Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity

1. Auflage 2026
ISBN: 978-1-032-97066-0
Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd

Buch, Englisch, 270 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm

Reihe: Routledge Studies in Epistemology

This book contains twelve original contributions from leading epistemologists, which connect the debate over epistemic dilemmas with fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology.

In an epistemic dilemma, any doxastic response of an agent will violate an epistemic requirement. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in epistemic dilemmas. However, few attempts have been made to systematically connect epistemic dilemmas to a wider range of issues in epistemology and normative theorizing. The present volume begins to fill this lacuna. Some of its contributions explore new responses to epistemic dilemmas and others present novel epistemic dilemmas, which connect in interesting ways to other areas of epistemology. Several contributions discuss links between epistemic dilemmas and the nature of epistemic and practical reasons, investigate the nature of evidence or of doxastic attitudes, or explore dilemmas arising in collective or oppressive contexts.

Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.

Zielgruppe

Postgraduate and Undergraduate Advanced

Autoren/Hrsg.

Schmidt, Eva

Grajner, Martin

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Introduction: Epistemic Dilemmas and their Place in Epistemology (Eva Schmidt and Martin Grajner) Part I: Epistemic Dilemmas: Core Issues 1. Does Higher-Order Evidence Provide Evidence for Epistemic Dilemmas? (Andy Mueller) 2. The Ignorance Dilemma and Awareness-First Epistemology (Paul Silva Jr.) 3. The Normative Impotence of Practical Reasons for Belief (Keshav Singh) 4. Epistemic Dilemmas, Higher-Order Evidence, and Intellectual Self-Trust (Martin Grajner) Part II: Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity 5. How to Solve the Epistemic Dilemma for Firsthand Understanding: The Case for Acceptance (Thomas Grundmann) 6. Against the Fixed-Point Thesis (Nick Hughes) 7. Evidence in Disguise (Timothy Williamson) 8. The Torments of Tantalus and Radical Suspension (Wolfgang Freitag and Alexandra Zinke) 9. Why Rational People Obstinately Hold onto Irrational Beliefs: A New Approach (Chenwei Nie) Part III: Epistemic Dilemmas: New Perspectives 10. If to Know the Fact that P is Not Just to Know that P, We Get an Epistemic Dilemma (Simon Wimmer) 11. Collective Epistemic Dilemmas (Joshua Brecka) 12. Oppressive Epistemic Dilemmas (Veli Mitova)

Über Autor(innen)

Eva Schmidt is a Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at TU Dortmund. She works in epistemology, the philosophy of action, and philosophy of mind. She has published numerous articles on epistemic reasons and reasons for action, explainable artificial intelligence, and the epistemology and nature of perception. Eva Schmidt's book Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content (2015) defends a nonconceptualist approach to perception. She is co-editor of Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock (Routledge, 2023).

Martin Grajner is a research fellow at TU Dortmund. Before TU Dortmund, he held academic appointments at TU Dresden and the University of Jena, and spent one year as a visiting fellow at New York University. His main areas of research are epistemology and metaphysics. He has published papers in journals like Philosophical Studies and Analytic Philosophy. Martin Grajner is co-editor of Epistemic Norms, Reasons, and Goals (2016).