Emotion, Cognition, and the Virtue of Flexibility

1. Auflage 2025
ISBN: 978-3-11-221409-1
Verlag: De Gruyter

Buch, Englisch, Band 26, 178 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 230 mm

Reihe: Practical Philosophy

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

Zielgruppe

Philosophy scholars and students, psychology scholars, ethicists,

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kaeslin, Isabel

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Psychologie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Psychologische Theorie, Psychoanalyse Philosophische Psychologie, Logotherapie, Existenzanalyse
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie Emotion, Motivation, Handlung

Über Autor(innen)

Isabel Kaeslin, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.