Klir Predictive Simplicity

Induction Exhum'd
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-1-4832-8702-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 5, 210 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: IFSR International Series on Systems Science and Engineering

The book attempts to develop an account of simplicity in terms of testability, and to use this account to provide an adequate characterization of induction, one immune to the class of problems suggested by Nelson Goodman. It is then shown that the past success of induction, thus characterized, constitutes evidence for its future success. A qualitative measure of confirmation is developed, and this measure - along with the considerations of simplicity - is used to provide an account of the consilience of inductions, and also an inductivist account of the structure and progress of scientific theory. An appendix extends the treatment of simplicity to statistical distributions and provides a reasonable interpretation of the maximum entropy principle. Thus, this book is an attempt to characterize induction in terms of a well-defined notion of simplicity and to use that characterization as a basis of an account of empirical, and in particular, scientific reasoning.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Klir, George J.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Predictive Simplicity: Induction Exhum'd;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;6
6;Preface;12
7;Part I: The Evolution of the Problem;16
7.1;Section 1: The Justification of Induction;18
7.1.1;Chapter 1. Hume's Problem;18
7.1.1.1;1 The scope of induction;18
7.1.1.2;2 The point of justification;20
7.1.1.3;3 Major lines of progress;22
7.1.1.4;Notes;25
7.1.2;Chapter 2. The Inductivist Solution;26
7.1.2.1;1 Braithwaite's approach;27
7.1.2.2;2 Black's approach;29
7.1.2.3;3 Reasons for the failure of the inductive approach;31
7.1.2.4;Notes;32
7.1.3;Chapter 3. The Pragmatic Vindication;33
7.1.3.1;1 Reichenbach's vindication;33
7.1.3.2;2 Salmon's modifications;35
7.1.3.3;3 Criticisms of the pragmatic approach;36
7.1.3.4;4 Reasons for the failure of the pragmatic approach;41
7.1.3.5;Notes;42
7.1.4;Chapter 4. The Dissolution of the Problem;43
7.1.4.1;1 The analyticity of the reasonableness of induction;43
7.1.4.2;2 Strawson's claims;44
7.1.4.3;3 The analyticity of reasonableness and the naturalistic fallacy;45
7.1.4.4;4 Goodman's analogy with the justification of deduction;49
7.1.4.5;Notes;50
7.2;Section 2: The Characterization of Induction;52
7.2.1;Chapter 5. Goodman's New Riddle and the Justification of Induction;52
7.2.1.1;1 The new riddle;52
7.2.1.2;2 The effect of the new riddle on solutions to Hume's problem;53
7.2.1.3;Notes;56
7.2.2;Chapter 6. A Closer Look at Goodman's New Riddle;58
7.2.2.1;1 Five conditions necessary to a solution;58
7.2.2.2;2 Goodman's own solution;62
7.2.2.3;3 Suggestions for a positive approach;64
7.2.2.4;Notes;65
8;Part II: The Resolution of the Problem;68
8.1;Section 3: An Account of Simplicity;70
8.1.1;Chapter 7. Simplicity: Raw;70
8.1.1.1;1 Simplicity as testability;70
8.1.1.2;2 Prior accounts of testability;71
8.1.1.3;3 A new account of testability;73
8.1.1.4;4 A more systematic treatment;74
8.1.1.5;5 The definition of simplicity;78
8.1.1.6;6 Several examples;78
8.1.1.7;7 Simplicity, logical strength, emergent properties, natural kinds;81
8.1.1.8;Notes;83
8.1.2;Chapter 8. Simplicity: Refined;84
8.1.2.1;1 Simplicity orderings;84
8.1.2.2;2 A preliminary distinction;85
8.1.2.3;3 The revised account;86
8.1.2.4;4 The simplicity of mathematical relationships;87
8.1.2.5;5 An extension of the account of simplicity to cases of dimension;89
8.1.2.6;6 Several examples involving considerations of dimension;91
8.1.2.7;7 A conflict of standards;92
8.1.2.8;8 Some more substantive results;94
8.1.2.9;9 Concluding remarks;97
8.1.2.10;Notes;98
8.2;Section 4: The Explication of Induction;100
8.2.1;Chapter 9. Induction as Simplicity;100
8.2.1.1;1 The scope of this definition;100
8.2.1.2;2 Goodman's new riddle;101
8.2.1.3;3 Some remarks on induction and projectibility;106
8.2.1.4;Notes;106
8.2.2;Chapter 10. Induction Justified;107
8.2.2.1;1 The gist of the justification;107
8.2.2.2;2 Some preliminaries;107
8.2.2.3;3 The justification;110
8.2.2.4;4 Coarse graining;112
8.2.2.5;5 A modification of Hempel's special consequence condition;117
8.2.2.6;6 Response to objections;119
8.2.2.7;7 Remarks on the nature of this justification;122
8.2.2.8;Notes;124
8.3;Section 5: Some Implications of Induction;125
8.3.1;Chapter 11. Inductive Logic and Confirmation;125
8.3.1.1;1 Inductive logic as opposed to probability theory and mathematical statistics;125
8.3.1.2;2 A non-probabilistic component of inductive logic – simplicity;127
8.3.1.3;3 A probabilistic component of inductive logic – evidential support;129
8.3.1.4;4 The paradoxes of confirmation;138
8.3.1.5;Notes;143
8.3.2;Chapter 12. The Consilience of Inductions;147
8.3.2.1;1 Arguments that theories are dispensible;148
8.3.2.2;2 An account of inductive systematization;151
8.3.2.3;3 The impossibility of a purely probabilistic account of consilience;154
8.3.2.4;4 The importance of consilience;157
8.3.2.5;Notes;158
8.3.3;Chapter 13. The Resilience of Induction;160
8.3.3.1;1 Popper's criticisms of the inductivist program;160
8.3.3.2;2 An inductivist critique of Popper's program;164
8.3.3.3;3 An inductivist critique of Lakatos's modifications;165
8.3.3.4;4 Replies to 'incommensurabilist' programs;169
8.3.3.5;Notes;172
8.3.4;Chapter 14. A Logic of Scientific Discovery;174
8.3.4.1;1 The role of simplicity;174
8.3.4.2;2 The role of confirmation;179
8.3.4.3;3 Combined considerations;180
8.3.4.4;Notes;183
9;Appendix: A Measure of Statistical Simplicity;185
9.1;1 A measure of statistical simplicity;186
9.2;2 The maximum-entropy principle;188
9.3;3 The interpretation of the maximum-entropy principle;191
9.4;4 The resolution of the incompatibility between the maximum-entropy principle and Bayesian conditionalization;193
9.5;5 The justification of particular prior probability distributions;194
9.6;Notes;199
10;REFERENCES;202
11;NAME INDEX;208
12;SUBJECT INDEX;210