E-Book, Englisch, Band 15, 205 Seiten
Kaiser / Seide Philip Kitcher
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032488-4
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Pragmatic Naturalism
E-Book, Englisch, Band 15, 205 Seiten
Reihe: Münstersche Vorlesungen zur Philosophie
ISBN: 978-3-11-032488-4
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Zielgruppe
Philosophers, Libraries, Institutes
Autoren/Hrsg.
Fachgebiete
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Wissenschaftstheorie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Pragmatismus
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Naturphilosophie, Philosophie und Evolution
- Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 20./21. Jahrhundert
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Contents;7
1.1;1 Lecture;7
1.2;2 Colloquium;7
2.1;Preface;9
3.1;List of Abbreviations of Philip Kitcher’s Publications;11
4;Blank Page;14
5.1;PRAGMATIC NATURALISM;15
5.1.1;I;15
5.1.2;II;18
5.1.3;III;22
5.1.4;IV;28
5.1.5;V;30
5.1.6;VI;34
5.1.7;VII;39
5.1.8;VIII;41
5.1.9;Acknowledgements;43
5.1.10;References;43
6.1;Living with Kitcher?;45
6.2;Some Thoughts Concerning the Relation between Darwinism and Theism;45
6.2.1;1 Introduction: Philip Kitcher’s Criticism of Creationism;45
6.2.2;2 Kitcher’s Argument for the Relation of Darwinism and Theism;49
6.2.3;3 Theism and Darwinism – Possible Combinations;53
6.2.4;4 The Relation between Religion and Science;57
6.2.5;References;59
7;Blank Page;60
8.1;Can Kitcher Avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy?;61
8.1.1;1 Introduction;61
8.1.2;2 Kitcher’s Understanding of ‘Naturalism’ and the ‘Analytical History’ of Ethics;64
8.1.3;3 Kitcher’s Attempt to Avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy;67
8.1.4;4 Ethical Progress;72
8.1.5;5 Conclusion;75
8.1.6;References;76
9.1;Refining Kitcher’s Semantics for Kind Terms, or: Cleaning up the Mess;91
9.1.1;1 Introduction;91
9.1.2;2 The Qua Problem;92
9.1.2.1;2.1 What Is the Qua Problem?;93
9.1.2.2;2.2 Kitcher’s and Stanford’s Proposed Solution;94
9.1.3;3 The “No Failures of Reference” Problem;96
9.1.3.1;3.1 What Is the “No Failures of Reference” Problem?;96
9.1.3.2;3.2 Kitcher’s and Stanford’s Proposed Solution;97
9.1.4;4 Evaluation of the Proposed Solutions;99
9.1.4.1;4.1 The Qua Problem;100
9.1.4.2;4.2 The “No Failures of Reference” Problem;103
9.1.5;5 Sketch of a Solution: Semantic Dualism;105
9.1.6;References;109
10;Blank Page;110
11.1;Promiscuous objects, hybrid truth and scientific realism;111
11.1.1;1 Introduction;111
11.1.2;2 Kitcher’s Kantian Realism in The Advancement of Science;112
11.1.3;3 Kitcher’s Promiscuous Realism in Science, Truth, and Democracy;120
11.1.4;References;127
12;Blank Page;128
13.1;The Apriorists Return;129
13.1.1;1 Introduction;129
13.1.2;2 The Argument from Weak Revisability;131
13.1.3;3 The Argument from Concept Development;135
13.1.4;4 The Argument from Truth by Convention;141
13.1.5;5 Concluding Remarks;145
13.1.6;References;146
14.1;Examining the Quality of Life;147
14.2;Notes on Philip Kitcher’s Writings on Bioethics;147
14.2.1;1 Introduction;147
14.2.2;2 The Conception of the Quality of Life in The Lives to Come;149
14.2.3;3 The Conception of the Quality of Life in Creating Perfect People;150
14.2.4;4 Some Supplements – The Conception of the Quality of Life in The Ethical Project;153
14.2.5;5 Problems and Open Questions in Kitcher’s Conception of the Quality of Life;154
14.2.6;6 Conclusion;158
15;Blank Page;160
16.1;WELL-ORDERED PHILOSOPHY?;161
16.2;REFLECTIONS ON KITCHER’S PROPOSAL FOR A RENEWAL OF PHILOSOPHY;161
16.2.1;1 Introduction: The Shortcomings of Contemporary Philosophy;161
16.2.2;2 What Instead? – Kitcher’s Vision of a Renewed Philosophy;163
16.2.2.1;2.1 Well-Ordered Science;163
16.2.2.2;2.2 Well-Ordered Philosophy;165
16.2.3;3 Obscurities in and Challenges for the Pragmatic-Naturalistic Vision of Philosophy;166
16.2.3.1;3.1 Where Does Naturalism Come In?;166
16.2.3.2;3.2 Philosophical Experts;169
16.2.3.3;3.3 How Ideal is the Ideal?;171
16.2.4;4 Conclusion;173
16.2.5;References;173
17;Blank Page;174
18.1;SOME ANSWERS, ADMISSIONS, AND EXPLANATIONS;175
18.1.1;1 Introduction;175
18.1.2;2 Darwinism and Theism;176
18.1.3;3 Fallacies in Ethics?;180
18.1.4;4 Well-ordered Science;184
18.1.5;5 Semantics for Kind Terms;187
18.1.6;6 Realism and Pragmatism;190
18.1.7;7 Against the A Priori;194
18.1.8;8 Worthwhile Lives;198
18.1.9;9 Reviving Philosophy;201
18.1.10;References;204
19.1;Well-Ordered Science in a not Well-Ordered Society;77
19.1.1;1 Introduction;77
19.1.2;2 Realization-Focused Theory or Theoretical Approach?;79
19.1.3;3 Features of Kitcher’s Ideal Theory;81
19.1.4;4 Problems with Ideal Theories;82
19.1.5;5 Pluralism and the Restriction to Scientific Arguments;85
19.1.6;6 Conclusion;88
19.1.7;References;89
20;Blank Page;2
21;Blank Page;4