristics;50
4.2.4.3;4.3 Consequences of Coworker Trust;51
4.2.4.3.1;4.3.1 Type E Consequences: Perceptual/Attitudinal Outcomes;51
4.2.4.3.2;4.3.2 Type F Consequences: Behavioural Outcomes;52
4.2.4.3.3;4.3.3 Type G Consequences: Performance Outcomes;52
4.2.5;5 A Proposed Integrative Framework on Antecedents and Consequences of Peer Trust in Franchise Networks;53
4.2.5.1;5.1 Introduction to the Framework;53
4.2.5.2;5.2 Antecedents of Peer Trust;54
4.2.5.2.1;5.2.1 Type A Antecedents: Franchisee (Trustor) Characteristics;54
4.2.5.2.2;5.2.2 Type B Antecedents: Peer (i.e. Trustee) Characteristics;54
4.2.5.2.3;5.2.3 Type C Antecedents: Franchisor Characteristics;55
4.2.5.2.4;5.2.4 Type D Antecedents: Franchise Network Characteristics;56
4.2.5.3;5.3 Consequences of Franchisees' Peer Trust;57
4.2.5.3.1;5.3.1 Type E Consequences: Perceptual/Attitudinal Outcomes;57
4.2.5.3.2;5.3.2 Type F Consequences: Behavioural Outcomes;57
4.2.5.3.3;5.3.3 Type G Consequences: Performance Outcomes;58
4.2.6;6 Conclusion;59
4.2.7;Appendix 1 Summary of Research on the Antecedents and Consequences of Coworker Trust;60
4.2.8;Appendix 2 Integrative Framework on the Antecedents and Consequences of Coworker Trust;61
4.2.9;Appendix 3 Proposed Integrative Framework on the Antecedents and Consequences of Franchisees' Peer Trust;61
4.2.10;References;62
4.3;Business Model Innovation in Franchising: Rethinking the Franchising Taxonomy;65
4.3.1;1 Introduction;65
4.3.2;2 Rethinking the Franchise Model and Redefining the Franchising Taxonomy;67
4.3.2.1;2.1 Business Format Franchising;69
4.3.2.2;2.2 Brand Franchising;69
4.3.2.3;2.3 Quasi-franchising;70
4.3.2.4;2.4 Flexible Franchising;71
4.3.3;3 The Flexible Franchise Model;72
4.3.4;4 Flexible Franchising in Practice: Examples from Australia;76
4.3.4.1;4.1 Degani;76
4.3.4.2;4.2 Eview Property Group;78
4.3.5;5 Conclusion;79
4.3.6;References;81
4.3.6.1; Websites;82
4.4;Why Adopt Microfranchising? Evidence from Brazil on an Organizational Innovation Designed to Face New Challenges;83
4.4.1;1 Introduction;83
4.4.2;2 Analytical Background and Hypotheses;85
4.4.2.1;2.1 Microfranchising and Social Franchising Versus Business Format Franchising;85
4.4.2.2;2.2 Microfranchising and Social Entrepreneurship as Partially Overlapping Concepts;87
4.4.2.3;2.3 Hypothesis Development;87
4.4.3;3 Franchising and Microfranchising in Brazil;88
4.4.4;4 Data and Measurement;91
4.4.4.1;4.1 Data Collection and Sample;91
4.4.4.2;4.2 Variables of Interest;91
4.4.4.2.1;4.2.1 Dependent Variables;91
4.4.4.2.2;4.2.2 Summary Statistics (See Table 3);92
4.4.5;5 Estimations, Results, and Discussion;93
4.4.6;6 Conclusion;95
4.4.7;References;96
4.5;Strategic CSR and the Competitive Advantage of Franchise Firms;98
4.5.1;1 Introduction;98
4.5.2;2 Relevant Literature;100
4.5.2.1;2.1 Franchising and CSR;100
4.5.2.2;2.2 The Stakeholder Approach to CSR;101
4.5.3;3 Research Model and Hypotheses;102
4.5.3.1;3.1 Intangible CSR-Related Assets as Source of Competitive Advantage;103
4.5.3.2;3.2 Creation of Intangible Assets with CSR Strategy;104
4.5.4;4 Research Methodology;105
4.5.4.1;4.1 Data;105
4.5.4.2;4.2 Measurement;106
4.5.4.2.1;4.2.1 Dependent Variable;106
4.5.4.2.2;4.2.2 Independent Variables;107
4.5.4.2.3;4.2.3 Control Variables;107
4.5.4.3;4.3 Results;107
4.5.5;5 Discussion and Implications;110
4.5.6;6 Conclusion;112
4.5.7;Appendix Summary Measures on CSR Strategy and Brand Name Assets;112
4.5.8;References;114
4.6;Institutional Influences of Professional Associations and Franchise Organizations on Competitiveness of the Healthcare Clinics;119
4.6.1;1 Introduction;119
4.6.2;2 Franchising and Institutional Influences in the Healthcare Sector;120
4.6.2.1;2.1 The Franchise Model in the Healthcare Sector;120
4.6.2.2;2.2 Professional Associations;122
4.6.2.3;2.3 Core and Peripheral Elements of a Franchise;122
4.6.3;3 Theoretical Framework;124
4.6.3.1;3.1 Institutional Influences of Professional Associations;124
4.6.3.2;3.2 Institutional Influences of Franchise Organizations;125
4.6.4;4 Empirical Study;126
4.6.4.1;4.1 Survey of Healthcare Professionals;126
4.6.4.2;4.2 Professional Associations;127
4.6.4.3;4.3 Franchise Organizations;128
4.6.4.4;4.4 Measurement;128
4.6.4.4.1;4.4.1 Competitiveness of Healthcare Clinics;129
4.6.4.4.2;4.4.2 Institutional Influences of Professional Associations;130
4.6.4.4.3;4.4.3 Institutional Influences of Franchise Organizations;130
4.6.4.4.4;4.4.4 Control Variables;130
4.6.4.4.5;4.4.5 Factor Analysis and Construct Validation;131
4.6.4.5;4.5 Regression Analysis;131
4.6.5;5 Conclusions and Future Research;133
4.6.6;Appendix;135
4.6.7;References;135
4.7;Management of Franchising Networks: Seven Principles for Fair Franchise Advisory Councils;138
4.7.1;1 Introduction;138
4.7.2;2 A Fairness Perspective on FACs: A Framework for Fair FAC Management;140
4.7.2.1;2.1 Introduction to the Framework;140
4.7.2.2;2.2 The Consistency Principle;142
4.7.2.3;2.3 The Bias Suppression Principle;145
4.7.2.4;2.4 The Accuracy Principle;147
4.7.2.5;2.5 The Correctability Principle;149
4.7.2.6;2.6 The Representativeness Principle;150
4.7.2.7;2.7 The Ethicality Principle;152
4.7.2.8;2.8 The Interactional Principle;153
4.7.3;3 Conclusion, Discussion, and Directions for Future Research;155
4.7.4;Appendix: Extended Fair FAC Management Framework;156
4.7.5;References;158
4.8;Decision Model to Locate a Franchisee Applied to a Fast-Food Restaurant;160
4.8.1;1 Introduction;160
4.8.2;2 Literature Review;162
4.8.3;3 Methodology Proposal;163
4.8.3.1;3.1 Data Collection Phase;164
4.8.3.1.1;3.1.1 Selecting Streets or Avenues;164
4.8.3.1.2;3.1.2 Defining Influential Environmental Factors;165
4.8.3.1.3;3.1.3 Geographical Information System (GIS);165
4.8.3.2;3.2 Data Analysis and Processing Phase;165
4.8.3.2.1;3.2.1 Decision-Making Phase;166
4.8.4;4 Case Study;167
4.8.4.1;4.1 Data Collection Phase;168
4.8.4.1.1;4.1.1 Selecting Streets or Avenues;168
4.8.4.1.2;4.1.2 Defining Influential Environmental Factors;170
4.8.4.1.3;4.1.3 Geographical Information System (GIS);172
4.8.4.2;4.2 Data Analysis and Processing Phase;172
4.8.4.2.1;4.2.1 Decision-Making Phase;173
4.8.5;5 Conclusions;179
4.8.6;References;180
5;Part II Cooperatives;182
5.1;Horizon and Portfolio Investment Constraints in Agricultural Cooperatives;183
5.1.1;1 Introduction;183
5.1.2;2 Literature and Hypotheses;186
5.1.3;3 Methodology;189
5.1.3.1;3.1 Research Design and Data;189
5.1.3.2;3.2 Measures;191
5.1.4;4 Results;192
5.1.4.1;4.1 Correlations;192
5.1.4.2;4.2 Regression Results;194
5.1.5;5 Conclusions;195
5.1.6;References;197
5.2;Member Heterogeneity and Exit;200
5.2.1;1 Member Heterogeneity in Practice and Theory;200
5.2.2;2 Hypotheses;202
5.2.2.1;2.1 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Cooperatives;203
5.2.2.2;2.2 Identity;204
5.2.2.3;2.3 Fairness Perceptions;205
5.2.2.4;2.4 Rational Egoists, Conditional Cooperators, and Willing Punishers;207
5.2.2.5;2.5 Theoretical Framework;211
5.2.3;3 DMK and Arla;212
5.2.4;4 Conclusion and Discussion;214
5.2.5;References;216
5.3;Cooperatives in Modern Food Supply Chains: A Case Study of the Malt Barley Sector in Ethiopia;219
5.3.1;1 Introduction;219
5.3.2;2 Cooperatives in the Evolving Food Systems of Ethiopia;221
5.3.3;3 Literature Review;222
5.3.4;4 Methods;224
5.3.4.1;4.1 Study Context;224
5.3.4.2;4.2 Data Collection;225
5.3.4.3;4.3 Analytical Framework;227
5.3.5;5 Empirical Results;228
5.3.5.1;5.1 Services Provided by the Cooperatives;228
5.3.5.2;5.2 Integration of Cooperatives into Malt Barley Chains;229
5.3.5.3;5.3 Comparative Analysis;231
5.3.5.3.1;5.3.1 Characterization of Members and Non-members;231
5.3.5.3.2;5.3.2 Production, Quality, and Income;232
5.3.6;6 Regression Results;233
5.3.6.1;6.1 Determinants of Farmer Membership;233
5.3.6.2;6.2 Is Cooperative Performance Related to Member Characteristics?;234
5.3.7;7 Discussion;235
5.3.8;8 Conclusion;236
5.3.9;Appendix;237
5.3.10;References;238
5.4;Hybrids in the French Apple Industry: Opportunistic and Cognitive Differences Between a Cooperative and an Investor-Owned Group;240
5.4.1;1 Introduction;240
5.4.2;2 Theoretical Framework;243
5.4.2.1;2.1 Transaction Complexity and Governance;243
5.4.2.2;2.2 Governance of Knowledge;246
5.4.3;3 Methodology;249
5.4.4;4 Results and Analysis;251
5.4.4.1;4.1 Two Apple Groups as Two Hybrid Forms;251
5.4.4.1.1;4.1.1 Co-op Group A;251
5.4.4.1.2;4.1.2 Capitalistic Group B;253
5.4.4.2;4.2 Two Hybrid Forms with Different Knowledge Asymmetry and Cognitive Governance Processes;254
5.4.5;5 Conclusion;261
5.4.6;Appendix 1 Semi-Structured Interviews;263
5.4.6.1;Co-op Group A;263
5.4.6.2;Capitalistic Group B;264
5.4.7;References;265
6;Part III Alliances;268
6.1;Collocation for Supplier–Client Knowledge-Based Coordination: Niche Positioning, Task Complexity, and Comparative Costs;269
6.1.1;1 Introduction;269
6.1.2;2 Theory and Hypotheses;271
6.1.2.1;2.1 Client Niche Positioning;274
6.1.2.2;2.2 Client Task Complexity;275
6.1.2.3;2.3 Improved Communication Technology;276
6.1.3;3 Methods;277
6.1.3.1;3.1 Data and Sample;278
6.1.3.2;3.2 Statistical Analysis;281
6.1.4;4 Results;283
6.1.5;5 Conclusion;288
6.1.6;References;290
6.2;Dealing with the Post-Honeymoon Blues: Tensions and Governance in Industry-University Alliances;294
6.2.1;1 Introduction;294
6.2.2;2 Theoretical Framework;295
6.2.2.1;2.1 Formation of IU Alliances;296
6.2.2.2;2.2 Dissimilarities in IU Alliances;297
6.2.2.3;2.3 Governance of IU Alliances;298
6.2.3;3 Methodology;300
6.2.4;4 Findings;301
6.2.4.1;4.1 Wave Energy Alliance;301
6.2.4.1.1;4.1.1 Dissimilarities and Tensions;301
6.2.4.1.2;4.1.2 Tensions and Governance Decisions;303
6.2.4.2;4.2 Power Network Alliance;304
6.2.4.2.1;4.2.1 Dissimilarities and Tensions;305
6.2.4.2.2;4.2.2 Tensions and Governance Decisions;307
6.2.4.3;4.3 Summary of Findings;308
6.2.5;5 Discussion;310
6.2.5.1;5.1 Orientation-Based Dissimilarities;310
6.2.5.2;5.2 Routine-Based Dissimilarities;311
6.2.5.3;5.3 Administrative Dissimilarities;312
6.2.5.4;5.4 Personal Dissimilarities;312
6.2.6;6 Concluding Remarks;313
6.2.6.1;6.1 Tension and Governance in IU Alliance Formation;313
6.2.6.2;6.2 Limitations and Future Research;314
6.2.7;Appendix 1 Overview of Data Sources;315
6.2.8;Appendix 2 Overview of Coded Concepts;316
6.2.9;References;317
6.3;The Co-evolution of Clusters and the Role of Trans-local Linkages;319
6.3.1;1 Introduction;319
6.3.2;2 Theoretical Background;321
6.3.3;3 Methodology;323
6.3.3.1;3.1 Research Setting;323
6.3.3.2;3.2 Data Collection;325
6.3.4;4 Findings;326
6.3.4.1;4.1 The Evolution of the NASCAR Cluster: Building of Inter-cluster Relationships;326
6.3.4.2;4.2 Building Trans-local Linkages with UK Suppliers;326
6.3.4.3;4.3 The Persistence of Indigenous Relationships over Trans-local Ones;328
6.3.5;5 Discussion and Conclusion;328
6.3.6;References;330
6.4;The Effects of Cluster Cooperation as a Source of Company Value Creation;334
6.4.1;1 Introduction;334
6.4.2;2 Literature Review;335
6.4.3;3 Methodology;338
6.4.4;4 Results;339
6.4.5;5 Summary;341
6.4.6;Appendix;343
6.4.7;References;347
6.5;Entering a Foreign Market: Exports, FDI or Strategic Alliance?;349
6.5.1;1 Introduction;349
6.5.2;2 Export vs. FDI in Cournot Duopoly;351
6.5.3;3 Cournot Oligopoly and Alliance Formation;356
6.5.4;4 Price and Quantity Competition with Heterogeneous Products;362
6.5.5;5 Conclusion;366
6.5.6;References;368
6.6;Public-Private Partnerships in Latin America: Evidences from Healthcare Networks;369
6.6.1;1 Introduction;370
6.6.2;2 Theoretical Framework: PPP in the Healthcare Sector;371
6.6.3;3 PPP in Latin America: A Multiple Case Studies Analysis;374
6.6.3.1;3.1 Findings;375
6.6.4;4 Discussion;380
6.6.5;5 Conclusions;382
6.6.6;References;383