Dann / Rynkowski The Unity of the European Constitution

1. Auflage 2010
ISBN: 978-3-540-37721-4
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 396 Seiten

This book collects the contributions to a conference of a group of young Polish and German public law scholars on the Constitutional Law of the European Union. The articles present a multi-faceted examination of unity and its realization in the primary and constitutional law of the EU, an analysis of EU constitutional structure in the face of diversity, and the independence of EU law from international common law, among other topics.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Dann, Philipp

Rynkowski, Michal

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Preface;6
2;Table of Contents;8
3;European Ungleichzeitigkeit: Introductory Remarks on a Binational Discussion about Unity in the European Union
;11
4;The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution
;21
4.1;A. Introduction: Uneasiness over the Constitutional Treaty;21
4.2;B. The Constitutional Treaty as a Motor for Legal and Political Unity
;23
4.2.1;I. Stabilization of the Unity: Institutional Framework and Membership
;24
4.2.2;II. Promoting New Unity: the Founding of the New European Union
;25
4.2.2.1;1. A Codified Constitutional Text: One Union, One Treaty;25
4.2.2.2;2. A Single Organization: One Union, One Personality;26
4.2.2.3;3. A Unified Legal Regime: One Union, One Method;27
4.3;C. The Incomplete Promotion of Unity
;27
4.3.1;I. Formal Incoherence;28
4.3.2;II. Prolongation of the Pillar Structure;29
4.3.3;III. Supranational Specialized Regimes;31
4.4;D. Policy-Specific Differentiation as a Leitmotif of Union Constitutional Law
;32
4.4.1;I. A Broader Concept of Differentiation;32
4.4.2;II. Sectoral Constitutional Compromises;33
4.5;E. The "Community Method" as the Constitutional Standard Case
;35
4.5.1;I. Towards a New Institutional Balance;35
4.5.2;II. The Invention of "the Community Method";37
4.5.3;III. The Community Method as the Standard Case in the Constitutional Treaty
;39
4.6;F. The Constitutional Treaty as a Reflexive Constitution;40
4.6.1;I. Conceptualizing the Relationship of the Parts of the Constitution;40
4.6.2;II. On the Operating Mode of a Reflexive Constitution;41
4.6.2.1;1. The "Not Here" Rationale;41
4.6.2.2;2. The "Not Yet" Rationale;42
4.6.3;III. The Constitutional Treaty between Manifesto and Constitutional Statute
;43
4.7;G. What if the Constitutional Treaty Fails?;43
5;Thoughts on a Methodology of European Constitutional Law
;45
5.1;A. Introduction;45
5.2;B. Preliminary Questions on a Methodology for European Constitutional Law
;47
5.2.1;I. A SpecializedMethodology for European Constitutional Law Why so?
;47
5.2.2;II . On the Nature and Notion of Constitutional Law - Nationally and in the EU
;50
5.2.3;III. On the Development of a European Methodology Epistemological Options
;53
5.3;C. Sketches of a Methodology of European Constitutional Law
;54
5.3.1;I. Interpretation;55
5.3.1.1;1. Rules ofInterpretation;55
5.3.1.2;2. Principles ofInterpretation;56
5.3.2;II. Comparison and Contextualization;57
5.3.3;III. Systematization;62
5.3.3.1;1. Dilemma ofthe Vocabulary of European Constitutional Law and How to Deal With It
;62
5.3.3.2;2. Pitfalls ofSystematizing European Constitutional Law;65
5.4;D. An Afterthought on Methodology and Habitus;66
6;Comment on Philipp Dann: Some Remarks on the Methodology of the "Constitutional Law" of the European Union
;68
7;The Primacy of European Union Law Over National Law Under the Constitutional Treaty
;73
7.1;A. Introduction;73
7.2;B. The Primacy of Community Law in the ECj Case Law;75
7.3;C. The Distinctive and Autonomous Nature of EC/EU Law as Justification for its Primacy: Critical Remarks
;78
7.4;D. The Primacy of Community Law and the National Courts
;81
7.4.1;I. The Grounds of the Primacy of Community Law under the Case Law of National Courts
;82
7.4.2;II. The Relationship between Community Law and the Constitutional Law of the Member States
;85
7.4.3;III. Conclusions Arising from the Conflict Over "The Final Arbiter of Constitutionality" Within the ED
;87
7.5;E. The Limits of the Primacy Principle under the International Legal Status of the Member States
;89
7.6;F. Conclusions;92
8;Supremacy - Lost? Comment on Roman Kwiecien
;93
8.1;A. Introduction;93
8.2;B. Some Facts on Primacy;94
8.2.1;I. The Cases;94
8.2.2;II.The Wording - Supremacy or Primacy?;95
8.2.3;III. Reactions and Critics;95
8.2.4;IV. Recent Developments;98
8.3;C. The Debate on Primacy
;99
8.3.1;I. The Positions;99
8.3.2;II. Why Primacy and What Kind of Primacy?;99
8.3.3;III. Primacy: Re-Conceptualized
;101
8.4;D. Summary;102
9;The Democracy Concept of the European Union: Coherent Constitutional Principle or Prosaic Declaration of Intent?
;103
9.1;A. Democracy as Fundamental Value of the European Union
;103
9.2;B. Defining the Normative Standards: Democratic Legitimacy in the European Context
;105
9.2.1;I. The Subject of Legitimacy - Communitarianism vs, Individualism;105
9.2.1.1;1. Theoretical Foundation;105
9.2.1.2;2. Subject ofLegitimacy in the Constitutional Treaty;106
9.2.2;II. Participation and Efficiency: Complement or Contradiction?;108
9.2.2.1;1. Input and Output Legitimacy;108
9.2.2.2;2. The Differentiation Between Political Goals and Strategies of Implementation
;110
9.3;C. Democratic Legitimacy of the European Institutional Design
;111
9.3.1;I. European Parliament;112
9.3.2;II. Council of Ministers;114
9.3.2.1;1. Representativeness of Council Decisions
;114
9.3.2.2;2. Functional LegitimacyofState Representations in Federal Systems;115
9.3.2.3;3. Executive Federalism;117
9.3.2.4;4. Consociational Democracy;118
9.3.2.5;5. Summary;119
9.3.3;III. European Commission;120
9.3.4;IV. The Popular Initiative as New Participatory Element;122
9.4;D. Outlook: the Constitutional Treaty as Guide for Further Reforms
;123
10;Comment on Niels Petersen: A Democratic Union: Coherent Constitutional Principle or Prosaic Declaration of Intent?
;125
11;The Plurality of the Legislative Process and a System for Attributing Procedures to Competences
;134
11.1;A. Introduction;134
11.2;B. Continuing Variety of Legislative Procedures;135
11.3;C. Criteria for the Attribution of Procedures to Competences
;138
11.3.1;I. Democratic Legitimacy;138
11.3.1.1;1. Categorization of Competences;139
11.3.1.2;2. Providing Democratic Legitimacy;142
11.3.1.3;3. Systematic Attribution of Procedures to Competences
;146
11.3.2;II. Transparency;148
11.3.3;III. Efficiency;149
11.3.4;IV. Preliminary Conclusions;150
11.4;D. Attribution of Procedures to Competences under the Constitutional Treaty
;150
11.4.1;I. Democratic Legitimacy;150
11.4.2;II. Transparency;153
11.4.3;III. Efficiency;154
11.5;E. Conclusions and Prospects;155
12;The Concept of the "Legislative" Act in the Constitutional Treaty
;156
12.1;A. Introduction;156
12.2;B. The Concept of Legislation in National Constitutional Systems
;157
12.3;C. The Concept of a Legislative Act Under the Constitutional Treaty
;158
12.3.1;I. Legislation Under the Constitutional Treaty;158
12.3.2;II. Justification for the Use of Legislation;159
12.3.2.1;1. The Union's Competences;160
12.3.2.2;2. The Union's Institutions;162
12.3.2.3;3. The Union's Legislative Procedures;163
12.3.2.3.1;a) Ordinary Legislative Procedure as Legislation in Form;164
12.3.2.3.2;b) Special Procedures as Legislation in Form;165
12.3.3;III. Substantive Limitations;167
12.3.4;IV. Scope of Legislative Acts;168
12.3.5;V. Legal Consequences of the Concept
;169
12.4;D. Conclusion;172
13;Comment on Alexander Turk: The Concept of the "Legislative Act"
;175
14;The Emperor's New Clothes: The ECB and the New Institutional Concept
;179
14.1;A. Introduction;179
14.2;B. Institutional Standing de lege lata;180
14.2.1;I. Monetary Union and its Institutional Framework;180
14.2.1.1;1. Aspects ofthe System;180
14.2.1.2;2. The Core of the System;181
14.2.2;II. Self-conception of the ECB - the Emperor's Story;183
14.2.2.1;1. FormalCriteria;184
14.2.2.2;2. Substantial Criteria;185
14.2.3;III. Bringing the Emperor "back home";185
14.3;C. Institutional standing de lege ferenda
;187
14.3.1;I. The ECB and the New Institutional Framework of the Constitutional Treaty
;187
14.3.1.1;1. The Convention Debate;187
14.3.1.2;2. The Outcome ofthe Constitutional Treaty;188
14.3.2;II. Stability and Growth Pact and Political Decision-making;191
14.3.3;III. Institutional Independence, Democratic Accountability and Transparency
;192
14.3.3.1;1. Structural Requirements;192
14.3.3.2;2. The Democratic Issue;193
14.3.3.3;3. Independence and Transparency;195
14.3.4;IV. Bridging the Gap - Democracy, Legitimacy and Deliberative Supranationalism
;195
14.4;D. Concluding Remarks: Do the New Clothes Fit Well?;198
15;Comment on Timo Tohidipur;200
15.1;A. Does the Emperor Have New Clothes?;200
15.2;B. Is the Emperor Wearing Anything at All?;201
15.2.1;I. Autonomisation of European Integration Law;201
15.2.2;II. Constitutionalisation of European Integration Law;206
15.3;C. Where are the Emperor's Clothes?;208
16;The Right to an Effective Remedy Pursuant to Article II-107 Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Treaty
;209
16.1;A. Introduction;209
16.2;B. The Content of the Right to an Effective Remedy;209
16.2.1;I. The Foundations of the Right to an Effective Remedy;209
16.2.2;II. The Consideration of Article 13 ECHR in the Interpretation of Article II-107(1)CT
;210
16.3;C. The Addressee of the Right to an Effective Remedy
;215
16.4;D. The System of Legal Protection in the Light of Article II-107 CT
;217
16.4.1;I. Centralized and Decentralized Individual Legal Protection;218
16.4.2;II. Action for Annulment According to Article III-365(4) CT;218
16.4.2.1;1. The Problem: Gaps in the Legal Protection Against Legislative Acts;218
16.4.2.2;2. The Answer ofArticle 107(1) CT;221
16.4.2.3;3. The Consequences;223
16.4.3;III. An Individual's Right to Initiate a Preliminary Ruling?;226
16.5;E. Conclusion;227
17;Comment on Katharina PabeI: The Right to an Effective Remedy in a Polycentric Legal System
;228
17.1;A. Introduction;228
17.2;B. The Theory of a Polycentric Legal System;228
17.3;C. Effective Remedy in a Polycentric Legal System
;229
17.4;D. Is The Right to an Effective Remedy Really "Effective?";230
17.5;E. Potential of the Right to an Effective Remedy in Reforming of the Polish Judicial System
;231
18;Developments in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Brought About by the Constitutional Treaty
;234
18.1;A. Introduction;234
18.2;B.The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Current Law
;235
18.2.1;I. The Nature and Rationale of the Area;235
18.2.2;II. Material and Geographical Dimension: the Asymmetry of the ASFJ
;237
18.2.3;III. Conclusions;240
18.3;C. Structure of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the Constitutional Treaty
;241
18.3.1;I. The New Architecture of the Area;241
18.3.2;II.New Principles;244
18.3.3;III.Decision-Making;246
18.3.3.1;1. Legislative Initiative;246
18.3.3.2;2. QualifiedMajority Voting;248
18.3.4;IV. Judicial Control;249
18.4;D. Conclusions;251
19;Comment on Dagmara Kornobis-Romanowska: Conceptual Changes in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through the Constitutional Treaty
;253
19.1;A. Introduction;253
19.2;B. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Present Treaties: "A Europe of Bits and Pieces?"
;253
19.3;C. The Area According to the Constitutional Treaty: The Individual at the Heart of the Union's Activities?
;255
19.3.1;I. Loyalty and Mutual Recognition as Guiding Principles;255
19.3.2;II. Applying the Constitutional Standard Case in the Area and the Justification of Deviations
;258
19.4;D. Conclusion: Persisting Fragmentation and the Need for a Consistent Concept
;259
20;Constitutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Implications of the Constitutional Treaty
;261
20.1;A. Introduction;261
20.2;B. What Is Constitutionalization?;263
20.3;C. How Supranational Is CFSP?;266
20.3.1;I. Foreign Minister and European President;266
20.3.2;II. Voting Procedures in CFSP;269
20.4;D. Extra-constitutional Developments in CFSP?;270
20.4.1;1.Common Security and Defense Policy;270
20.4.2;II. Solidarity Clause;273
20.4.3;III. Challenge ofa "Hard Core";274
20.5;E. Democratic Accountability of CFSP?;276
20.5.1;I. Limitations of Parliamentary Scrutiny of CFSP;276
20.5.2;II. Alternative Democratic Control Mechanisms in CFSP?;277
20.6;F. Conclusions;279
21;Comment on Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski: Constitutionalization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Implications of the Constitutional Treaty
;281
22;Common Commercial Policy: The Expanding Competence of the European Union in the Area of International Trade
;286
22.1;A. Introduction;286
22.2;B. The Scope of the Common Commercial Policy;287
22.3;C. Limitations on the Common Commercial Policy;292
22.4;D. Institutions of the ED and the Common Commercial Policy
;295
22.5;E. Qualified Majority or Unanimity?;297
22.6;F. Homogeneity and Uniformity of the Common Commercial Policy
;298
22.7;G. Conclusion;300
23;Comment on Dorota Leczykiewicz: Common Commercial Policy: The Expanding Competence of the European Union in the Area of International Trade
;302
23.1;A. Elements of Unity;303
23.1.1;I. Internal Unity: Parliamentary Consent to International Agreements
;303
23.1.2;II. External Unity: Exclusivity of the Extended Common Commercial Policy
;304
23.2;B. Element of Differentiation: Inconsistency between Internal and External Competences?
;306
24;Fundamental Rights Concerning Biomedicine in the Constitutional Treaty and Their Effect on the Diverse Legal Systems of Member States
;309
24.1;A. Introduction;309
24.2;B. European Diversity;311
24.3;C. The Constitutional Treaty;313
24.3.1;I. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EV;313
24.3.1.1;1. General Remarks;313
24.3.1.2;2. Limitations;314
24.3.2;II. Biomedical Research in the Constitutional Treaty;315
24.3.2.1;1. Freedom of Research
;315
24.3.2.2;2. EU Competences;317
24.3.3;III. The Limits of Biomedical Research and Practice
;319
24.3.3.1;1. Human Dignity and the Notion ofPersonhood;319
24.3.3.2;2. Discrimination on the Ground of Genetic Features;321
24.3.4;IV. Biomedical Practices;321
24.4;D. Conclusions;324
25;Comment on Atina Krajewska: Plural Concepts of Human Dignity and the Constitutional Treaty
;328
25.1;A. Biotechnology as a Challenge to the Cohesion of European Constitutionalism
;328
25.2;B.Human Dignity and Biotechnology - Three Constellations
;331
25.2.1;I. Protection of Human Dignity as a Justification for Restrictions on Free Movement
;331
25.2.2;II. Respect for Human Dignity as an Overarching Principle of the Union and its Member States
;332
25.2.3;III. Human Dignity as a Limit to European Legislation;333
25.3;C. Conclusion;335
26;Remarks on Art. I-52 of the Constitutional Treaty: New Aspects of the European Ecclesiastical Law?
;337
26.1;A. Introductory Remarks;337
26.2;B. Differentiated Church - State Relations in New Member States
;338
26.3;C. Dialogue between the ED and Churches and Non Confessional Organisations
;343
26.3.1;I. Who is Conducting the Dialogue?;343
26.3.2;II. A Dialogue -What Should be the Content?;345
26.3.3;III. Is a Concordat Possible? Is it Needed?;346
26.4;D. Conclusions and Outlook;347
27;"United in Diversity" - The Integration of Enhanced Cooperation into the European Constitutional Order
;350
27.1;A. Introduction;350
27.2;B. Accommodating Diversity;353
27.3;C. "Flexibility" in Chains?;357
27.3.1;I. Substantive Constraints;358
27.3.2;II. Procedural Requirements;361
27.4;D. Asymmetric Constitutionalism;363
27.5;E. Outlook: New Dynamics?;368
28;Comment on Daniel Thym: United in Diversity or Diversified in the Union?
;369
28.1;A. Introduction;369
28.2;B. Asymmetry and Poland;369
28.3;C. Asymmetry and Democratization
;371
28.4;D. Asymmetry and Constitutionalization;373
29;Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who Are the "Masters of the Treaties"?
;375
29.1;A. Introductory Notes: The Withdrawal Debate De Lege Lata
;375
29.2;B. Some Thoughts andOpen Issues Regarding the New Right to Withdraw fromthe Union
;376
29.3;C. Conclusion;380

Leseproben

"Comment on Dorota Leczykiewicz: Common Commercial Policy: The Expanding Competence of the European Union in the Area of International Trade (S. 305-306)

By Karen Kaiser

I would like to elaborate on some of the elements of unity and differentiation with regard to the Unions common commercial policy under the Constitutional Treaty. I do not want to touch upon the elements of differentiation that are already part of the common commercial policy under the EC Treaty (EC) and would remain so under the Constitutional Treaty, such as the special so-called 133-committee1 and the principle of unanimous voting in cases where agreements include provisions for which unanimit y is required for the adoption of internal rules.> However, I try to find out whether the Constitutional Treaty introduces new elements of differentiation. A. Elements of Unity I would like to distinguish between elements of internal and external unity.

As understood here, internal unity reflects the unity of the Union as a political community vis-a-vis its Member States, illustrated most prominently by the "Community method,">while external unity reflects the unity of the Union vis-a-vis third countries. I. Internal Unity: Parliamentary Consent to International Agreements Dorota Leczykiewicz has pointed out one element of internal unity: the regular involvement of the European Parliament within the context of the common commercial policy, foreseen for the first time under the Constitutional Treaty.

Hereunder, the common commercial policy would be implemented by means of European laws, which are adopted according to the ordinary legislative, i.e. co-decision, procedure. However, unlike Dorota Leczykiewicz, I think that the common commercial policy has not arrived at the "Community method" in only this respect. Parliamentary consent would not only be required where European laws are adopted, but also where international agreements are concluded . According to Art. III -325 (6) (a) of the Constitutional Treaty, "agreements covering fields to which [...] the ordinary legislative procedure applies" would require parliamentary consent.

As has been shown, the common commercial policy is a field to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies. An exception applicable to agreements under Art. 111-315 (3) of the Constitutional Treaty has not been provided for.4 This would not only strengthen democratic control within the Union, but also within the World Trade Organization (WTO). Two different suggestions for strengthening democratic control within the WTO have been discussed so far: establishing a standing Parliamentary Assembly with consultative power and, alternatively, convening regular interparliamentary meetings through existing structures such as the International Parliamentary Union."