A New Institutional Economics Approach
1. Auflage 2019,
327 Seiten, Kartoniert, Paperback, Format (B × H): 155 mm x 235 mm, Gewicht: 534 g
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Oritani The Japanese Central Banking System Compared with Its European and American CounterpartsThis book uniquely explores the role and governance mechanism of central banks by applying new institutional economics (NIE). Simultaneously, the book tests the analytical viability of NIE when applied to an organization that has both public and private characteristics. Special attention is paid to the Bank of Japan (BOJ) based on the author’s 30 years of work experience and “participant observation” there, touching upon discussion of central bank independence. The book argues that central bank independence cannot be defended solely by law, and a mechanism to eliminate requests from politicians needs to be embedded within the governance structure.The book also provides a comparative analysis between the BOJ and central banks in Europe and the USA. In reviewing the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, it suggests possible measures based on behavioral economics and public choice theory. These theory-based analyses provide useful insights when considering matters such as whether a central bank should issue electronic money or the European system of central banks could be established in Asia.
Weitere Infos & Material
ForewordPrefaceAcknowledgements1 Rationale of Central Banks1.1 Overview1.2 Earlier Studies1.2.1 Bagehot’s Study1.2.2 Sayers’ Study1.2.3 Smith’s Study1.2.4 Hayek’s Study1.3 Three Types of Banking Systems and Three Modes of Economic Systems1.3.1 Three Types of Banking Systems1.3.2 Examples of Type Change from Type A to Type C in Japan and the US1.3.3 Three Modes of Economic Systems1.3.4 Transaction Costs and Modes of Economic Systems1.3.5 Asset Specificity and Modes of Economic Systems1.4 Analysis of Transaction Costs in Interbank Transactions1.4.1 Methodology1.4.2 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with no Central Bank1.4.3 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with Central Bank Only1.4.4 Transaction Costs of a Banking System with Both Central Bank and Commercial Banks1.5 Importance of Institutional Environment and Recent Changes1.5.1 Institutional Environment and its Influence1.5.2 Recent Major Changes in the Institutional Environment1.6 Implications for Institutional Issues of Central Banks1.6.1 Evolution of a Supranational Central Bank 1.6.2 Bankers’ Associations vs. Central Banks 1.6.3 Central Bank as Supervisor 1.6.4 Clients and Business Scope of Central Banks1.7 Conclusion 2 Governance Structure of Central Banks2.1 Overview2.2 Governance Structure Theory of New Institutional Economics2.2.1 Williamson’s Governance Structure Theory2.2.2 Theory of Club Goods and Governance Structure of Club Organization2.3 Application to Central Bank Governance Structure2.3.1 Central Bank Services and Organizational Features 2.3.2 Arguments on the Governance Structure of Central Banks2.4 Designing a Central Bank Board Structure2.4.1 Multiboard Structure2.4.2 Examples of a Central Bank Multiboard Structure2.5 Role of Capital Stock2.5.1 Identifying Matters Related to Central Bank Capital Stock2.5.2 Application of Williamson’s Theory to Capital Stock2.5.3 Central Bank Capital Stock from the Perspective of Organizational Culture Theory2.6 Conclusion 3 Public Governance of Central Banks3.1 Overview3.2 Application of Transaction Cost Economics 3.2.1 Application of Williamson’s Governance as Probity Hypothesis3.2.2 Application of Moe’s Theory on the Autonomy of a Bureaucratic Organization3.3 Application of Agency Theory 3.3.1 Agency Theory and the Political Process 3.3.2 Features of the Principal-Agent Relationship of a Central Bank 3.3.3 Congressional Dominance Hypothesis and the Central Bank 3.3.4 Multiboard System of the Central Bank Based on Agency Theory 3.3.5 Agency Problem of a Central Bank and Accountability3.4 Application of Public Choice Theory 3.4.1 Cycle Theory Under Majority Rule and Central Banks 3.4.2 Vote-Maximizing Behavior Hypothesis and Countermeasures3.5 Conclusion 4 Governance of Monetary Policy4.1 Overview4.2 Issue Identification 4.2.1 What is Monetary Policy? 4.2.2 Period When Monetary Policy was Conceived 4.2.3 Governance Issues of Monetary Policy4.3 Approach from Transaction Cost Economics 4.3.1 Integration of Monetary Policy and Market Operation Bodies 4.3.2 Integration of Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Policy Bodies4.3.3 Integration of Monetary Policy and Unconventional Monetary Policy Bodies 4.3.4 Integration of Monetary Policy and Prudential Policy Bodies 4.3.5 Implications of the Arguments4.4 Approach from Agency Theory 4.4.1 Outline of Multitask Agency Theory 4.4.2 Multitask Agency Problem in a Central Bank4.5 Approach from the Theory of Organizational Culture 4.5.1 Outline of the Theory of Organizational Culture 4.5.2 Application of Theory of Organizational Culture to a Central Bank4.6 Conclusion 5 Ownership of Prudential Policy5.1 Overview5.2 Issue Identification 5.2.1 Categories of Prudential Policy 5.2.2 Ownership Issue of Prudential Policy5.3 Theoretical Analysis of the Integration of Policy Bodies 5.3.1 Macro and Micro Integration 5.3.2 Integration of Supervisors of Multiple Financial Industries 5.3.3 Issue of Overlapping Supervisors5.4 Theoretical Analysis of a Central Bank’s Role in Prudential Policy 5.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of Conflict of Interest5.4.2 Purpose and Rationale Behind Central Bank Involvement in Prudential Policy 5.4.3 Implications for Central Bank Role in Prudential Policy5.5 Case of Japan and the US 5.5.1 Japan’s Case 5.5.2 Case of the US5.6 Conclusion 6 Role of Central Banks in Financial Crisis Management6.1 Overview6.2 Study of the Failure of Financial Crisis Management by the US Authorities 6.2.1 Effects and Process of the US Originated Global Financial Crisis 6.2.2 Outline of Behavioral New Institutional Economics 6.2.3 Failure of Neoclassical Economics-Based Strategy 6.2.4 Failure of Behavioral Economics-Based Strategy 6.2.5 Failure of Transaction Cost Economics-Based Strategy6.3 The Importance of Risk Money in Financial Crisis Management 6.3.1 Financial Crisis Management Strategy 6.3.2 Risk Money Provision by a Central Bank 6.3.3 Risk Taking by a Central Bank and Seigniorage Utilization 6.3.4 Case Study of Financial Crisis in Japan6.4 Conclusion 7 Scope and Governance of Central Bank Payment and Settlement Systems7.1 Overview7.2 Diversification of Central Bank Payment and Settlement Systems 7.2.1 Diversification from RTGS to Securities Settlement System 7.2.2 Diversification into Retail Payment Systems7.3 Globalization of Central Bank Payment and Settlement Systems 7.3.1 Chronology of CLS Bank’s Establishment 7.3.2 Implications of Process Leading to Establishment of CLS Bank7.3.3 Provision of Cross-Border Settlement Services by Central Banks and Bureaucracy Costs7.4 Governance of Central Bank Payment and Settlement Systems7.4.1 Potential for Conflict of Interest Between Provision of Payment and Settlement Systems and Supervisory Function7.4.2 Possibility of Achieving Governance of Payment and Settlement System Through Competition7.4.3 Bureaucracy Costs and Countermeasures of Central Bank Payment and Settlement Systems7.5 Conclusion 8 Epilogue