Mas-Colell Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7160-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 280 Seiten, Web PDF

Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics: A Series of Monographs and Textbooks: Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition focuses on the application of noncooperative approaches to the theory of perfect competition, including Cournot game, no-surplus condition, and Nash equilibria. The selection first elaborates on collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives and noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets. Discussions focus on noncooperative equilibria which support the monopoly allocation, alternative definition of perfect epsilon-equilibrium, one-period Cournot game, fixed-demand case, and replication case. The book takes a look at noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets, no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium, perfect competition, profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity. Topics include profits to individually improving welfare, structure of firms, competitive allocations as no surplus allocations, profits as rents, Walrasian and perfectly competitive equilibrium, and no-surplus and core equivalence as alternative characterizations of perfectly competitive equilibrium. The manuscript ponders on Nash equilibria of market games and efficiency properties of strategic market games, as well as commodities, agents, assignments, strategic markets games, proper and full Cournot-Nash equilibria, and finiteness and inefficiency. The selection is a valuable source of data for researchers interested in noncooperative approaches to the theory of perfect competition.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Mas-Colell, Andreu

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;Contributors;8
6;Preface;10
7;Chapter 1. Noncooperative Approaches to the Theory of Perfect Competition: Presentation;12
7.1;1. INTRODUCTION;12
7.2;2. COOPERATION VERSUS NONCOOPERATION;15
7.3;3. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF AGENTS;16
7.4;4. PERFECT COMPETITION AS THE ABSENCE OF MONOPOLY POWER;22
7.5;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;25
7.6;REFERENCES;25
8;Chapter 2. Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives;28
8.1;1. INTRODUCTION;28
8.2;2. THE ONE-PERIOD COURNOT GAME;31
8.3;3. THE SEVERAL-PERIOD COURNOT GAME;34
8.4;4. EPSILON-EQUILIBRIA;37
8.5;5. LARGE NUMBER OF FIRMS: THE FIXED-DEMAND CASE;38
8.6;6. LARGE NUMBERS OF FIRMS: THE REPLICATION CASE;42
8.7;7. AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF PERFECT EPSILON-EQUILIBRIUM;45
8.8;8. INTERPRETATIONS OF EPSILON;45
8.9;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;46
8.10;REFERENCES;46
9;Chapter 3. Noncooperative Price Taking in Large Dynamic Markets;48
9.1;1. INTRODUCTION;48
9.2;2. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA WHICH SUPPORT THE MONOPOLY ALLOCATION;50
9.3;3. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA WHICH SUPPORT THE MONOPOLY ALLOCATION (continued);54
9.4;4. AN INCLUSION THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES;57
9.5;5. A LIMIT THEOREM FOR ANONYMOUS REPEATED GAMES WITH RANDOM OUTCOMES;62
9.6;6. CONCLUDING REMARKS;71
9.7;APPENDIX: EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF A RANDOM PATH;73
9.8;REFERENCES;74
10;Chapter 4. The No-Surplus Condition as a Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium;76
10.1;I. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS;77
10.2;II. THE
NO-SURPLUS CONDITION AND ITS DUAL IN;79
10.3;III. WALRASIAN AND PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM;84
10.4;IV. THE
NO-SURPLUS CONDITION AND ITS DUAL IN;88
10.5;V. NO-SURPLUS AND CORE EQUIVALENCE AS ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERIZATIONS OF PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM;96
10.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;99
10.7;REFERENCES;99
11;Chapter 5. A Characterization of Perfectly Competitive Economies with Production;102
11.1;1. COMPETITIVE ALLOCATIONS AS NO SURPLUS ALLOCATIONS;103
11.2;2. PROFITS AS RENTS;106
11.3;3. A SPECIAL CASE OF THE MODEL: A SIMPLE PRODUCTION ECONOMY;112
11.4;REFERENCES;115
12;Chapter 6. Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion, and the Organization of Economic Activity;116
12.1;1. THE PRELIMINARIES: THE BASIC MODEL;118
12.2;2. THE FIRM'S OBJECTIVE AND THE CONCEPT OF EQUILIBRIUM;119
12.3;3. PROFITS TO INDIVIDUALLY IMPROVING WELFARE;123
12.4;4. THE EFFICIENCY OF FWE IN THE ABSENCE OF PECUNIARY EXTERNALITIES;124
12.5;5. THE STRUCTURE OF FIRMS;132
12.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;135
12.7;REFERENCES;135
13;Chapter 7. Small Efficient Scale as a Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium;138
13.1;INTRODUCTION;138
13.2;THE MODEL;141
13.3;THEOREMS;142
13.4;REFERENCES;149
14;Chapter 8. The Limit Points of Monopolistic Competition;152
14.1;1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY;152
14.2;2. THE MODEL;154
14.3;3. PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE LIMITS OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION;159
14.4;4. CRITICAL EQUILIBRIA;163
14.5;5. PATHOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES;168
14.6;6. UNCERTAINTY AND CRITICAL EQUILIBRIA;170
14.7;7. CONCLUDING REMARKS;173
14.8;REFERENCES;174
15;Chapter 9. Perfect Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation;176
15.1;1. INTRODUCTION;176
15.2;2. THE MODEL;178
15.3;3. PROPERTIES OF MONOPOLISTICALLY COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE FINITE ECONOMIES;184
15.4;4. SOME EXAMPLES;193
15.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;199
15.6;APPENDIX;201
15.7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;208
15.8;REFERENCES;208
16;Chapter 10. Equilibrium in Simple Spatial (or Differentiated Product) Models;210
16.1;1. INTRODUCTION;210
16.2;2. EXISTENCE AND PROPERTIES OF EQUILIBRIUM;213
16.3;3. REMARKS;215
16.4;4. CONCLUSION;219
16.5;APPENDIX;219
16.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;223
16.7;REFERENCES;223
17;Chapter 11. Entry (and Exit) in a Differentiated Industry;224
17.1;APPENDIX;233
17.2;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;235
17.3;REFERENCES;235
18;Chapter 12. Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach;236
18.1;1. INTRODUCTION;236
18.2;2. COMMODITIES, AGENTS, ASSIGNMENTS;238
18.3;3. ECONOMIES;239
18.4;4. STRATEGIC MARKETS GAMES;239
18.5;5. NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA;241
18.6;6. AXIOMS;242
18.7;7. THE CONTINUUM AS A MODEL FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS;243
18.8;8. PROPER AND FULL COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA;245
18.9;9. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CN NET TRADE ALLOCATIONS IN THE FINITE NUMBER OF TRADERS CASE;246
18.10;10. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CN NET TRADE ALLOCATIONS IN THE CONTINUUM OF TRADERS CASE;248
18.11;11. SOME EXAMPLES;253
18.12;12. ON THE CONCEPT OF STRICT COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONTINUUM ECONOMIES;256
18.13;REFERENCES;258
19;Chapter 13. Nash Equilibria of Market Games: Finiteness and Inefficiency;260
19.1;1. INTRODUCTION;260
19.2;2. FlNITENESS AND INEFFICIENCY;261
19.3;3. PROOF OF THEOREM;262
19.4;4. CONCLUDING REMARKS;270
19.5;APPENDIX;271
19.6;REFERENCES;272
20;Index;274