Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design

2001
ISBN: 978-3-8244-9063-9
Verlag: Deutscher Universitätsverlag

Buch, Deutsch, Band 97, 175 Seiten, Paperback, Format (B × H): 148 mm x 210 mm, Gewicht: 266 g

Reihe: Beiträge zur betriebswirtschaftlichen Forschung

Silke Neubauer analyses the implications of multimarket contact and organizational devices for market strategies and market results within a game-theoretic framework.

Zielgruppe

Graduate

Autoren/Hrsg.

Neubauer, Silke

Fachgebiete

• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftsphilosophie
• Wirtschaftswissenschaften Volkswirtschaftslehre Volkswirtschaftslehre Allgemein Verhaltensökonomik
• Mathematik | Informatik Mathematik Operations Research Spieltheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1 Introduction.- 2 The impact of multimarket contact on the strategic behavior of firms.- 2.1 Classical concepts.- 2.2 The role of organization for multimarket firms.- 3 The basic game with centralized decision making.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 The basic model.- 3.3 The Cournot-Nash outcome.- 3.4 The outcome of joint profit maximization.- 3.5 Summary.- 4 Strategic delegation and multimarket contact.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The delegation game.- 4.3 Welfare effects.- 4.4 Summary.- 5 Commitment and multimarket contact.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 Strategic cost allocation in multimarket firms.- 5.3 Commitment through endogenous timing.- 5.4 Conclusion.- 6 Interdivisional information sharing and multimarket contact.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The general setting.- 6.3 The Cournot game.- 6.4 The information game.- 6.5 Welfare Effects.- 6.6 Information costs.- 6.7 Endogeneizing the incentive choice?.- 6.8 Summary.- 7 Collusion and multimarket contact in a repeated game.- 7.1 A general framework.- 7.2 Collusion by centralized firms with cost linkages.- 7.3 Sustainability of collusive outcomes in decentralized firms.- 7.4 The impact of the organizational structure on collusion.- 7.5 Summary.- 8 Conclusion.- A.A Appendix to Chapter 3.- A.B Appendix to chapter 4.- A.B.1 The incentive game.- A.B.2 Welfare effects.- A.B.3 Upper boundary for g.- A.0 Appendix to chapter 5.- A. C.1 Strategic cost allocation.- A.C.1.1 Solution of the last two stages.- A.C.1.2 The delegation game.- A. C.2 Welfare effects.- A. C. 3 Endogenous timing.- A.C.3.1 Solution of the second stage.- A.C.3.2 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations.- A.C.3.3 Welfare differences.- A.D Appendix to chapter 6.- A.D.1 Restrictions on g.- A.D.2 Delegation vs. centralization.- A.D.3 Linear strategy equilibrium without information sharing.- A.D.4 Linear strategy equilibrium for asymmetric information structures.- A.D.5 Calculations leading to proposition 6.2.- A.E Appendix to chapter 7.- A.E.1 One market collusion and output shares.- A. E. 2 One market collusion with and without cost linkages.- A.E.3 Pooled vs. separated incentive constraints.- A.E.4 Two market collusion and output shares.- A.E.4.1 Deviation profit minimizing output shares.- A.E.4.2 The minimal critical discount factor in the case of diseconomies of scope.- A. E. 5 Equal output shares in case of divisional ization.- A.E.6 Critical discount factors for two market collusion.- A.E. 7 The impact of ?.- References.

Über Autor(innen)

Dr. Silke Neubauer promovierte bei Prof. Dr. Horst Albach an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Sie ist Unternehmensberaterin bei der Boston Consulting Group.