The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement

2015. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-1-137-40089-5
Verlag: Palgrave MacMillan UK

Buch, Englisch, 190 Seiten, Format (B × H): 140 mm x 216 mm, Gewicht: 386 g

Reihe: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Matheson, J.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1. Introduction 2. Idealized Disagreement 3. Steadfast Views of Disagreement 4. Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and the Equal Weight View 5. Objections to the Equal Weight View 6. Everyday Disagreements 7. Objections 8. Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

Über Autor(innen)

Jonathan Matheson is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Florida. He works mainly in epistemology, and has published articles in Philosophical Studies, Episteme, and Social Epistemology among others, and is the co-editor (with Rico VItz) of The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social.