Colman / Argyle Game Theory and Experimental Games

The Study of Strategic Interaction
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4831-5467-1
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 314 Seiten, Web PDF

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction is a critical survey of the essential ideas of game theory and the findings of empirical research on strategic interaction. Some experiments using lifelike simulations of familiar kinds of strategic interactions are presented, and applications of game theory to the study of voting, the theory of evolution, and moral philosophy are discussed. Comprised of 13 chapters, this volume begins with an informal definition of game theory and an outline of the types of social situations to which it applies. Games of skill, games of chance, and games of strategy are considered. Games of strategy are further subdivided into coordination, zero-sum, and mixed-motive varieties. Subsequent chapters deal with one-person games in which a solitary decision maker is pitted against Nature; the competitive nature of two-person, zero-sum games; the relationship between game theory and experimental games; and the mixed-motive character of variable-sum games that generate intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts. Experiments with prisoner's dilemma as well as coalition, auction, and social dilemma games are also considered. Finally, some applications of game theory are described. This book is designed for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and relevant practitioners in social psychology, sociology, economics, and politics, and in some cases for a rather broader public.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Colman, Andrew M.

Argyle, Michael

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Game Theory
and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of
Contents;10
5;Introduction to the Series;6
6;Preface;8
7;PART I:
BACKGROUND;14
7.1;Chapter 1. Introduction;16
7.1.1;1.1 Intuitive Background;16
7.1.2;1.2 Abstract Models: Basic Terminology;18
7.1.3;1.3 Skill, Chance, and Strategy;22
7.1.4;1.4 Historical Background;24
7.1.5;1.5 Summary;26
7.2;Chapter 2. One-Person Games;27
7.2.1;2.1 Games Against Nature;27
7.2.2;2.2 Certainty;27
7.2.3;2.3 Risk;29
7.2.4;2.4 Utility Theory;31
7.2.5;2.5 Uncertainty;35
7.2.6;2.6 Summary;43
7.3;Chapter 3.
Pure Coordination Games and the Minimal Social Situation;44
7.3.1;3.1 Strategic Collaboration;44
7.3.2;3.2 Pure Coordination Games;44
7.3.3;3.3 The Minimal Social Situation;50
7.3.4;3.4 Summary;57
8;PART II:
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE;58
8.1;Chapter 4.
Two-Person, Zero-Sum Games;60
8.1.1;4.1 Strictly Competitive Games;60
8.1.2;4.2 Extensive and Normal Forms;61
8.1.3;4.3 Games With Saddle-Points;64
8.1.4;4.4 Games Without Saddle-Points;67
8.1.5;4.5 Dominance and Admissibility;74
8.1.6;4.6 Methods for Finding Solutions;76
8.1.7;4.7 Ordinal Payoffs and Incomplete Information;81
8.1.8;4.8 Summary;86
8.2;Chapter 5.
Experiments With Strictly Competitive Games;87
8.2.1;5.1 Ideas Behind Experimental Games;87
8.2.2;5.2 Review of Research on Non-Saddle-Point Games;89
8.2.3;5.3 Review of Research on Saddle-Point Games;93
8.2.4;5.4 Critique of Experimental Gaming;95
8.2.5;5.5 Experiment I: Abstract and Lifelike Strictly
Competitive Games;98
8.2.6;5.6 Summary;105
8.3;Chapter 6.
Two-Person, Mixed-Motive Games: Informal Game Theory;106
8.3.1;6.1
Mixed-Motive Games;106
8.3.2;6.2
Classification of 2 x 2 Mixed-Motive Games;107
8.3.3;6.3
Leader;108
8.3.4;6.4
Battle of the Sexes;110
8.3.5;6.5
Chicken;111
8.3.6;6.6
Prisoner's Dilemma;114
8.3.7;6.7
Comparison of the Archetypal 2 x 2 Games;118
8.3.8;6.8
Metagame Theory;120
8.3.9;6.9
Summary;125
8.4;Chapter 7.
Experiments With Prisoner's Dilemma and Related Games;126
8.4.1;7.1
The Experimental Gaming Literature;126
8.4.2;7.2
Strategic Structure;127
8.4.3;7.3
Payoffs and Incentives;131
8.4.4;7.4
Circumstances of Play;132
8.4.5;7.5
Responses to Programmed Strategies;136
8.4.6;7.6
Sex Differences;137
8.4.7;7.7 Attribution Effects;139
8.4.8;7.8
Investigations of Ecological Validity;141
8.4.9;7.9
Experiment II: Abstract and Lifelike Prisoner's Dilemma Games;144
8.4.10;7.10
Experiment III: Abstract and Lifelike Chicken Games;149
8.4.11;7.11
Summary;153
8.5;Chapter 8.
Multi-Person Games: Social Dilemmas;155
8.5.1;8.1 Multi-Person Game Theory;155
8.5.2;8.2
Non-Cooperative Games: Equilibrium Points;157
8.5.3;8.3
Cooperative Games: Characteristic Functions;158
8.5.4;8.4
Harold Pinter's "The Caretaker";162
8.5.5;8.5
The Shapley Value;164
8.5.6;8.6
The Dollar Auction Game and the Concorde Fallacy;166
8.5.7;8.7
Multi-Person Prisoner's Dilemma;169
8.5.8;8.8 General Theory of Compound Games;176
8.5.9;8.9
Summary;179
8.6;Chapter 9.
Experiments with Coalition, Auction, & Social Dilemma Games;181
8.6.1;9.1 Multi-Person Experimental Games;181
8.6.2;9.2 Coalition Formation;182
8.6.3;9.3 Auction Games and Psychological Traps;186
8.6.4;9.4 N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma;191
8.6.5;9.5 Experiment IV: Abstract and Lifelike N-Person
Prisoner's Dilemmas;197
8.6.6;9.6 Summary;203
9;PART III:
APPLICATIONS;206
9.1;Chapter 10.
Sincere Voting and Collective Choice Theory;208
9.1.1;10.1 Background;208
9.1.2;10.2 Alternatives, Voters, Preferences;209
9.1.3;10.3 Axioms Concerning Individual Preferences;210
9.1.4;10.4 Voting Procedures;211
9.1.5;10.5 Condorcet's Paradox;214
9.1.6;10.6 Probabilities of Cyclic Majorities;217
9.1.7;10.7 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem;220
9.1.8;10.8 The Borda Effect;223
9.1.9;10.9 Summary;286
9.2;Chapter 11.
Strategic Voting;227
9.2.1;11.1 Optimal Voting Strategies;227
9.2.2;11.2 Historical Background;228
9.2.3;11.3 Insincere Voting and Equilibrium Points;228
9.2.4;11.4 The Classical Solution: Dominance and Admissibility;232
9.2.5;11.5 Sophisticated Voting;235
9.2.6;11.6 Anticipated Decisions and Multistage Solutions;237
9.2.7;11.7 General Results on Strategic Voting;241
9.2.8;11.8 Is Strategic Voting Unfair?;244
9.2.9;11.9 Empirical Evidence;246
9.2.10;11.10 Summary;247
9.3;Chapter 12.
Theory of Evolution: Strategic Aspects;248
9.3.1;12.1 Historical Background;248
9.3.2;12.2 Strategic Evolution;248
9.3.3;12.3 Animal Conflicts and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies;251
9.3.4;12.4 An Improved Multi-Person Game Model;256
9.3.5;12.5 Empirical Evidence;263
9.3.6;12.6 Summary;266
9.4;Chapter 13.
Moral Philosophy and Practical Problems of Strategy;267
9.4.1;13.1 Game Theory and the Conduct of Life;267
9.4.2;13.2 Rationality and Self-Interest;270
9.4.3;13.3 Kant's Categorical Imperative;275
9.4.4;13.4 Rousseau's Social Contract;277
9.4.5;13.5 Evolution and Stability of Moral Principles;279
9.4.6;13.6 Summary;281
10;Appendix A: A Simple Proof of the Minimax Theorem;284
10.1;A.1 Introductory Remarks;286
10.2;A.2 Preliminary Formalization;286
10.3;A.3 The Minimax Theorem;287
10.4;A.4 Proof;288
11;References;294
12;Index;308