Bartels / Bauman / Skitka Psychology of Learning and Motivation

Moral Judgment and Decision Making
1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-0-08-092277-5
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 384 Seiten

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology.  Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas.  Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives.  The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning.  Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts.  Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe.  Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference.  Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition.  Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence.  Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition.  They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory.  Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques.  Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion.  Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral.  They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bartels, Daniel

Bauman, Christopher

Skitka, Linda

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Moral Judgment and Decision Making;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Contents;6
5;Contributors;10
6;Preface;12
7;Chapter 1: Causal Models: The Representational Infrastructure for Moral Judgment;14
7.1;1. Introduction;15
7.2;2. Causal Models;17
7.3;3. Architectural Considerations;20
7.4;4. Roles for Causal Models;22
7.5;5. Moral Principles that Draw on Causal Structure;24
7.6;6. Conclusions;35
7.7;References;36
8;Chapter 2: Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge;40
8.1;1. The Moral Grammar Hypothesis;42
8.2;2. The Problem of Descriptive Adequacy;44
8.3;3. Intuitive Legal Appraisal;58
8.4;4. Deontic Rules;64
8.5;5. A Periodic Table of Moral Elements;84
8.6;6. Conversion Rules;94
8.7;7. Conclusion;105
8.8;Acknowledgments;106
8.9;References;106
9;Chapter 3: Law, Psychology, and Morality;114
9.1;1. Introduction;115
9.2;2. How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Cognitions?;120
9.3;3. How Does Law Shape Morally Laden Behaviors?;126
9.4;4. The Effect of Law on Moral Expression;132
9.5;5. Conclusion;137
9.6;Acknowledgments;137
9.7;References;137
10;Chapter 4: Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgments;146
10.1;1. Introduction;147
10.2;2. Protected Values;150
10.3;3. Relation of PVs to Other Types of Judgment;151
10.4;4. Omission Bias;152
10.5;5. Relation of Omission Bias to Other Biases;154
10.6;6. Study 1: Relation of PVs to Omission Bias;156
10.7;7. Study 2: Relation to Emotion;163
10.8;8. Study 3: The Nature of Omission Bias;169
10.9;9. Conclusion;176
10.10;Acknowledgments;178
10.11;References;178
11;Chapter 5: Attending to Moral Values;182
11.1;1. Introduction;183
11.2;2. Moral Values in the Laboratory;186
11.3;3. A Cognitive Perspective on Sacred Values;191
11.4;4. Attentional Influences and the Acceptability of Trade-Offs;195
11.5;5. General Discussion;201
11.6;References;203
12;Chapter 6: Noninstrumental Reasoning over Sacred Values: An Indonesian Case Study;206
12.1;1. Introduction;207
12.2;2. Testing the "Backfire Effect" in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict;211
12.3;3. Sequential Offers in Negotiations over Sacred Values;212
12.4;4. Retesting the Backfire Effect in a Study of Indonesian Madrassah Students;213
12.5;5. General Discussion;217
12.6;References;218
13;Chapter 7: Development and Dual Processes in Moral Reasoning: A Fuzzy-trace Theory Approach;220
13.1;1. Overview;221
13.2;2. An Introduction to Fuzzy-trace Theory;222
13.3;3. Building Blocks of Moral Reasoning;223
13.4;4. Explaining Reversals and Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning;229
13.5;5. Moral Values and Risky Decisions in Adolescence;240
13.6;6. Conclusions;242
13.7;References;245
14;Chapter 8: Moral Identity, Moral Functioning, and the Development of Moral Character;250
14.1;1. Introduction;251
14.2;2. Moral Self-Identity;252
14.3;3. Development of Moral Self-Identity;261
14.4;4. Schemas and Moral Information Processing;269
14.5;5. Moral Development as Ethical Expertise Development;271
14.6;6. New Directions: Neuroscience and Moral Personality;274
14.7;7. Conclusions;277
14.8;References;278
15;Chapter 9: "Fools Rush In": A JDM Perspective on the Role of Emotions in Decisions, Moral and Otherwise;288
15.1;1. Introduction;289
15.2;2. The Emergence of Emotion Research in JDM;293
15.3;3. Feelings and Emotions in Moral Decisions;302
15.4;4. Some Conclusions and Some Suggestions;311
15.5;Acknowledgments;314
15.6;References;314
16;Chapter 10: Motivated Moral Reasoning;320
16.1;1. Introduction;320
16.2;2. Motivated Reasoning;322
16.3;3. Motivated Moral Reasoning;325
16.4;4. Motivated Assessments of Moral Accountability;328
16.5;5. Motivated Use of Moral Principles;335
16.6;6. Motivated Moral Reasoning and Views of the Moral Thinker;345
16.7;References;347
17;Chapter 11: In the Mind of the Perceiver: Psychological Implications of Moral Conviction;352
17.1;1. Introduction;353
17.2;2. What Is Moral Conviction?;354
17.3;3. How Does Research on Moral Conviction and Moral Judgment Differ?;358
17.4;4. The Consequences of Moral Conviction on Choice and Action;366
17.5;5. Implications;371
17.6;References;372
18;Subject Index;376
19;Contents of recent volumes;382