Wilson Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism

1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-032707-6
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 22, 512 Seiten

Reihe: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical AnalysisISSN

This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Wilson, Fred

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: Aufklärung
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik, Ontologie
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Geschichte der Westlichen Philosophie Westliche Philosophie: 18. Jahrhundert
• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Acknowledgments;6
2;Note;7
3;Table of Contents;9
4;Introduction;13
5;Chapter OneSelf as Substance;29
5.1;(1) The Substance Tradition1;29
5.2;(2) The Metaphysics of Morals;38
5.3;(3) Morality and the Substantial Self Untied;45
5.4;(4) Human Nature Defended;54
5.5;(5) George Grant: Aristotelian Moral Philosophy Made Modern;81
5.6;(6) Another Sort of Mind;98
5.7;(7) Minds as Bundles;106
5.8;Endnotes to Chapter One;108
6;Chapter TwoNominalism and Acquaintance;115
6.1;(1) Individuation and Nominalism;118
6.2;(2) The Principle of Acquaintance in Locke and Hume;120
6.3;(3) The Appeal to Acquaintance: Empiricism vs. Descartes;133
6.4;(4) Hume’s Nominalism;137
6.5;(5) Nominalism and Relations;142
6.6;(6) Nominalism, Causation, Substances and Things;151
6.7;Endnotes to Chapter Two;194
7;Chapter ThreeFrom the Substance Tradition through Locketo Hume:Ordinary Things and Critical Realism;203
7.1;(1) Up to Locke;203
7.2;(2) From Locke to Hume9;208
7.3;(3) Hume’s Causal Inference to Critical Realism;226
7.4;(4) The System of the Vulgar as False, Inevitable and Reasonable;236
7.5;(5) The World of the Philosophers;244
7.6;(6) Conclusion;253
7.7;Endnotes to Chapter Three;258
8;The Disappearance of the Simple Self: ItsProblems;263
8.1;(1) Substance and Self in Locke1;263
8.2;(2) The Contents of the Humean Mind;270
8.3;(3) Explaining Consciousness;295
8.4;(4) Privacy and Other Minds;324
8.5;(5) The Problem of the Self in Hume;365
8.6;Endnotes to Chapter Four;373
9;Chapter FiveHume’s Positive Account of the Self;387
9.1;(1) Mind and Body;387
9.2;(2) The Bodily Criterion;407
9.3;(3) Humean Persons;415
9.4;(4) Becoming Our Selves;483
9.5;(5) Conclusion – The Final One;500
9.6;Endnotes to Chapter Five;510
10;Bibliography;519