Soviet Military Intelligence in War

1. Auflage 1990
ISBN: 978-0-7146-4076-1
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd (Sales)

Buch, Englisch, 440 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm, Gewicht: 640 g

Reihe: Soviet (Russian) Military Theory and Practice

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Glantz, Colonel David M

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Nachrichtendienste, Geheimdienste

Inhaltsverzeichnis

The nature of intelligence (Razvedka); to 1941; the first period of war; the Stalingrad counteroffensive; the Kursk operation; the Vistula-Oder operation; the legacy of war - contemporary Razvedka.

Über Autor(innen)

Colonel David M. Glantz