A Psychological Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism

1. Auflage 2022
ISBN: 978-1-032-42189-6
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)

Buch, Englisch, 180 Seiten, Format (B × H): 156 mm x 234 mm, Gewicht: 431 g

Reihe: Advances in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

A Psychological Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism is a thoroughly researched interdisciplinary exploration of the critical role metaethical beliefs play in the way morality functions.

Whether people are "moral objectivists" or not is something that deserves much more empirical attention than it has thus far received, not only because it bears upon philosophical claims but also because it is a critical piece of the puzzle of human morality. This book aims to facilitate incorporating the study of metaethical beliefs into existing research programs by providing a roadmap through the theoretical and empirical landscape as it currently exists and evaluating the methodological approaches used thus far. In doing so, it summarizes the key findings—both in terms of metaethical beliefs and their correlates, causes, and consequences—that have emerged, and explores the value of this area of study for anyone interested in the development, function, causes, and/or consequences of morality.

A Psychological Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism offers a helpful guide to social scientists interested in joining this thriving new area of research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates, postgraduates, and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics, and philosophy of the mind.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wright, Jennifer Cole

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Psychologie: Allgemeines

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Part I: Studying Metaethical Objectivism—Why, What, and How?1. Introduction 2. Setting the Stage Part II: Methodological Strategies and Challenges—A Review 3. Is it Moral? Measuring Domain Classification 4. Is it Truth-Apt? Measuring Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism 5. Is it Objectively True? Measuring Objectivism Vs. Subjectivism 6. Is it Universally True? Measuring Universalism vs. Relativism Part III: Are the Folk Moral Objectivists? What We Know and Why it Matters 7. Variability in Metaethical Beliefs—Metaethical Pluralism? 8. Correlates, Causes, and Consequences 9. Broader Implications

Über Autor(innen)

Jennifer Cole Wright is a professor of psychology at the College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, USA. Her area of research includes moral development and moral psychology more generally. Specifically, she studies virtue (with a current focus on humility), meta-ethics, moral conviction, and tolerance; the influence of individual and social "liberal vs. conservative" mindsets on moral judgments; and young children’s early moral development. In addition to writing Understanding Virtue: Theory and Measurement (with Michael Warren and Nancy Snow), she has edited an interdisciplinary volume on Humility (2019). Also she has co-edited, with Hagop Sarkissian, Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology (2014).