Keppel / Birnes The Psychology of Serial Killer Investigations

The Grisly Business Unit
1. Auflage 2003
ISBN: 978-0-08-051539-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 232 Seiten

Serial killers like Seattle's Ted Bundy, Maryland's Beltway Sniper, Atlanta's Wayne Williams, or England's Peter Sutcliffe usually outsmart the task forces on their trail for long periods of time. Keppel and Birnes take readers inside the operations of serial killer task forces to learn why. What is the underlying psychology of a serial killer and why this defeats task force investigations? This is the first book of its kind that combines state-of-the-art psychological assessment experience with the expertise of a homicide investigator who has tracked some of this country's most notorious serial killers. The author also brings to the book hands-on best practices gleaned from the experience of other task forces. Readers, both professionals and students, will benefit from the comprehensive and critical case reviews, the analysis of what went wrong, what went right, and the after-action recommendations of evaluators in the US, UK, and Canada. The book covers: * The nature of the psychology of a serial killer * How crime assessment profiling reveals that psychology * Why psychological profiles fail * How serial killer task forces defeat themselves * How the media can, and usually does, undermine the task force operation * The big secret of all serial killer investigations: police already have the killer's name * The best practices for catching a serial killer* Comprehensive case reviews of some of the US's and UK's most baffling serial killer cases* A list of best practices for serial killer task force investigators* Recommendations for how to manage comprehensive files and computer records* Practical advice on how to manage the media: what to say and not to say* Insight into what a serial killer might be thinking and doing to stay away from police* Recommendations for setting up and administering long-term investigations* Practical tips on how to maintain a task force's psychological edge and avoid defeatism

Robert D. Keppel, Ph.D. is the President of the Institute for Forensics in Seattle, Washington. He retired after 17 years as the Chief Criminal Investigator with the Washington State Attorney General's Office. With over 25 years of experience, he was Chief Investigator in the Ted Bundy murder cases in the Pacific Northwest. Dr. Keppel has authored a number of books and articles about serial murder. Dr. Keppel has personally investigated, reviewed, or consulted in more than 2000 murder cases. He has lectured extensively to police officers at national seminars on homicide investigation. He has testified in trial as an expert on the method of operation of serial killers, the 'signature aspects' of murder investigations, and police investigations. He is the author of several articles and four books entitled: The Riverman: Ted Bundy and I Hunt the Green River Killer, published in 1995 by Pocket Books, New York, NY; Signature Killers, published in 1997 by Pocket Books, New York, NY; and Murder: A Multidisciplinary Anthology of Readings, published in 1999 by Harcourt Brace, Orlando, FL; Serial Murder: Future Implications for Police Investigations, published in 2000 by Authorlink.com. He received his Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Washington in 1992. He graduated from Washington State University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Police Science and Administration in 1966 and a Master of Arts Degree in Police Science and Administration in 1967. Also, he received a Master of Education Degree from Seattle University in 1979. Dr. Keppel maintains a website for the Institute of Forensics at http://www.iff-murder.com/

Autoren/Hrsg.

Keppel, Robert D.

Birnes, William J.

Leseproben

INTRODUCTION: THE STUDY OF SERIAL MURDER INVESTIGATIONS Serial murder has become part of the public consciousness even though most people are not really sure what it is, why it happens, and much less how to investigate it. This ignorance is as much a part of the professional circles as the lay public. Federal and local law-enforcement officers have a common interest in how to investigate serial murder cases, but no authority has perfected an answer to investigating these most troublesome cases. When the acts of a serial murderer are discovered, these very law-enforcement officers only share the vaguest of ideas on how to solve them. My study of serial murder began in 1974. It was not prompted by any great design, but out of the futility I encountered investigating the murders of eight female coeds later attributed to Theodore Robert Bundy. It was this lack of investigative know-how in this and the subsequent 50 serial murder investigations that I have been involved in, as an investigator or a consultant, that forced me to continue studying for the last 25 years. The pursuit of successful procedures in the investigation of the serial killer is what drove me to continue. As I studied, first techniques of homicide investigation and then the crime of serial murder itself, I was struck with how remote the reality I saw was from the rhetoric I heard. The most potent example was from the early 1980s at a homicide investigation seminar in Atlanta, GA. A detective from Florida, who investigated the 40-plus murders of Gerald Stano, was giving a lecture about the unique use of sodium pentathol in interviewing a serial killer. His presentation was well received, but I detected a tinge of shame in his voice. After the presentation, I introduced myself to him. Immediately, he took on the role of a subservient and humble person. He claimed he had come to hear me speak about methods for investigating serial killers. At first I was dismayed, and then started recognizing and commending him for his presentation to the group of over 300 investigators. But it wasn’t long before his true emotions were laid out on his sleeve. He hung his head as though he possessed a heavy burden. He was a combination of the psychologically stressed victim of a serial killer and the investigator undergoing the political and administrative lack of support within his own law-enforcement agency. His main complaint was that his work was unappreciated. What a contrast; he went from the experienced and proud investigator-presenter to the emotionally whipped person standing before me. This psychological dichotomy has stuck with me for years. What happened to cause this hard-working detective to finish his career without the respect of his co-workers? This perspective is not easily stated, but I begin by pointing out what serial murder investigation is and isn’t all about. By the end of this book, the reader will appreciate how these cases psychologically affect the personnel involved in those investigations. Few offenses involve a sole operator. Instead, they often consist of groups or teams of individuals that, to a greater or lesser extent, have to interact to make the offense possible and make it beneficial for the criminals. This is most obvious in what is known as “organized” crime. To understand how these crimes are possible, the implicit and formal organizational networks of which they are a part, have to be understood (Canter and Allison, 1999). We know more about solving cases in which there are perpetrators acting in concert, and the research in this area is abundant. But how can serial murders be understood and solved when most of the cases are committed by one person, and not a member acting in concert with other members of the group? Canter’s point is that examining the profile of the criminal entrepreneur is not sufficient unless one also has a grasp of the entrepreneurial landscape. What is so troublesome about serial murder investigations is that no formal research has ever taken place that aids police in understanding the serial killer’s landscape and how to solve these types of cases. Worse yet, the social fabric between the investigative team and the serial killers is often intertwined—they do, after all, have some overlapping social concerns. Predatory crime does not merely victimize individuals, it impedes and, in the extreme case, even prevents the formation and maintenance of community (Wilson, 1975). When a disturbed man kills his girlfriend at her home in a rage of jealousy and in a blizzard of bullets, the murder investigation is solved quickly. The boyfriend is present when police officers arrive, possibly more afraid of what he’s done than of the punishment he may be facing. He hands over the gun while he tries to explain the circumstances of the shooting before the police can stop him so they can read him his rights first. However, when a nude female is found raped, stabbed, and strangled in a remote wooded area, the case takes on a complexity far from the norm. The solution is not imminent. Not only do the investigating officers have a “who done it,” worse yet, they have a “who is it.” Even further complicating this case is that the victim may be one of others by the same killer. This book focuses on the psychological behavior of detectives and the effects of investigating the grisly business of serial murder cases by members of law-enforcement agencies. In my study of the UK’s longest running serial killer case, outlined in Chapter 2, a complex serial murder investigation is examined. It is prototypical in the sense that the killer was active for a number of years, killing more than ten prostitutes and assaulting others, before the police discovered his identity as Peter Sutcliffe. The Yorkshire Ripper Task force experienced all the typical ills of investigating an ongoing serial killer case: numerous victims, thousands of suspects, poor control and coordination of incoming leads, inexperienced personnel to investigate or supervise, improper media relations, investigations conducted on tangents, ill-conceived procedures in prioritizing investigative leads, and inadequate filing procedures of case materials. The Yorkshire Ripper cases are atypical because the British Parliament conducted a major review critical of the investigative procedures; a procedure unprecedented in U.S. criminal investigations. The product of the review was the discovery of a multitude of investigative errors and the establishment of the HOLMES system, a central repository of case information in major cases. That kind of database, along with the ability of investigators to draw on the data contained therein, goes a long way to solve many of the information disconnects that plague interagency task force investigations, particularly the cases involving serial offenders such as killers and sex offenders. But what have we learned from all of this? Just this past year, in October 2002, a shooting spree inside one of the most policed areas of our country defied a joint task force comprised not only of highly trained police officers from local agencies but the FBI, ATF, and perhaps even other federal agencies that we don’t even know about. My brief review of the DC Beltway sniper case will show that not only did the individuals charged with these crimes, but not as of this writing either tried or convicted, manage to elude a massive manhunt including military aircraft, but they left a visible trail across the very areas the police were patrolling. Police in at least six different states along with federal authorities are only now beginning to put together the pieces of one of the most troubling coast-to-coast murder and felony murder sprees in American history. This was a shooting spree that took place in the months before the DC Beltway shootings actually began, and it took place right under the noses of police in local jurisdictions who couldn’t put the pieces together until after weapons were retrieved and ballistics identified them as the murder weapons. The primary suspects in the DC Beltway shootings have been charged with some of the shootings in other states. The investigation, now beginning to come together, is already revealing disturbing aspects about how warning signs were laid out and simply missed, how leads were not followed, and how similar patterns of crimes, because they were outside the immediate jurisdictions impacted during the DC Beltway shootings, were not considered by a narrowly focused task force. This points to the heart of what I intend to show in my study: The exclusivity of data in task force investigations and the reliance on superficial modus operandi (MO) profiles not only doesn’t further a task force serial homicide investigation, but actually distracts investigators and detracts from the overall effectiveness of the task force. The exclusivity and profiling in the DC Beltway shootings, as we will see, actually might have eliminated potential evidence that needed to be evaluated and which might have resulted in an earlier resolution of the case. This case, and others like it, will enable us to show, as a general rule, that inclusiveness rather than exclusivity is a better methodology of data management for serial homicide task force investigations. Serial homicide investigations succeed or fail on whether the police know what they have on their hands, how they accept the truth, and how they manage it once they’ve accepted it. Accordingly, I will explore thoroughly how task forces deal with the key factors of recognition, acknowledgement, and control. In other words, it will...