Ellis 'To Walk in the Dark'

Military Intelligence in the English Civil War, 1642-1646
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-0-7509-8008-1
Verlag: The History Press
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 342 Seiten

During the bloody years of the First English Civil War, as the battles of Edgehill, Newbury and Naseby raged, another war was being fought. Its combatants fought with cunning and deceit in a hidden conflict that nevertheless would steer the course of history. The story of the spies and intelligence-gatherers of the Roundheads and Royalists is one that sheds new light on the birth of the Commonwealth. In 'To Walk in the Dark', intelligence specialist John Ellis presents the first comprehensive analysis of the First English Civil War intelligence services. He details the methods of the Roundhead spies who provided their commanders with a constant flow of information about the movements of the King's armies, describes the earliest use of code-breaking and mail interception and shows how the Cavalier intelligence forces were overcome. He also reveals the intelligence personnel themselves: the shadowy spymasters, agents and femme fatales. The descriptions of how intelligence information was used in the main battles are particularly fascinating and show how intelligence information played a decisive role in determining the outcome of the Civil War itself.

JOHN ELLIS joined the Royal Navy in 1965, specialising in communications and intelligence, going on to hold a number of intelligence-related appointments including two sea commands and MoD. He left the Royal Navy as a Captain and worked for the police and the Home Office before retirement. He has a PhD in intelligence during the English Civil War.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ellis, John

Leseproben

1

English Intelligence Gathering Before the War

Although the recent ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland may help us to envisage a situation where perceived threats to religious, social and political rights have led to a form of armed insurrection, it is nonetheless difficult for us to fully comprehend the political, military and social landscape of the early 1640s. During this time Charles I’s determination to uphold the ‘divine right’ of the monarchy was opposed with increasing popularity and success by John Pym, the Tavistock MP and unofficial leader of the Parliamentarian party with followers in both the House of Commons as well as the House of Lords. Pym’s single-minded ambition to give Parliament a greater role in the governance of England, coupled with a combination of regal ineptitude and duplicity from Charles, had split the country and had made some form of military resolution increasingly inevitable. Thus, as England moved inexorably towards civil war at the beginning of 1642, it is helpful to establish just what military expertise was available to the commanders of the opposing Cavalier and Roundhead forces and, consequently, just how effective would be their generals’ understanding of the role to be played by military intelligence in any future conflict. There had been no major fighting on English soil for generations and, although some of the more restless spirits were involved in the Thirty Years’ War in northern Europe, the recent Bishops’ Wars fought against Scotland had shown with embarrassing clarity that England’s military expertise was extremely limited. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to ‘set the scene’ so that we may better understand which events influenced English military thinking in the early years of Charles I’s reign – and thereby understand how military intelligence-gathering operations contributed to the conduct and eventual outcome of the First English Civil War.

Before the Bishops’ Wars and the Civil War, there had been no large-scale internal disturbances in England since the Tudor rebellions of 1535–36, 1549 and 1569. Although parallels with the English Civil War are difficult to draw as these earlier insurrections were not full-blown nation-wide conflicts, contemporary accounts of these rebellions provide evidence that both national and local intelligence-gathering operations nonetheless played a significant part in their suppression. During the Tudor period, the responsibility for the provision of intelligence lay with the monarch’s chief ministers; thus, in 1535–36, Thomas Cromwell – as Henry VIII’s chief minister – had directed an unrivalled intelligence network which had enabled him to send spies into the rebel-held areas. Cromwell had also gathered further intelligence from the interception of mail.1 During the later uprising called the Pilgrimage of Grace, some of Henry VIII’s commanders had used their own intelligence-gathering networks; for example, it was recounted how one of Henry VIII’s commanders, called Davey, ‘had many friends who acted as spies for him’.2 At the same time, the rebel commanders had established their own ‘scoutwatch’ system to ensure continuity of reporting; we are told that the rebel commanders waited ‘to hear the reports of the scouts and spies as they came in’.3

The central direction of intelligence networks continued after the death of Cromwell and Henry VIII, for whilst commanders had continued to rely upon scouts and local informants during the 1549 rebellion, the Privy Council had also undertaken to keep the local commanders informed of any intelligence information they could get their hands on. For example, in 1549 it was reported that the Lord Privy Seal (Russell) was ‘undelayedly (sic) advertised from us [the Privy Council] of all occurrences of importance’.4 Both sides made full use of spies and scouts to gather intelligence, and ‘the rebels freely sent spies into Russell’s camp’ just as he ‘was to send trusting men into theirs.’5 The rebels also made effective use of local intelligence and were able to use this information to launch a number of delaying attacks on Russell’s army as it moved to attack Exeter in the summer of 1549.6 The importance of intelligence-gathering continued to be recognised during Elizabeth’s reign; in 1569, one George Bowes was appointed ‘to provide intelligence of the [rebel] Earles [Northumberland and Westmoreland] setting out’.7 Bowes reported that the rebels had also established an effective intelligence-gathering system, recording that, although ‘I keep as good spyall as I can, but not so good, I feare, as they have of me, for I am therebye watched.’8 The rebels proved to be active gatherers of intelligence, intercepting mail so frequently that Bowes requested that senders should tell him of any messages sent ‘least some of them be intercepted’.9 Contemporary accounts of the rebellions show very clearly that, as intelligence-gathering was recognised as a priority task by the Tudor monarchs, a variety of intelligence networks were established by the ruler’s senior ministers. Any possible means of obtaining intelligence were used and the deployment of spies and scouts, along with the opening of intercepted letters, was commonplace. Locally provided intelligence proved to be both accurate and timely in all of the major rebellions of the Tudor era.10

Similarly, the threat from Spain which had manifested itself during the later years of Elizabeth I’s reign had led to the continued deployment – and development – of a nationwide intelligence service. Headed by Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth I’s Secretary of State, England’s intelligence network had been instrumental in protecting the life of the monarch and preserving the internal stability of the country at a time when the threat from Spain and fanatical Roman Catholics was substantial.11 During his time in office, Walsingham obtained intelligence information from a wide variety of sources including the interception of mail, the breaking of codes and the use of spies. Perhaps his most sophisticated intelligence-gathering coup was the so-called Babington Plot of 1586, which, as it was a major factor in the decision to execute Mary Queen of Scots, is also his most well-known operation.12 However, as the events of Charles I’s reign were to show, much of this expertise had been allowed to waste away during the early years of the Stuart dynasty.

Because there had been no fighting on English soil since the Tudor rebellions, the fighting that took place on the Continent during the Thirty Years’ War provided an ideal opportunity for both the English (and Scots) to gain experience of current military tactics and to rekindle their knowledge of intelligence-gathering. By authorising ‘unofficial’ English forces to fight in Europe, James I devised not just a cost effective and convenient way of satisfying public expectations and supporting the Protestant cause, but also a means of allowing the more passionate supporters of English and European Protestantism to participate in the fighting. The experience that those English and Scottish soldiers gained during the Thirty Years’ War varied enormously. For the majority, who served as foot soldiers, their experience was limited to a series of interminable sieges as they became members of Protestant garrisons such as at Mannheim and Frankenthal. Their garrison duties did not appear to offer the majority of them many opportunities to understand – let alone develop – the military advantages of obtaining superior intelligence information.

Whilst it is evident that the number and expertise of the veterans returning from the European wars was used to swell and train the ranks of the newly formed Parliamentarian and Royalist armies, there is little contemporary evidence that this fresh expertise was subsequently used to improve the quality of intelligence-gathering on either side. Even though an estimated 6,000–8,000 Scots served with the Swedish army (until 1632 trained and organised by their inspirational monarch, Gustavus Adolphus), and although some 10,000–15,000 Englishmen and up to 25,000 Scots fought in the Thirty Years’ War, very few of them gained any experience at the senior command level.13 (Patrick Ruthven – a Scot who was knighted by Gustavus Adolphus and made a full general in the Swedish forces – is an obvious exception.14) For most young soldiers, their transferable experience of continental warfare was limited mainly to the training, forming and deployment of bodies of horse and foot which was not particularly relevant to military intelligence operations. Although historical accounts of the Battle of the White Mountain make no references to innovative intelligence-gathering by either side, as it was the standard reports of sentries and scouts that provided the intelligence prior to the battle,15 later battles of the Thirty Years’ War, such as that fought at Lützen (16 November 1632) reveal a greater use of intelligence information by both sides.16 Whilst the few British soldiers who served with the regiments of horse would probably have picked up some experience of military intelligence, this would almost certainly have been limited to the duties of scouting.17 Therefore, despite the relatively large numbers of English and Scottish soldiers who served on the continent in the years prior to the Civil War, few returned home with any significant expertise in intelligence-gathering.

Charles I’s attempt to impose religious conformity on the Scots, which led to the outbreak of the so-called...