E-Book, Englisch, 281 Seiten
E-Book, Englisch, 281 Seiten
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7160-6
Verlag: Elsevier Reference Monographs
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Front Cover;1
2;Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Contributors;8
6;Preface;10
7;Chapter 1. Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition: Presentation;12
7.1;1. INTRODUCTION;12
7.2;2. COOPERATION VERSUS NONCOOPERATION;15
7.3;3. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF AGENTS;16
7.4;4. PERFECT COMPETITION AS THE ABSENCE OF MONOPOLY POWER;22
7.5;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;25
7.6;REFERENCES;25
8;Chapter 2. Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives;28
8.1;1. INTRODUCTION;28
8.2;2. THE ONE-PERIOD COURNOT GAME;31
8.3;3. THE SEVERAL-PERIOD COURNOT GAME;34
8.4;4. EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA;37
8.5;5. LARGE NUMBER OF FIRMS: THE FIXED-DEMAND CASE;38
8.6;6. LARGE NUMBERS OF FIRMS: THE REPLICATION CASE;42
8.7;7. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF PERFECT EPSILON-EQUILIBRIUM;45
8.8;8. INTERPRETATIONS OF EPSILON;45
8.9;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;46
8.10;REFERENCES;46
9;Chapter 3. Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets;48
9.1;1. INTRODUCTION;48
9.2;2. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA WHICH SUPPORT THE MONOPOLY ALLOCATION;50
9.3;3. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA WHICH SUPPORT THE MONOPOLY ALLOCATION (continued);54
9.4;4. AN INCLUSION THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES;57
9.5;5. A LIMIT THEOREM FOR ANONYMOUS REPEATED GAMES WITH RANDOM OUTCOMES;62
9.6;6. CONCLUDING REMARKS;71
9.7;APPENDIX: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF A RANDOM PATH;73
9.8;REFERENCES;74
10;Chapter 4. The No-Surplus Condition as a Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium;76
10.1;I. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS;77
10.2;II. THE
NO-SURPLUS CONDITION AND ITS DUAL IN;79
10.3;III. WALRASIAN AND PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM;84
10.4;IV. THE
NO-SURPLUS CONDITION AND ITS DUAL IN;88
10.5;V. NO-SURPLUS AND CORE EQUIVALENCE AS ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM;96
10.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;99
10.7;REFERENCES;99
11;Chapter 5. A Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Economies with Production;102
11.1;1. COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS AS NO SURPLUS ALLOCATIONS;103
11.2;2. PROFITS AS RENTS;106
11.3;3. A SPECIAL CASE OF THE MODEL: A SIMPLE PRODUCTION ECONOMY;112
11.4;REFERENCES;115
12;Chapter 6. Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion, and the Organization of Economic Activity;116
12.1;1. THE PRELIMINARIES: THE BASIC MODEL;118
12.2;2. THE FIRM'S OBJECTIVE AND THE CONCEPT OF EQUILIBRIUM;119
12.3;3. PROFITS TO INDIVIDUALLY IMPROVING WELFARE;123
12.4;4. THE EFFICIENCY OF FWE IN THE ABSENCE OF PECUNIARY EXTERNALITIES;124
12.5;5. THE STRUCTURE OF FIRMS;132
12.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;135
12.7;REFERENCES;135
13;Chapter 7. Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium;138
13.1;INTRODUCTION;138
13.2;THE MODEL;141
13.3;THEOREMS;142
13.4;REFERENCES;149
14;Chapter 8. The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition;152
14.1;1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY;152
14.2;2. THE MODEL;154
14.3;3. PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE LIMITS OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION;159
14.4;4. CRITICAL EQUILIBRIA;163
14.5;5. PATHOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES;168
14.6;6. UNCERTAINTY AND CRITICAL EQUILIBRIA;170
14.7;7. CONCLUDING REMARKS;173
14.8;REFERENCES;174
15;Chapter 9. Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation;176
15.1;1. INTRODUCTION;176
15.2;2. THE MODEL;178
15.3;3. PROPERTIES OF MONOPOLISTICALLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE FINITE ECONOMIES;184
15.4;4. SOME EXAMPLES;193
15.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;199
15.6;APPENDIX;201
15.7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;208
15.8;REFERENCES;208
16;Chapter 10. Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models;210
16.1;1. INTRODUCTION;210
16.2;2. EXISTENCE AND PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM;213
16.3;3. REMARKS;215
16.4;4. CONCLUSION;219
16.5;APPENDIX;219
16.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;223
16.7;REFERENCES;223
17;Chapter 11. Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry;224
17.1;APPENDIX;233
17.2;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;235
17.3;REFERENCES;235
18;Chapter 12. Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach;236
18.1;1. INTRODUCTION;236
18.2;2. COMMODITIES, AGENTS, ASSIGNMENTS;238
18.3;3. ECONOMIES;239
18.4;4. STRATEGIC MARKETS GAMES;239
18.5;5. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA;241
18.6;6. AXIOMS;242
18.7;7. THE CONTINUUM AS A MODEL FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS;243
18.8;8. PROPER AND FULL COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA;245
18.9;9. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CN NET TRADE ALLOCATIONS IN THE FINITE NUMBER OF TRADERS CASE;246
18.10;10. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CN NET TRADE ALLOCATIONS IN THE CONTINUUM OF TRADERS CASE;248
18.11;11. SOME EXAMPLES;253
18.12;12. ON THE CONCEPT OF STRICT COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTINUUM ECONOMIES;256
18.13;REFERENCES;258
19;Chapter 13. Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency;260
19.1;1. INTRODUCTION;260
19.2;2. FlNITENESS AND INEFFICIENCY;261
19.3;3. PROOF OF THEOREM;262
19.4;4. CONCLUDING REMARKS;270
19.5;APPENDIX;271
19.6;REFERENCES;272
20;Index;274
