Epistemic Paternalism

A Defence
2013. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-0-230-34789-2
Verlag: Palgrave MacMillan UK

Buch, Englisch, 194 Seiten, Format (B × H): 144 mm x 223 mm, Gewicht: 3648 g

Any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways faces a problem: While we acknowledge that others stand to benefit from intellectual advice, each and every one of us tends to consider ourselves an exception, on account of overconfidence. The solution? Accept a form of epistemic paternalism.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Loparo, Kenneth A

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Sozialpsychologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Sozialphilosophie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Psychologie Allgemeine Psychologie Differentielle Psychologie, Persönlichkeitspsychologie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves For Epistemic Improvement 2. Epistemic Paternalism Defined 3. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Personal Autonomy 4. On The Viability Of Epistemic Paternalism: Epistemic Autonomy 5. Justifying Epistemic Paternalism 6. Epistemic Paternalism Defended Bibliography Index

Über Autor(innen)

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. He specializes in social epistemology and epistemic normativity.