Berg-Hildebrand / Suhm Bas van Fraassen

The Fortunes of Empiricism
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032622-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 9, 171 Seiten

Reihe: Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie

"Participation in the Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie 2005 was an honor and a genuine intellectual pleasure for me. The symposium, with all its contributions by the Münster faculty and students, was a wonderfully valuable experience. I can hardly do justice to its spirit of free discussion, or adequately express my thanks, by these short replies. But I think that they will testify clearly to the stimulation the symposium provided and to how much I learned from this exchange." Bas van Fraassen

Autoren/Hrsg.

Berg-Hildebrand, Andreas

Suhm, Christian

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften: Allgemeines Wissenschaften: Theorie, Epistemologie, Methodik

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Contents ;7
2.1;Preface ;9
3.1;List of Abbreviations of Bas C. van Fraassen’s Publications ;11
4.1;1  Science as Representation ;13
4.1.1;1.1  Weyl on isomorphism ;14
4.1.2;1.2 The history behind Weyl’s point ;15
4.1.2.1;Lobachevsky measures ;15
4.1.2.2;Helmholtz ;16
4.1.2.3;Mathematicians’ reaction ;17
4.1.2.4;Philosophers’ reaction: There must be ‘a fact of the matter’! ;18
4.1.3;2  Carnap: Der Logische Aufbau der Welt ;20
4.1.3.1;2.1  The crucial problem ;21
4.1.3.2;2.2  Return to the problem ;22
4.1.4;3  Putnam’s Paradox ;25
4.1.4.1;3.1  The argument ;25
4.1.4.1.1;Suppositions ;25
4.1.4.1.2;Argument ;26
4.1.4.2;3.2  An example, an objection, and a realist ‘way out’ (?) ;27
4.1.5;4  Doing without Metaphysics ;28
4.1.5.1;4.1  Asserting a relation between phenomena and model ;29
4.1.5.2;4.2  Cutting through isomorphism: the Essential Indexical ;30
4.1.5.3;4.3  Return to our epistemological question ;31
4.1.6;Appendix: re Putnam ;32
4.1.7;References ;34
5.1;Introduction ;35
5.2;1  Constructive Empiricism and the Observable/Unobservable Distinction ;36
5.3;2  Observability and the Epistemic Community ;37
5.4;3  Observability and Objectivity ;40
5.5;Conclusion ;42
5.6;References ;43
6.1;1 ;45
6.2;2 ;47
6.3;3 ;52
6.4;4 ;54
6.5;References ;56
7.1;Introduction ;57
7.2;1  Setting the stage ;59
7.2.1;(A)  Epistemic modesty and Philosophy of Science ;59
7.2.2;(B)  Constructive Empiricism and Adequacy to Science ;60
7.2.3;(C)  Balancing the Elements ;61
7.2.4;2  Undermining the Compromise ;62
7.2.5;Conclusion ;67
7.2.6;References ;67
8.1;Introduction ;69
8.2;1  The Concept of Observation ;70
8.3;2  Observability realistically construed ;74
8.4;3  Running into a dilemma ;76
9.1;Introduction ;81
9.2;1  Truth as Correspondence to the Real World ;82
9.3;2  Truth as indexical ;85
9.4;3  Remnants of Realism – Observables in the Mind-Independent World ;88
9.5;References ;91
10.1;Introduction ;93
10.2;1  Scientific Language ;94
10.3;2  Experience and Metaphysics ;97
10.4;3  Inference to the best explanation ;99
10.5;Conclusion ;100
10.6;References ;101
11.1;1  Laws, Necessity, and a Dilemma ;103
11.2;2  Van Fraassen’s skepticism about laws ;105
11.3;3  About becoming a metaphysician when you do not want to ;108
11.4;References ;112
12.1;Introduction ;113
12.2;1  Van Fraassen’s conception of a stance ;114
12.2.1;The problem: Empiricism’s self-defeating argument against metaphysics ;114
12.2.2;The solution: Empiricism as a stance ;115
12.2.3;2  Two accounts of possible discourse besides truth- and falsehood ;116
12.2.3.1;Consistency and a common ground ;117
12.2.3.2;Normative dimensions besides Truth- and Falsehood ;118
12.2.4;3  The truth-dependence of philosophical stances ;119
12.2.4.1;Stances as policies ;119
12.2.4.2;Attitudes ;120
12.2.4.3;Values ;121
12.2.5;4  Two final objections ;122
12.2.5.1;One belief or many? ;122
12.2.5.2;Teller or van Fraassen? ;123
12.2.6;Conclusion ;124
12.2.7;References ;124
13.1;Preamble: on Literate Experience and Realism ;125
13.2;1 Observability and the Epistemic Community ;128
13.2.1;1.1 Factual claims ;129
13.2.2;1.2 The factual claim of observability ;130
13.2.3;1.3 Our epistemic community ;131
13.2.4;2 To be Prussian or not to be Prussian – van Fraassen and the Inference to the Best Explanation ;132
13.2.4.1;2.1 Initial arguments using IBE in support of scientific realism ;133
13.2.4.2;2.2 The ‘best of a bad lot’ argument ;134
13.2.4.3;2.3 The ‘argument from indifference’ ;135
13.2.4.4;2.4 Do we now have succor to offer the scientific realist? ;137
13.2.4.5;2.5 The ‘no miracle argument’ – how the realist begs the question ;138
13.2.5;3 The Hardships of an Empiricist – van Fraassen’s Compromise Between Epistemic Modesty and Adequacy to Science ;141
13.2.5.1;3.1 Empiricists’ stake in the portrayal of science ;142
13.2.5.2;3.2 The scientists’ pursuit of truth ;142
13.2.5.3;3.3 A footnote to epistemic false modesty ;144
13.2.5.4;3.4 The other challenge ;144
13.2.6;4 Experience Becoming Fully Literate: van Fraassen On The Verge Of Constructivism ;146
13.2.6.1;4.1 The two faces of experience ;146
13.2.6.2;4.2 Metaphysical realism contested ;147
13.2.6.3;4.2.1 Reification of structure ;148
13.2.6.4;4.2.2 The one true story of the world ;149
13.2.6.5;4.3 Observability is a matter of fact ;151
13.2.7;5 Indexical Truth and Anti-Metaphysical Inclinations – Getting Rid of the Remnants of Realism ;152
13.2.7.1;5.1 Truth as I used to think of it ;153
13.2.7.2;5.2 What I think about truth now ;156
13.2.7.3;5.3 Making sense of The Scientific Image in retrospect ;158
13.2.8;6 There’s Life In The Old Dog Yet! – van Fraassen And The Death Of Metaphysics ;159
13.2.8.1;6.1 The untold riches of metaphysics ;160
13.2.8.2;6.2 Does today’s metaphysics have a different rationale? ;161
13.2.8.3;6.3 Explicanda and simulacra ;162
13.2.8.4;6.4 The metaphysical instinct ;163
13.2.9;7 Laws and Metaphysics – Two Burdens Easily Discarded? ;164
13.2.9.1;7.1 The dilemma and its origin ;164
13.2.9.2;7.2 Two ways to understand the idea of laws of nature ;165
13.2.10;8 Empiricism Without Metaphysics? – On van Fraassen’s Conception Of A Stance ;167
13.2.11;References ;171
14;CONTENTS;7
15;Blank Page;2
16;Blank Page;4