Johnson Formal Theories of Politics

Mathematical Modelling in Political Science
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9774-3
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 20, 210 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: International Series in Modern Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

Formal Theories of Politics demonstrates the role of formal mathematical models in political science, and aims to convey a sense of the questions and methods which govern the political science research agenda. While there is still much interest in empirical patterns of voting behaviour and public opinion data, there has been substantial growth in emphasis on mathematical theory as a technique for the derivation of testable hypotheses. Topics discussed include: optimal candidate strategies and equilibria in competitive elections; voting agendas and parliamentary procedure in the multidimensional events; revolution, repression and inequality as outputs of dynamics systems. The mathematical techniques are widely varied, including game theory, functional analysis, differential equations, expert systems, stochastic processes and statistical models.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Johnson, P. E.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Formal Theories of Politics: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Pergamon Titles of Related Interest;3
6;EDITORIAL FOREWORD;8
7;FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS: THE SCOPE OF MATHEMATICAL MODELLING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE;10
7.1;A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODELS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE;10
7.2;ABOUT THE ARTICLES;11
7.3;CONCLUSION;16
7.4;REFERENCES;16
8;PART 1: MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODELS OFLEGISLATIVE DECISION;18
8.1;CHAPTER 1. LIMITS ON AGENDA CONTROL INSPATIAL VOTING GAMES;20
8.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;20
8.1.2;2. AGENDA CONTROL;21
8.1.3;3. MAJORITY RULE IN SPATIAL VOTING GAMES;23
8.1.4;4. AGENDA PROPOSITIONS;26
8.1.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;30
8.1.6;REFERENCES;30
8.2;CHAPTER 2. SMOOTH SOCIAL CHOICE;32
8.2.1;1. SOCIAL CHOICE AND THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY;32
8.2.2;2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION;34
8.2.3;3. THE CORE IN THE DISCRETE CONTINUOUS AND SMOOTH CATEGORIES;40
8.2.4;4. CHAOS AND THE INSTABILITY DIMENSION, w{D);44
8.2.5;5. ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACIES;48
8.2.6;REFERENCES;49
9;PART 2: SPATIAL COMPETITION AMONG CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE;52
9.1;CHAPTER 3. A MODEL OF PARTY CONSTRAINTS ON OPTIMAL CANDIDATE POSITIONS;54
9.1.1;INTRODUCTION;54
9.1.2;SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL;55
9.1.3;THE MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTISAN ACTIVISTS;59
9.1.4;SOME GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THE ELECTORAL GAME;62
9.1.5;THE CASE OF SYMMETRIC f(x) AND POLITICAL PARTIES;64
9.1.6;DISCUSSION;66
9.1.7;REFERENCES;67
9.2;CHAPTER 4. UNDOMINATED CANDIDATE STRATEGIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE VOTING RULES;68
9.2.1;INTRODUCTION;68
9.2.2;VOTING METHODS;69
9.2.3;CANDIDATE STRATEGIES;71
9.2.4;RESULTS;72
9.2.5;CONCLUSION;74
9.2.6;REFERENCES;75
9.2.7;APPENDIX;75
9.3;CHAPTER 5. THE LOCATION OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A NEW SPATIAL MODEL OF ELECTIONS†;78
9.3.1;INTRODUCTION;78
9.3.2;AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY FOR TESTING SPATIAL THEORY;79
9.3.3;SCALING THE CANDIDATES IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION;81
9.3.4;ADDING THE VOTERS TO THE SPACE;82
9.3.5;A PROBABILISTIC EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE CANDIDATES;85
9.3.6;CONCLUSION;86
9.3.7;REFERENCES;87
9.4;CHAPTER 6. A MODEL OF CANDIDATE CONVERGENCE UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT VOTER PREFERENCES;88
9.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;88
9.4.2;2. THE OPTIMALITY OF A TWEEDLE-DUM RESPONSE TO TWEEDLE-DEE;89
9.4.3;3. THE CHALLENGER'S OPTIMAL DIRECTION AND THE INCUMBENT'S OPTIMAL POSITION;91
9.4.4;4. THE PARETO OPTIMALITY OF THE INCUMBENT'S LOCATION;93
9.4.5;REFERENCES;95
9.5;CHAPTER 7. REPUTATIONAL DYNAMICS IN SPATIAL COMPETITION;96
9.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;96
9.5.2;2. THE REPUTATION MODEL;99
9.5.3;3. INCUMBENT-CHALLENGER EQUILIBRIUM;101
9.5.4;4. REPUTATIONAL DYNAMICS IN SPATIAL COMPETITION—OVERVIEW;105
9.5.5;5. THE EVOLUTION OF POSITIONS AND ELECTORAL PROBABILITIES OVER TIME;107
9.5.6;6. SUMMARY;111
9.5.7;REFERENCES;112
9.5.8;APPENDIX;113
10;PART 3: GAME AND DECISION THEORY;114
10.1;CHAPTER 8. POLITICAL DECISION MAKING WITH COSTLY AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION;116
10.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;116
10.1.2;2. THE MODEL;117
10.1.3;3. UNIQUENESS OF THE SOLUTION TO THE FUNCTIONAL EQUATION;118
10.1.4;4. THE EFFECTS OF RISK AND INFORMATION COSTS;120
10.1.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;124
10.1.6;REFERENCES;126
10.1.7;APPENDIX;126
10.2;CHAPTER 9. ADVANTAGEOUS MULTIPLE RENT SEEKING;130
10.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;130
10.2.2;2. THE MODEL;132
10.2.3;3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS;132
10.2.4;4. AN EXTENSION: HETEROGENEOUS OBJECTS;134
10.2.5;5. SUMMARY;136
10.2.6;REFERENCES;137
10.3;CHAPTER 10. THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMPERATIVES OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN 3-COUNTRY SYSTEMS;138
10.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;138
10.3.2;2. AN INITIAL MODEL;139
10.3.3;3. INCORPORATING GEOGRAPHY;143
10.3.4;4. SYSTEM- AND RESOURCE-STABILITY;145
10.3.5;5. BALANCERS AND CENTRAL POWERS;147
10.3.6;REFERENCES;149
10.3.7;APPENDIX;149
11;PART 4: DYNAMIC MODELS;152
11.1;CHAPTER 11. NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE LIMITS OF COERCION: THE PROBLEMATIC ENFORCEMENT OF UNPOPULAR LAWS;154
11.1.1;INTRODUCTION;154
11.1.2;A CHARACTERIZATION OF COMPLIANCE;155
11.1.3;A CHARACTERIZATION OF COERCION;156
11.1.4;THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK;159
11.1.5;THE POTENTIAL FOR PREEMPTIVE SUCCESS;161
11.1.6;CONTROLLING NONCOMPLIANCE WITHOUT PREEMPTION;162
11.1.7;DESPERATE STRATEGIES FOR DESPERATE CIRCUMSTANCES;163
11.1.8;CONCLUSION;164
11.1.9;REFERENCES;165
11.1.10;APPENDIX;166
11.2;CHAPTER 12. COERCION AND REVOLUTION: VARIATIONS ON A PREDATOR-PREY MODEL;168
11.2.1;INTRODUCTION;168
11.2.2;REVOLUTION AND COERCION;172
11.2.3;COERCION AND FOREIGN AID;173
11.2.4;THE ELABORATED MODEL;174
11.2.5;TIME PATHS AND EQUILIBRIA;175
11.2.6;WHICH CURVE IS THE CURVE OF REVOLUTION?;177
11.2.7;PUTTING DYNAMICS TO USE IN IRELAND;178
11.2.8;CONCLUSION;178
11.2.9;REFERENCES;179
11.2.10;APPENDIX;179
11.2.11;DEPRIVATION, REVOLUTION, PREDATORS AND PREY;170
12;PART 5: PROBABILITY MODELS;182
12.1;CHAPTER 13. MATHEMATICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF WAR;184
12.1.1;INTRODUCTION;184
12.1.2;THE HYPORELIABILITY EFFECT;185
12.1.3;THE TV-CRISES PROBLEM;188
12.1.4;THE WAR LEDGE;190
12.1.5;WAR DILATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY;193
12.1.6;CONCLUSIONS;195
12.1.7;REFERENCES;197
12.2;CHAPTER 14. A DISTRIBUTION OF EXTREME INEQUALITY WITH APPLICATIONS TO CONFLICT BEHAVIOR: A GEOMETRIC DERIVATION OF THE PARETO DISTRIBUTION;200
12.2.1;INTRODUCTION;200
12.2.2;A SEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS;201
12.2.3;AN EXPOSITORY GEOMETRIC APPROACH TO THE PARETO DISTRIBUTION;201
12.2.4;COMPARISON OF THE EXPONENTIAL AND LOG-EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTIONS;206
12.2.5;POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND TWO APPLICATIONS;207
12.2.6;CONCLUSION;208
12.2.7;REFERENCES;210
13;PART 6: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;212
13.1;CHAPTER 15. SHORT-TERM PREDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR USING A HOLLAND CLASSIFIER;214
13.1.1;INTRODUCTION;214
13.1.2;KNOWLEDGE, ANALOGY AND PATTERN MATCHING;214
13.1.3;HOLLAND MACHINES;215
13.1.4;APPLYING A HOLLAND CLASSIFIER TO STP;217
13.1.5;RESULTS;220
13.1.6;CONCLUSIONS;223
13.1.7;REFERENCES;224
13.1.8;APPENDIX A;225
13.1.9;APPENDIX B;225