Sacconi / Blair / Freeman | Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance | E-Book | sack.de
E-Book

E-Book, Englisch, 441 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: International Economic Association Series

Sacconi / Blair / Freeman Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance

The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines

E-Book, Englisch, 441 Seiten, eBook

Reihe: International Economic Association Series

ISBN: 978-0-230-30211-2
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen (»Systemvoraussetzungen)



Corporate social responsibility is examined in this book as multi-stakeholder approach to corporate governance. This volume outlines neo-institutional and stakeholder theories of the firm, new rational choice and social contract normative models, self regulatory and soft law models, and the advances from behavioural economics.
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Weitere Infos & Material


Introduction PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TRANSACTION COSTS, TEAM PRODUCTION AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY Corporate Governance: A Contractual and Organizational Perspective Human-Asset Essentiality and Corporate Social Capital in a Stakeholders-Society Perspective Stakeholder Theory as a Basis for Capitalism Behavioral Economics, Federalism and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory Specific Investment and Corporate Law PART II: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT AND NORMATIVE RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND CSR Corporate Social Responsibility in a Market Economy: The Perspective of Constitutional Economics A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part I): The Multi-stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance A Rawlsian View on CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium When Reputation is not Enough: Justifying Corporate Social Responsibility Rational Association and Corporate Responsibility PART III: CSR, REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION The Sustainable Corporation and its Governance: Long Run Performance and Social Responsibility The Role of Standardization, Certification and Assurance Service in Global Commerce PART IV: MODELS OF NON-PURELY SELF-INTERESTED ECONOMIC AGENTS AND THE INTRINISIC MOTIVATION FOR THE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE OF THE ORGANISATIONS Voluntary Co-determination Produces Sustainable Competitive Advantage Corporate Trust Games in Modern Knowledge Economies Effects of Different Stakeholder Groups' Strategic Control on Organizational Effectiveness and Well-being of Customers and Employees: An Empirical Investigation Trusting, Trustworthiness and CSR: Some Experiments and Implications


LUCIANO ANDREOZZI University of Trento, Italy
MASAHIKO AOKI Stanford University, USA
LEONARDO BECCHETTI University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', Italy
AVNER BEN-NER University of Minnesota, USA
BRUCE CHAPMAN University of Toronto, Canada
ERNIE ENGLANDER George Washington University, USA
BRUNO S. FREY University of Zurich, Switzerland
ALLEN KAUFMAN University of New Hampshire, USA
LI-WEN LIN University of Illinois, USA
MARGIT OSTERLOH University of Zurich, Switzerland
NOEMI PACE University of Rome 'Tor Vergata', Italy
BIDHAN PARMAR University of Virginia, USA
LOUIS PUTTERMAN Brown University, USA
TING REN Peking University, China
LYNN A. STOUT University of California, Los Angeles, USA
VIKTOR J. VANBERG University of Freiburg, Germany
ANDREW WICKS University of Virginia, USA
CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS University of Illinois, USA
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON University of California, Berkeley, USA
HOSSAM ZEITOUN University of Zurich, Switzerland


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