Epistemic Paternalism

A Defence
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-1-349-34511-3
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK

Buch, Englisch, 194 Seiten, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 2679 g

Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.

Zielgruppe

Research

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Differentielle Psychologie, Persönlichkeitspsychologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Sozialpsychologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended Bibliography Index

Über Autor(innen)

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He specializes in social epistemology and epistemic normativity.