Bramble The Passing of Temporal Well-Being

Erscheinungsjahr 2018
ISBN: 978-1-351-81842-1
Verlag: Taylor & Francis
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 72 Seiten

Reihe: Routledge Focus on Philosophy

The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers of well-being to distinguish between two kinds of well-being:

- lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole

- temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time (momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life (periodic well-being).

A major question in recent years has been how these two kinds of well-being relate to each other. Most philosophers hold that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being however this book argues that this is a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being because there is no such thing as temporal well-being (at least not as most philosophers understand it).

Autoren/Hrsg.

Bramble, Ben

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophie: Allgemeines, Methoden

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction. Chapter 1: Why only lifetime well-being is intrinsically normatively significant. Chapter 2: Why all well-being must be intrinsically normatively significant. Chapter 3: The best current theories of temporal well-being, and why they fail. Chapter 4: Explaining the relevant talk. Chapter 5: Implications for Value Theory and Public Policy.

Über Autor(innen)

Ben Bramble is Assistant Professor in Philosophy at University College Dublin, Ireland.