Emotion, Cognition, and the Virtue of Flexibility

1. Auflage 2024
ISBN: 978-3-11-221409-1
Verlag: De Gruyter

Buch, Englisch, 178 Seiten, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 230 mm, Gewicht: 288 g

Reihe: ISSN

Should emotions play a role in our decisions, even if they are "just feelings" and not necessarily "imbued with reason" or cognitively penetrated? The author shows that such basic feelings as aversion and attraction can be important normative guides by disrupting engrained habits and beliefs, enabling us to reconsider our ways, which is important due to the ever-changing nature of ethical demands on us. Therefore, these feelings should guide our decisions, even if they are not cognitive. This book fi lls a gap in the philosophy of emotions, ethics, and virtue epistemology.

Zielgruppe

Philosophy scholars and students, psychology scholars, ethicists,

Autoren/Hrsg.

Kaeslin, Isabel

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Psychologie / Allgemeines & Theorie Psychologische Theorie, Psychoanalyse Philosophische Psychologie, Logotherapie, Existenzanalyse
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Philosophische Psychologie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Kognitionspsychologie Emotion, Motivation, Handlung
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Über Autor(innen)

Isabel Kaeslin, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.