A Manual of Political Philosophy
E-Book, Englisch, 290 Seiten
ISBN: 978-3-86838-593-9
Verlag: editiones scholasticae
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
Weitere Infos & Material
Chapter 1
Societies and the perfect society
The English word ‘politics’ comes from the Greek word p???? (polis), which means ‘city’. In ancient Greece, the polis or city-state emerged in the middle of the 6th century before our era as the principal community, a position which it retained until Philip of Macedon’s victory at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. Since ‘politics’ refers in common speech to the activities of politicians, the phrase ‘political philosophy’ is often used to refer more precisely to the study of the polis and its successors.1 Political philosophy is therefore a branch of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy in general is the study of man’s life, and of the good which strictly befits, or is proportioned to, man’s nature: its goal is to show us how to attain this good on earth. Political philosophy, or politics, is the study of man’s life insofar as he is united with his fellow men in a way that extends beyond the family. Since, as we shall see, the good that men may obtain by this union is greater than the good which they may obtain by their union in domestic society, which in turn is greater than the good which they may obtain as individual human beings, politics is the study of the highest good, proportionate to human nature, which may be obtained on earth. It is therefore the highest branch of moral philosophy. Under the survey of political philosophy come: the nature of societies in general, and of the perfect or complete society in particular; the idea of the common good and of authority in general; the relation of the domestic society to external authority; the origin and scope of temporal authority; the nature and purpose of law; the goal or end of the temporal commonwealth; its economic organisation; the relations which different temporal commonwealths have with each other; and the relation of the temporal power to the ultimate end of human life. Politics, like all moral philosophy, must be instructed by divine revelation. This is because, in contrast to speculative reason, the first principle in moral or practical philosophy is the final end: before deciding what to do, we must first know what to aim at. Revelation is necessary not simply because God has freely chosen to call man to a supernatural end; it would have been necessary in every order of providence.2 Even if the end that God had assigned to man were merely proportionate to our nature, it would be impossible for us to know this fact by reason alone, and to exclude the possibility that we had been assigned a preternatural or supernatural end.3 Thus, even in a hypothetical state of pure nature, man would require divine revelation.4 Hence, to engage correctly in practical reasoning, man must learn by divine revelation where he is going and the way thereto.5 “No one can arrive at any wisdom except by faith.”6 The gospel teaches that our ultimate end is beatitude. This is available in heaven, and not on earth.7 But only our life on earth can bring us to that end. A component, and in fact the most important component, of a good earthly life is therefore its being rightly directed to the life beyond. Therefore, since politics seeks to know the truth about the good earthly life, it must understand how man is directed toward beatitude, namely, by the teaching and the sacraments of the Catholic Church.8 Nature of society
Since politics studies human beings in society, the first question to consider is: ‘What is a society?’ At this stage we are not using the word as a synonym for what is normally called civil society, but in a more general sense. In this broader sense, the family is a society; so is a university, and a golf-club, and a trade union, and a multi-national corporation; so, on a higher plane, is the Catholic Church, and the religious institutes and other fraternities which she includes. Yet not every grouping of human beings ranks as a society. Within a city or country, there may exist, for example, a certain number of brown-eyed or lefthanded people, but they will not normally compose a society. The activity of none of these people need be affected by the fact that other people exist who share this physical characteristic. Nor need any reckon it as part of his good that others exist who share this characteristic. A society exists when several beings so act that each makes it part of his aim that both he and those with whom he is grouped achieve something good by their activity. Since only intelligent beings can consciously intend an end as such, as opposed to acting for some particular end by simple instinct, only intelligent beings can strictly compose a society. We may therefore define a society as ‘a union of intelligent beings acting for an end’, or ‘the conscious coordinated activity of persons for a common end’.9 Division of societies
While we may compare societies in many ways, the most important distinctions to draw pertain (i) to the end for which a society exists, and (ii) to the bond of union between its members.10 (i) Every created society exists for the sake of its end, and so the end is above all that by which the nature of a society is understood.11 The end of a given society may be identical with man’s ultimate end, beatitude, or it may be some lesser or partial end, such as happiness in this world, or the advance of learning, or the raising of children, or the pursuit of some trade or craft. This distinction gives rise to the distinction between perfect and imperfect societies, which, because of its importance, we shall consider separately below. Again, still distinguishing societies by their ends, a society may be supernatural, when its specific goal exists by reason of God’s elevation of mankind to a supernatural end; for example, a religious order which exists to communicate saving truth. Or it may be natural, when its specific goal does not depend on this elevation of mankind to the supernatural level; for example, a guild of teachers or physicians. Again, the end of the society, and therefore the society itself, may be something necessary, whether in virtue of natural law, or of positive divine law, or even in virtue of some merely human law; or on the other hand, it may be an end which a man freely proposes to himself without being under any obligation. Thus the family, and the wider civil or political society are necessary by natural law; the Catholic Church is necessary by positive divine law; in time of war, the army may be necessary by human law for certain classes of people. On the other hand, a business or trade union or university or religious order, or a simple commercial contract entered into by a buyer and seller, are voluntary societies.12 Finally, we may also distinguish societies by reason of the relative dignity of their goals. In this respect, societies may be called equal or equivalent, when they have an end of the same worth, for example the United States of America and Malta, or two football teams; and unequal or non-equivalent, if one society has a specific goal which is worthier than another, for example Malta and the University of Oxford. If two equivalent societies are parts of some society that encompasses them both, like the States of the United States of America, or like two sovereign nations allied in a war, then they may be called co-ordinate societies. In the case of two non-equivalent societies, if one of them is part of another, like the University of Oxford and the United Kingdom, or if one exists for the sake of the other, like the civil service and the executive, then they are respectively subordinate and subordinating societies. (ii) In virtue of the bond of union that unites its members, a society may be either juridical or non-juridical.13 A society is juridical when membership of it implies rights and duties which must be recognised by law and which can therefore be upheld and enforced by those who enjoy authority either within it or within a wider society of which it is a part. Thus the United Kingdom is a juridical society; but so is a business, where one person contracts to work for another in return for pay. A group of friends who meet to discuss philosophy or to play darts is a non-juridical society. It is clear that every non-juridical society is also a voluntary society; however, not every juridical society is a necessary one. Reason for society
Aristotle begins his Politics by noting that every society exists for the sake of some good. Why else would men associate if not to obtain something that will benefit them? Universal human experience manifests the desire for such association, and man’s possession of speech suggests his aptitude for it, surpassing the aptitude of any other material creature for association with its fellows.14 Hence, association among human beings is natural not only in the sense that each of us depends in fact for his existence, nurture and education on some prior association, but also in that it answers a desire of nature. What is the deepest reason of this desire for association? All finite entities act toward ends established by their natures. By the very nature of a finite created entity, there is a real distinction within it between its existence (that it is) and its essence (what it is). It is this essence that limits and defines its being.15 The absence of this distinction in God is the reason for His infinite and unlimited perfection.16 As a consequence of the real distinction in creatures between essence and existence, the same essence can be...
