Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

Erscheinungsjahr 2008
ISBN: 978-0-521-86209-7
Verlag: Cambridge University Press

Buch, Englisch, 424 Seiten, Format (B × H): 157 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 842 g

Reihe: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hawkins, Darren G.

Lake, David A.

Nielson, Daniel L.

Tierney, Michael J.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen Internationale Organisationen und Institutionen
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Part I. Introduction: 1. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; Part II. Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits: 2. A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney; 3. US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems Helen V. Milner; 5. Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality Lisa L. Martin; 6. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Pollack; Part III. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. How agents matter Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby; 8. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson; 9. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity Erica R. Gould; 11. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Alter; Part IV. Directions for Future Research: 12. The logic of delegation to international organizations David A. Lake and Mathew McCubbins.

Über Autor(innen)

Lake, David A.
David A. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

Tierney, Michael J.
Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.

Nielson, Daniel L.
Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.

Hawkins, Darren G.
Darren G. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.