Why Counterinsurgency Fails

The US in Iraq and Afghanistan
1. Auflage 2019
ISBN: 978-3-319-97992-2
Verlag: Springer International Publishing

Buch, Englisch, 142 Seiten, Format (B × H): 153 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 343 g

This book examines why the U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have failed and presents a solution for future counterinsurgency campaigns that was developed and tested in Afghanistan in the hope that it will spark a conversation that will shape the next counterinsurgency war to U.S. advantage. The author argues that both development assistance and counterinsurgency campaigns - which often go hand in hand -  overwhelm weak states with too much money, too many projects, and too many consultants, leading to weaker rather than stronger governments. The solution proposed, was initially developed by David Petraeus but never effectively implemented. Using an insider's perspective, this volume explains the details of this solution and the problem with its mis-implementation in Afghanistan.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

de Tray, Dennis

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Gewalt Revolutionäre Gruppen und Bewegungen, Bewaffnete Konflikte
• Interdisziplinäres Wissenschaften Wissenschaften Interdisziplinär Friedens- und Konfliktforschung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Konflikt- und Friedensforschung, Rüstungskontrolle, Abrüstung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Gewalt Terrorismus, Religiöser Fundamentalismus
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Militärwesen

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1: How It Ended in Afghanistan, How It Started in Iraq.- 2: Reflections on Iraq, 2008.- 3: On to Afghanistan.- 4: Reflections on Afghanistan.- 5: Postscript, 2008: Why Counterinsurgency Is Still Flawed.

Über Autor(innen)

Dennis de Tray is Senior Non-Resident Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Principal at the Results for Development Institute, both in Washington, D.C.