E-Book, Englisch, Band 2, 112 Seiten
Seifert Discours des Méthodes
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032917-9
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology
E-Book, Englisch, Band 2, 112 Seiten
Reihe: Realistische Phänomenologie / Realist Phenomenology
ISBN: 978-3-11-032917-9
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark
The term "method" of realist phenomenology and philosophy can refer to three kinds of things which are being explored extensively in this work: (1) Kinds of philosophical knowledge used to return to things themselves: intellectual "vision" of necessary intelligible essences, insights into necessary states of affairs, knowledge of less than necessary essences, knowledge of existence as such, of the ego cogitans and of a concretely existing world, other persons, and the absolute being, deductive forms of reasoning, and others. (2) Ways to achieve such knowledge: such as various types of distinctions, asking proper questions, correct use of analogies, and replies to objections. (3) Finally, these methods include several "tricks" and devices such as methodic doubt and epoché; these are subordinated to the other methods, and neither necessary nor universal tools of all philosophical knowledge.
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1;TABLE OF CONTENTS;7
2;INTRODUCTION;11
2.1;WHAT IS A ‘METHOD’?;11
3;CHAPTER ONE PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS AS KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE USED INPHILOSOPHY;17
3.1;I.
Intuition/Intellectual Vision of Necessary Essences;18
3.2;II.
Insight into Necessary States of Affairs Rooted in Necessary Essences;26
3.3;III.
Experience, Empirical and a priori Knowledge;32
3.4;IV.
Mediated (“Speculative”) Intuitive Knowledge whose Objects areGiven “in the Mirror” of Others as a Form of Intuition Distinct fromFirst Order Immediate Intuition of Essences and Immediate Insights;34
3.5;V.
Reasoning (Inferring and Demonstrating) and Mediate DeductiveForms of Knowledge as Methods of Philosophy;37
3.6;VI. Intuitive Knowledge of less than Necessary Essences of a CertainIntelligible Kind;42
3.7;VII.
Immediate Philosophical Knowledge of Real Existence — the actusessendi and Epoché of Essence: A First Break with the Exclusiveness ofthe Methods of Epoché of Real Existence, ‘Eidetic Intuition(Reduction),’ and Wesenseinsicht;46
3.8;VIII.
The Manifold Methods and Forms of Knowledge of ConcretelyExisting Beings: a Second Break with the Exclusiveness of theMethods of Epoché and of ‘Eidetic Intuition (Reduction)’/Wesenseinsicht;51
3.9;IX.
Imperfect Understanding and docta ignorantia as Methods of Knowingthe Incomprehensible: Apories, Apparent Antinomies, Paradoxes, andthe Infinite;61
3.10;X.
The Importance Experience Holds for All Philosophical/Phenomenological Methods and Its Different Forms and Uses inPhilosophy and Empirical Science;62
4;CHAPTER TWO
PHILOSOPHICAL/PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODS INHERENT INKNOWLEDGE ITSELF ASWAYS TO OBTAIN AND PERFECTKNOWLEDGE;65
5;CHAPTER THREE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL (PHILOSOPHICAL)METHODS IN THETHIRD SENSE—THE TOOLS (OR TRICKS) USED TO OBTAINPHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE;73
5.1;I.
Abstraction;73
5.2;II.
Free Variation in Imagination;74
5.3;III.
Methodic Doubt;75
5.4;IV.
Epoché in the Double Sense of ‘Eidetic Reduction’ of Bracketing RealExistence and of Bracketing Inessential Moments of Essences inEidetic Reduction;78
5.5;V.
Epoché as Bracketing Opinions of Earlier Philosophers;85
5.6;VI. Transcendental Epoché as an Invalid Method (in the Third Sense)That Presupposes a False Interpretation of the Objects of PhilosophicalKnowledge;85
5.7;VII. Linguistic Analysis;87
5.8;VIII.
Hermeneutics of Texts and History of Philosophy as Tools to ReachPhilosophical Understanding of Things — A Transcendent Use of Texts;88
5.9;IX. Philosophical Texts and the Things They Speak About;91
5.10;X.
The Two Ways in Which the Understanding of Texts Presupposes anUnderstanding of Things and Can Perform Its Role as Tool forPhilosophical Knowledge Only if a “Canon of Transcendence” isApplied in the Hermeneutics of Interpreting Texts;95
5.11;XI.
The “Negative Test”;110
