Helmig Forms and Concepts

Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition
1. Auflage 2012
ISBN: 978-3-11-026724-2
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 5, 407 Seiten

Reihe: Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et ByzantinaISSN

Zielgruppe

Academics, Institutes, Libraries

Autoren/Hrsg.

Helmig, Christoph

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Literaturwissenschaft Klassische Griechische & Byzantinische Literatur
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Antike Philosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;A word of thanks;11
2;Introduction;13
2.1;1. ‘How comes the mind to be furnished?’;13
2.2;2. Survey of recent literature;17
2.3;3. Structure and contents of this study;21
3;I. Concepts – (ancient) problems and solutions;25
3.1;1. What is a concept?;25
3.2;2. The relevance of concepts in ancient epistemological debates;36
3.3;3. Different models of concept acquisition in antiquity;41
3.4;4. Forms and concepts & problematic concepts;47
4;II. Plato on learning as recollection;51
4.1;1. Forms and concepts;51
4.1.1;1.1. The role of concepts in Plato;51
4.1.2;1.2. Forms, concepts, language;53
4.2;2. The Parmenides and the archaeology of conceptualism;57
4.2.1;2.1. Concepts as ‘one over many’;57
4.2.2;2.2. Refuting conceptualism?;60
4.2.3;2.3. Conclusion;63
4.3;3. The Meno on the different stages of recollection;64
4.3.1;3.1. The transition from opinion (doxa) to knowledge;64
4.3.2;3.2. Conclusion;68
4.4;4. The Phaedo on the necessity of innate knowledge;69
4.4.1;4.1. The deficiency argument (Phaedo 72e–77a);69
4.4.2;4.2. The continuity between Meno and Phaedo;76
4.5;5. The Phaedrus on acquiring universal concepts;77
4.5.1;5.1. Recollection and concept attainment (Phaedrus 249b–c);77
4.5.2;5.2. Forms, concepts, language again;82
4.5.3;5.3. Conclusion;83
4.6;6. Concept formation and concepts in the Timaeus, Theaetetus, and Sophist;83
4.6.1;6.1. Recollection in Plato’s later works;83
4.6.2;6.2. Innateness and the structure of the human soul;85
4.7;7. The limits of recollection;90
4.7.1;7.1. Some problematic concepts;90
4.7.2;7.2. Recollection and error;95
4.8;8. Forms, concepts, and recollection;96
5;III. Aristotle’s reaction to Plato;99
5.1;1. Aristotle and his teacher Plato;99
5.1.1;1.1. A strange couple;99
5.1.2;1.2. Aristotle’s arguments against innate knowledge;100
5.2;2. The origin and nature of mathematical concepts;102
5.2.1;2.1. Concepts and the division of sciences;102
5.2.2;2.2. A troublesome emendation;104
5.2.3;2.3. Abstraction and the qua-operator;108
5.2.4;2.4. Aristotelian and Platonic separation;110
5.2.5;2.5. Mathematical objects and concepts;112
5.2.6;2.6. Linking abstractionM and induction?;120
5.3;3. Universal concepts – induction (epagoge) and its different domains;123
5.3.1;3.1. A general definition of induction;124
5.3.2;3.2. Induction and its different domains;125
5.3.3;3.3. The language of induction;126
5.3.4;3.4. Different kinds of induction in Aristotle;128
5.3.4.1;3.4.1. Induction in dialectical and rhetorical practice;128
5.3.4.2;3.4.2. Digression: likeness and the charge of circularity;131
5.3.4.3;3.4.3. Induction in ethics and natural science;133
5.3.4.4;3.4.4. The troublesome case of ‘complete’ or ‘perfect induction’;134
5.3.5;3.5. Induction and the starting points of syllogism;137
5.4;4. Induction of first principles (Posterior Analytics II 19);140
5.4.1;4.1. Introduction;140
5.4.2;4.2. What is the object of Analytica Posteriora II 19?;141
5.4.3;4.3. Articulation and summary of the argument;144
5.4.4;4.4. The relation of sense perception and intellect;146
6;IV. Three case studies: Alcinous, Alexander & Porphyry, and Plotinus;153
6.1;1. Alcinous between empiricism and recollection;153
6.1.1;1.1. The doctrine of the doxastic logos;154
6.1.2;1.2. Alcinous’ psychology;156
6.1.3;1.3. Empiricism vs. innate knowledge;159
6.2;2. Alexander of Aphrodisias & Porphyry on abstraction and universals;166
6.2.1;2.1. Alexander – elaborating Aristotle’s notion of abstraction;167
6.2.2;2.2. Neoplatonic readings of Alexander;169
6.2.3;2.3. Immanent forms, definitional natures, and universal concepts;173
6.2.4;2.4. A unitary theory of intellect?;176
6.2.5;2.5. Porphyry – an abstractionist malgré lui?;183
6.2.6;2.6. The ‘short commentary’ on Aristotle’s Categories;184
6.2.7;2.7. The epistemological digression in the commentary on Ptolemy;187
6.3;3. Plotinus – ‘Wegbereiter’ of Syrianus and Proclus;196
6.3.1;3.1. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (I): logoi as criteria in perceptual judgements;198
6.3.2;3.2. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (II): logoi as causes in matter;203
6.3.3;3.3. Plotinus on innate knowledge and recollection;207
7;V. Syrianus’ and Proclus’ attitude towards Aristotle;217
7.1;1. Amicus Aristoteles, sed;217
7.2;2. Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism of induction and abstraction;220
7.2.1;2.1. Criticizing abstracted universals;221
7.2.2;2.2. Who is the target of Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism?;231
8;VI. The crucial role of doxastic concepts in Proclus’ epistemology;235
8.1;1. Proclus on sense perception and phantasia;237
8.1.1;1.1. Place and character of sense perception;237
8.1.2;1.2. Olympiodorus on the ambiguity of sense perception;239
8.1.3;1.3. Proclus on phantasia;240
8.1.4;1.4. Phantasia and geometry;242
8.1.5;1.5. Resume: sense perception, phantasia, and concept formation;243
8.2;2. An innovation by Proclus: his theory of doxa;244
8.2.1;2.1. Unfair to Proclus? – Alleged inconsistencies in his theory of doxa;244
8.2.2;2.2. More recent studies on Proclus’ theory of doxa;245
8.2.3;2.3. Digression: doxa in Plato and Aristotle;252
8.2.4;2.4. Proclus on doxa and innate knowledge;255
8.2.5;2.5. Proclus on doxastic concepts (logoi doxastikoi);266
8.2.6;2.6. Doxa correcting sense perception;272
9;VII. Proclus’ Platonic theory of concept attainment;275
9.1;1. The soul and its innate knowledge;276
9.1.1;1.1. The discursive nature of soul: Proclus on dianoia;276
9.1.2;1.2. Dianoia and the logoi of the soul;277
9.1.3;1.3. Sources of Proclus’ doctrine of the psychic logoi;280
9.1.4;1.4. Common notions and psychic logoi;282
9.2;2. The triad of recollection: forgetting – articulation – probole;284
9.2.1;2.1. Recollection after Aristotle;284
9.2.2;2.2. Forgetting;286
9.2.3;2.3. Articulation (diarthrosis);290
9.2.3.1;2.3.1. The sources: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Middle Platonism;290
9.2.3.2;2.3.2. The Anonymous in Theaetetum (AT);294
9.2.3.3;2.3.3. Articulation: talent and error;296
9.2.3.4;2.3.4. Proclus on articulation;298
9.2.4;2.4. Probole;301
9.2.4.1;2.4.1. Meaning and translation;302
9.2.4.2;2.4.2. Probole and geometry;307
9.2.4.3;2.4.3. Résumé;311
9.3;3. Proclus on learning and the acquisition of concepts;311
9.3.1;3.1. Concept formation and the Platonic dialogue;312
9.3.2;3.2. Recollection as an intentional act of the soul;316
9.3.3;3.3. Different stages of recollection;317
9.3.4;3.4. Different kinds of concepts;321
9.3.5;3.5. A difficult passage;325
9.3.6;3.6. Recollection and error;329
9.3.7;3.7. Problematic concepts;337
10;VIII. Plato and Aristotle in harmony? – Some conclusions;347
11;Bibliography;355
11.1;1. Editions and translations;355
11.2;2. Secondary literature;367
12;Indices;393
12.1;1. Index nominum;393
12.2;2. Index locorum;395
12.3;3. Index rerum;402

Über Autor(innen)

Christoph Helmig, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany.