Halpern Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge

Proceedings of the 1986 Conference
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-1441-2
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 416 Seiten, Web PDF

Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference focuses on the principles, methodologies, approaches, and concepts involved in reasoning about knowledge. The selection first provides an overview of reasoning about knowledge, varieties of self-reference, and pegs and alecs. Topics covered include data semantics, partial objects and identity, circumstance, self, and causal connection, structure of circumstance, varieties and limits of self-reference, problem of logical omniscience, and knowledge, communication, and action. The book then explores reasoning about knowledge in artificial intelligence; synthesis of digital machines with provable epistemic properties; and a first order theory of planning, knowledge, and action. The publication ponders on the consistency of syntactical treatments of knowledge, foundations of knowledge for distributed systems, knowledge and implicit knowledge in a distributed environment, and the logic of distributed protocols. Topics include formal syntax and semantics, structure of models, message-based knowledge worlds, changing the class of messages, implicit knowledge in message-based knowledge worlds, conservation and implicit knowledge, and distributed protocols. The selection is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Halpern, Joseph Y.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about
Knowledge;2
3;Copyright Page;3
4;Table of Contents;4
5;Foreword;8
6;SESSION 1;10
6.1;CHAPTER 1. REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE: AN OVERVIEW;10
6.1.1;Abstract;10
6.1.2;1. Introduction;11
6.1.3;2. The "classical" model;11
6.1.4;3. A concrete interpretation: distributed systems;14
6.1.5;4. Some variants of the "classical" model;15
6.1.6;5. The problem of logical omniscience;16
6.1.7;6. Common knowledge;18
6.1.8;7. Knowledge, communication, and action;20
6.1.9;8. Areas for Further Research;22
6.1.10;Acknowledgements;23
6.1.11;References;23
6.2;CHAPTER 2. VARIETIES OF SELF-REFERENCE;28
6.2.1;ABSTRACT;28
6.2.2;1. INTRODUCTION;29
6.2.3;2. CIRCUMSTANCE, SELF, AND CAUSAL CONNECTION;31
6.2.4;3. THE STRUCTURE OF CIRCUMSTANCE;37
6.2.5;4. VARIETIES OF SELF-REFERENCE;39
6.2.6;5. THE LIMITS OF SELF REFERENCE;49
6.2.7;ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS;50
6.2.8;NOTES;50
6.2.9;REFERENCES;51
6.3;CHAPTER 3. PEGS AND ALECS;54
6.3.1;ABSTRACT;54
6.3.2;1. Partial objects and identity;55
6.3.3;2. Data semantics;56
6.3.4;3. Pegs;57
6.3.5;4. Strangers and acquaintances;60
6.3.6;5: Kind hearts and coronets;65
6.3.7;6. Alecs;66
6.3.8;Note;70
6.3.9;References;70
7;SESSION 2;72
7.1;CHAPTER 4. REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN PHILOSOPHY:
THE PARADIGM OF EPISTEMIC LOGIC;72
7.1.1;ABSTRACT;72
8;SESSION 3;90
8.1;CHAPTER 5. REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;90
8.1.1;SUMMARY;90
8.2;CHAPTER 6. THE SYNTHESIS OF DIGITAL MACHINES WITH PROVABLE EPISTEMIC PROPERTIES;92
8.2.1;ABSTRACT;92
8.2.2;Introduction;93
8.2.3;Theoretical Background;94
8.2.4;Rex : A Framework for Hierarchical Machine Specification;97
8.2.5;Example;102
8.2.6;Acknowledgments;107
8.2.7;References;107
8.3;CHAPTER 7. A First Order Theory of Planning, Knowledge, and Action;108
8.3.1;ABSTRACT;108
8.3.2;1. Introduction;109
8.3.3;2. Moore's Logic of Knowledge and Action;110
8.3.4;3. An Alternate Approach: 'Know' as a Syntactic Predicate;112
8.3.5;4. Planning, Knowledge, and Action;115
8.3.6;5. Conclusion;121
8.3.7;BIBLIOGRAPHY;122
8.4;CHAPTER 8. THE CONSISTENCY OF SYNTACTICAL TREATMENTS OF KNOWLEDGE;124
8.4.1;Abstract;124
8.4.2;Terminology and Notation;127
8.4.3;Review of Montague and Thomason;129
8.4.4;A Translation-Based Syntactical Treatment;131
8.4.5;Montague and Thomason Revisited;134
8.4.6;Other Considerations;136
8.4.7;Concluding Remarks;138
8.4.8;Acknowledgements;139
8.4.9;References;139
8.5;CHAPTER 9. THE KNOWER'S PARADOX AND REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES OF ATTITUDES;140
8.5.1;ABSTRACT;140
8.5.2;INTRODUCTION;141
8.5.3;THE KNOWER'S PARADOX AND NON REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES;141
8.5.4;REPRESENTATIONAL THEORIES;144
8.5.5;References;156
9;SESSION 4;158
9.1;Chapter 10. Knowledge and Common Knowledge in a Byzantine Environment I: Crash failures (Extended Abstract);158
9.1.1;ABSTRACT;158
9.1.2;1. Introduction;159
9.1.3;2. Definitions and preliminary results;161
9.1.4;3. Analysis of a simple protocol;165
9.1.5;4, Lower bounds;169
9.1.6;5. Applications;174
9.1.7;6. Conclusions;176
9.1.8;Acknowledgements;177
9.1.9;References;177
9.2;CHAPTER 11. FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS;180
9.2.1;Abstract;180
9.2.2;1 Introduction;181
9.2.3;2 Distibuted Protocols;182
9.2.4;3 Definitions of Knowledge and Common Knowledge;186
9.2.5;4 Common Knowledge in Asynchronous Systems;188
9.2.6;5 Alternate Definitions of Knowledge;190
9.2.7;6 Conclusions;193
9.2.8;References;193
9.3;Chapter 12. Knowledge and implicit knowledge in a distributed environment: Preliminary Report;196
9.3.1;Abstract;196
9.3.2;1. Introduction;197
9.3.3;2. Runs;199
9.3.4;3. Conservation of implicit knowledge;202
9.3.5;4. A new axiom;203
9.3.6;S. An S5-consistent formula that is not satisfiable under communication;205
9.3.7;6. Complete axiomatizations and decision problems;207
9.3.8;7. What if communication is reliable?;209
9.3.9;8. Changing the class of messages;210
9.3.10;9. Knowledge structures and knowledge worlds;211
9.3.11;10. Message-based knowledge worlds;212
9.3.12;11. Implicit knowledge in message-based knowledge worlds;213
9.3.13;12. Concluding remarks;214
9.3.14;13. Acknowledgments;214
9.3.15;14. Bibliography;214
9.4;Chapter 13. The Logic of Distributed Protocols (Preliminary Report);216
9.4.1;ABSTRACT;216
9.4.2;1 Introduction;217
9.4.3;2 The Formal Syntax and Semantics;220
9.4.4;3 Structure of Models;223
9.4.5;4 The Undecidability Result;225
9.4.6;5 Conclusion;230
9.4.7;References;230
10;SESSION 5;232
10.1;Chapter 14. Panel: Objects of knowledge and belief: sentences vs. propositions?;232
10.1.1;Abstract;232
10.2;CHAPTER 15. PARADOXES AND SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION;234
10.2.1;ABSTRACT;234
10.2.2;1. The Liar Paradox;235
10.2.3;2. The Liar in an Intensional Setting;238
10.2.4;3. Ways out;241
10.2.5;4. Consequences for Semantic Representation;243
10.2.6;5. Consequences for Computer Science;244
10.2.7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;245
10.2.8;REFERENCES;246
10.3;CHAPTER 16. WHAT AWARENESS ISN'T: A SENTENTIAL VIEW OF IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT BELIEF;250
10.3.1;ABSTRACT;250
10.3.2;Introduction;251
10.3.3;The Argument;252
10.3.4;Conclusion: propositional attitudes and possible worlds;257
10.3.5;Acknowledgements;258
10.3.6;References;258
11;SESSION 6;260
11.1;CHAPTER 17. REASONING ABOUT KNOWLEDGE IN ECONOMICS;260
11.1.1;SUMMARY;260
11.2;CHAPTER 18. SUMMARY OF "ON AUMANN'S NOTION OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE -- AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH";262
11.2.1;ABSTRACT;262
11.2.2;SUMMARY;263
11.2.3;References;266
11.3;CHAPTER 19. ON PLAY BY MEANS OF COMPUTING MACHINES (preliminary version);268
11.3.1;Abstract;268
11.3.2;1. Introduction;269
11.3.3;2. Play by means of finite automata;270
11.3.4;3. Play by means of unrestricted Turing machines;271
11.3.5;4. On machines with limited numbers of internal states;272
11.3.6;5. Fixed N, deterministic machines, unlimited space;275
11.3.7;6. Uniform deterministic machines with limited number of states;278
11.3.8;7. Conclusion;281
11.3.9;References;282
11.3.10;Appendix: The mechanism;283
11.4;CHAPTER 20. A THEORY OF HIGHER ORDER PROBABILITIES;284
11.4.1;ABSTRACT;284
11.4.2;Introduction;285
11.4.3;Simple HOPs;288
11.4.4;Probability Logic;297
11.4.5;General HOPs;299
11.4.6;REFERENCES;301
11.5;CHAPTER 21. ON EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE;302
11.5.1;Abstract;302
11.5.2;1.
Introduction;303
11.5.3;2. Belief in Propositions;304
11.5.4;3.
Belief Worlds;306
11.5.5;4. Reasoning;309
11.5.6;6.
Models for Local Reasoning;310
11.5.7;6. Concluding Remarks;312
11.5.8;Acknowledgements;312
11.5.9;REFERENCES;312
12;SESSION 7;316
12.1;CHAPTER 22. MENTAL SITUATION CALCULUS;316
12.1.1;ABSTRACT;316
12.2;CHAPTER 23. A RESOLUTION METHOD FOR QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGICS OF KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF;318
12.2.1;ABSTRACT;318
12.2.2;Introduction;319
12.2.3;The Resolution Method;320
12.2.4;A proof procedure for
BK-resolution;324
12.2.5;Controlling the search space;328
12.2.6;Implementation;331
12.2.7;Other resolution systems for modal logics;331
12.2.8;Acknowledgements;332
12.2.9;References;332
12.3;CHAPTER 24. STEPS TOWARDS A FIRST-ORDER LOGIC OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT BELIEF;334
12.3.1;Abstract;334
12.3.2;Introduction;335
12.3.3;"Knowing What"
and "Knowing That";336
12.3.4;The Language £;338
12.3.5;t-Entailment;338
12.3.6;From t-entailment to Explicit Belief;340
12.3.7;Conclusion;347
12.3.8;Acknowledgements;348
12.3.9;References;348
12.3.10;Appendix;349
13;SESSION 8;350
13.1;CHAPTER 25. LOGICIANS WHO REASON ABOUT THEMSELVES;350
13.1.1;ABSTRACT;350
13.1.2;FOREVER UNDECIDED;351
13.1.3;AN ACCURACY PREDICAMENT;352
13.1.4;THE GODEL CONSISTENCY PREDICAMENT;354
13.1.5;SELF-FULFILLING BELIEFS AND LOB'S THEOREM;356
13.1.6;THE STABILITY PREDICAMENT;358
13.1.7;A QUESTION OF TIMIDITY;358
13.1.8;A GRAND INDECISION;359
13.1.9;MODEST REASONERS;359
13.1.10;References;361
14;SESSION 9;362
14.1;Chapter 26. Knowledge and Efficient Computation;362
14.1.1;Abstract;362
14.1.2;1. Knowledge Complexity;363
14.1.3;2. The Knowledge Complexity of Theorem Proving Procedures;367
14.1.4;3. Applications of Knowledge Complexity to Cryptographic Protocols;370
14.1.5;Acknowledegement;371
14.1.6;References;371
14.2;Chapter 27. Realizability Semantics for Error-Tolerant Logics (preliminary version);372
14.2.1;Abstract;372
14.2.2;1. Introduction;373
14.2.3;2. Intuitive Foundations for Relevance Logic;375
14.2.4;3. Proof Systems for Intuitionistic and Relevance Logics;376
14.2.5;4. Evidence Semantics for Intuitionistic Logic;379
14.2.6;5. Evidence Semantics for Relevant Implication;384
14.2.7;6. Negation and Other Connectives;387
14.2.8;7. Conclusion and Directions for Farther Investigation;388
14.2.9;References;389
14.3;CHAPTER 28. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR BELIEF REVISION;392
14.3.1;ABSTRACT;392
14.3.2;INTRODUCTION;393
14.3.3;JUSTIFICATION-BASED VS. ASSUMPTION-BASED SYSTEMS;394
14.3.4;THE SWM SYSTEM;395
14.3.5;A CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION FOR SWM;403
14.3.6;CONCLUDING REMARKS;405
14.3.7;Aknowledgement;406
14.3.8;References;406
14.4;Chapter 29. A Framework for Intuitionistic Modal Logics;408
14.4.1;Introduction;408
14.4.2;1. 'Minimal' Intuitionistic Modal Logic;409
14.4.3;2. Further Modal Logics;412
14.4.4;References;415
15;AUTHOR INDEX;416