Clausen How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective?

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032412-9
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 6, 267 Seiten

Reihe: Logos

In this book, Andrea Clausen intends to reconcile Kripke's point according to which conceptual content has to be considered as being constituted by social, normative practice - by a process of mutual assessments - with the view that the content of empirical assertions has to be conceived as objective. She criticizes approaches that explicate content-constitutive practice in non-normative terms, namely in terms of sanctioning behavior (Haugeland, Pettit, Esfeld). She also rejects a pragmatist reading of Heidegger that proceeds from thoroughly normative but pre-conceptual practice. She develops and defends a particular reading of an approach that conceives normative, conceptually articulated practice - giving and asking for reasons - as primitive (Brandom, McDowell).

Autoren/Hrsg.

Clausen, Andrea

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Sprachwissenschaft Sprachwissenschaften Sprachphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Logik, Argumentationstheorie
• Mathematik | Informatik EDV | Informatik Informatik Logik, formale Sprachen, Automaten

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Introduction;10
2.1;Part IThe problem;34
2.2;The objectivity of content;34
3.1;The normative and social character of content;46
3.1.1;Kripke: A social, normative account of content;46
3.1.1.1;Why is semantics normative and social?;47
3.1.1.1.1;The rule-following problem and content;47
3.1.1.1.2;Rules as being constituted by normative practice;53
3.1.1.1.3;Rules as being constituted by social practice;61
3.1.1.2;Objections to Kripke’s specification of his pragm;63
3.1.1.3;Semantic naturalism;75
3.1.2;The notion of content;82
3.1.2.1;The Frege-Brandom proposal;82
3.1.2.2;Objections to inferential role semantics;101
3.1.2.3;A refined conception of content;111
3.1.3;The normative character of content in greater det;114
4.1;Part IICritical discussion of proposed answers;120
4.2;A naturalistic answer;120
4.2.1;Presentation and a first critical assessment;121
4.2.2;The rejection of the two-step model of content;132
4.2.3;Sellars’s antifoundationalism and its implication;135
4.3;A pragmatist reading of Heidegger – a middle posi;150
4.3.1;Protagonists of a pragmatist reading of Heidegger;150
4.3.2;Textual evidence for a pragmatist reading of Heidegger;154
4.3.3;What is wrong with Heidegger?;162
4.4;A primitivist answer;168
4.4.1;Presentation and a first critical assessment;168
4.4.1.1;The scorekeeping model;168
4.4.1.2;The Hegel model;199
4.4.2;How does a pragmatist reading of Brandom account for objectivity?;209
4.4.3;Circularity;226
4.4.4;Conceptual realism;231
4.4.4.1;Avoiding a gap between the world and our conceptualisations;232
4.4.4.2;Arguments against conceptual realism that have been formulated in the literature;252
4.4.4.3;Conceptual realism and the method of making explicit;256
4.5;Bibliography;258
5.1;Preface;5
5.1.1;;8
5.1.1.1;;8
5.1.1.1.1;;8
5.1.1.1.1.1;;8
5.1.1.1.1.1.1;Part IThe problem;8
5.1.1.1.1.1.1.1;1The objectivity of content31;8
5.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1;Part IICritical discussion of proposed answers;8
5.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1;5A primitivist answer165;8
5.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.2;Bibliography255;9