Arweiler / Möller Vom Selbst-Verständnis in Antike und Neuzeit / Notions of the Self in Antiquity and Beyond

1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-3-11-021401-7
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Deutsch, 442 Seiten, Gewicht: 10 g

Reihe: ISSN

Die interdisziplinäre Debatte über die Genese des autonomen Subjekts hat bisher unter weitgehender Ausblendung der Vormoderne stattgefunden. Auf diesen Mangel reagiert der vorliegende Band: In zum Teil eng miteinander vernetzten Beiträgen wird die Geschichtsschreibung der Subjekts- und Selbstvorstellungen an antiken wie nachantiken Texten präzisiert und in mancher Hinsicht revidiert. Zur Debatte stehen Konzepte von Selbst und Subjekt, von Individuum, Person- und Sprecheridentität in Rhetorik, Poetik, Philosophie und Theologie; dazu gehören im besonderen Erscheinungsformen des „lyrischen Ich“ und der Autorschaft. Die oft textnahen Interpretationen sind eingebettet in die breitgefächerte Diskussion methodologischer und theoretischer Probleme (z.B. Subjektivität und Textualität, Identität und Alterität, Individualität und Autobiographie als Themen antiker Texte oder Begriffe ihrer Beschreibung sowie ästhetische und poetologische Fragestellungen), unter Berücksichtigung ihrer jeweiligen historisch-politischen Dimensionen. Darüber hinaus rückt die Auseinandersetzung mit und Transformation von antiken Konzepten in der Moderne in den Blick.

Zielgruppe

Academics, Libraries, Institutes / Wissenschaftler, Institute, Bibliotheken

Autoren/Hrsg.

Arweiler, Alexander

Möller, Melanie

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Literaturwissenschaft Literaturwissenschaft
• Geisteswissenschaften Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Lateinische Literatur
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Antike Philosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Griechische & Byzantinische Literatur

Inhaltsverzeichnis

ist vorhanden (FB)

Leseproben

(S. 134-135)

The Brutus and the De officiis occupy the two ends of Cicero’s productive philosophical period from 46–43 BCE9, and by the time he reaches the latter work, he has become aware that he uses his philosophical writing as therapy10. He articulates that philosophy substitutes for politics in the De divinatione 2.711. This cuts both ways: Cicero presents the equivalent of public speeches in his writings, but, depending on whether we emphasize the success of the equivalence or the displacement it entails, we will come up with a view of philosophy as either a ful.lling public endeavor for Cicero or a pass-time for when he cannot engage in ›the real thing‹.

At the beginning of De of.ciis 3, however, the extended comparison he makes between his own use of leisure to that of Scipio Africanus reveals that, at least in his own self-presentation, he writes out of weakness. This is the rhetoric of inability. Scipio is offered as a contrast to Cicero: the former was able to engage in contemplation without leaving behind »monuments of his genius entrusted to letters« (nulla enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, Off . 3.4), because his dialogue with his mind meant that »he was never less at leisure than when at leisure, never less alone than when alone«, according to the maxim Cicero cites Cato as recording (numquam se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus esset, Off . 3.1).

Two things useful for the Brutus emerge from this passage. First, writing offers a kind of dialogue solitary contemplation cannot. It is directed outward, and though Cicero may be separated from his audience, whether contemporary or of posterity, writing still affords him away of connecting with others.He cannot keep his self whole without some sort of audience. The second is related and will occupy the rest of this paper, namely that Cicero de.nes himself not on his own, but in comparison to others.

The exemplum is an overdetermined device for constituting the self. Scipio offers a model that Cicero can only partially imitate, much as he would like to. Cicero says that he does not have Scipio’s strength of mind (nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, Off . 3.4). Furthermore, their external circumstances are different. Cicero’s otium has been imposed by the extinction of the senate and destruction of the law courts (extincto … senatu deletisque iudiciis, Off . 3.2), and is not, like Scipio’s, the result of choice.

In the Brutus, Cicero likewise de.nes himself in relation to exempla, but these are contemporary: Marcellus and Caesar. The time that has elapsed between the De of.ciis and the Brutus means that Caesar has been murdered in the interval. His death does not make him any easier to talk about, and reference to Caesar simmers under the surface of the De oficiis throughout – the difference is that both overt and covert references to Caesar in the De of.ciis provide a political critique12, but in the Brutus, the threat Caesar poses to Cicero is more personal and raw. Cicero’s assessment of Caesar’s style is a politically charged moment in the Brutus.

Über Autor(innen)

Alexander Arweiler, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster; Melanie Möller, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg.