Balisacan / Chakravorty / Ravago Sustainable Economic Development

Resources, Environment, and Institutions
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-0-12-800416-6
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 6 - ePub Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 532 Seiten

Sustainable Economic Development: Resources, Environment, and Institutions presents 25 articles that lay the foundations of sustainable development in a way that facilitates effective policy design. The editors mix broad thematic papers with focused micro-papers, balancing theories with policy designs.The book begins with two sections on sustainable development principles and practice and on specific settings where sustainable development is practiced. Two more sections illuminate institutions, governance, and political economy. Additional sections cover sustainable development and agriculture, and risk and economic security, including disaster management. This rich source of information should appeal to any institution involved in development work, and to development practitioners grappling with an array of difficult on-the-ground developmental challenges. - Analyzes policies that move markets and resource use patterns towards achieving sustainability - Articles are kaleidoscopic in scope and creativity - Authors embody extraordinary diversity and qualifications

Autoren/Hrsg.

Balisacan, Arsenio

Chakravorty, Ujjayant

Ravago, Majah-Leah

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Sustainable Economic Development;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Dedication;6
5;Contents;8
6;About the Editors;20
7;About the Authors;22
8;Foreword;28
9;Preface and Acknowledgments;30
10;1 Introduction and Synthesis;34
10.1;1 The Principles and Practice of Sustainable Economic Development: Overview and Synthesis;36
10.1.1;1.1 Introduction;36
10.1.2;1.2 Resource Management and Sustainable Development;37
10.1.3;1.3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy;39
10.1.4;1.4 The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Agricultural Development Policy;40
10.1.5;1.5 Development, Vulnerability, and Poverty Reduction;41
10.1.6;1.6 Conclusion;42
10.1.7;References;43
10.2;2 Reflections on the Foundations of Development Policy Analysis;44
10.2.1;2.1 Introduction;45
10.2.1.1;2.1.1 The Four Stages of Research in Development Economics;45
10.2.1.2;2.1.2 The Nature-Causes-Consequences Paradigm for Development Policy Analysis;47
10.2.2;2.2 Behavioral Foundations for Agricultural Development Policy;48
10.2.2.1;2.2.1 Toward Fundamental Explanations of Farm-Household Behavior;48
10.2.2.2;2.2.2 Modern Trends in Empirical Analysis;50
10.2.3;2.3 Organizational Foundations for Development Policy Analysis: The New Institutional Economics;52
10.2.3.1;2.3.1 Examples of Nonfundamental Explanations;52
10.2.3.2;2.3.2 From the Coase Theorem to Fundamental Explanations of Agrarian Contracts;54
10.2.3.3;2.3.3 Assumptions, Levels of Analysis, and Categorical Versus Noncategorical Theories;55
10.2.3.4;2.3.4 Toward a Unified Version of the New Institutional Economics;57
10.2.3.5;2.3.5 More on Big Versus Small Farms;59
10.2.3.6;2.3.6 The Economics of the Third-Best: A Constitutional Approach to Governing Rent-Seeking;59
10.2.4;2.4 Modern Theories of Market and Institutional Failure: Shocks, Traps, Nets, and Ladders;61
10.2.5;2.5 The Anatomy of Specialization;63
10.2.6;2.6 Black-Hole Economics;66
10.2.6.1;2.6.1 Prohibition of Alcohol and Drugs;66
10.2.6.2;2.6.2 Illegal Immigration;67
10.2.6.3;2.6.3 Abortion and Prostitution;68
10.2.6.4;2.6.4 Bans and Subsidies: Parastatals, Renewable Energy, and Sustainability;68
10.2.6.5;2.6.5 The Role of the Economist;71
10.2.7;References;72
11;2 Resources, Environment, and Sustainable Development;80
11.1;3 Scarcity, Security, and Sustainable Development;82
11.1.1;3.1 Introduction;82
11.1.2;3.2 Scarcity and Security;83
11.1.3;3.3 Sustainable Development: What Is It Anyway?;84
11.1.4;3.4 Trilogies, Triads, and Triangles;86
11.1.4.1;3.4.1 Positive Sustainability and the Three Pillars;86
11.1.4.1.1;3.4.1.1 A systems approach;87
11.1.4.1.2;3.4.1.2 Dynamic efficiency;88
11.1.4.1.3;3.4.1.3 Intertemporal equity;89
11.1.4.2;3.4.2 Public Policy: Prosustainability or Not?;90
11.1.5;3.5 Research Opportunities;92
11.1.6;3.6 Thoughts on Economic Diplomacy and Education;92
11.1.7;References;93
11.1.8;Technical Appendix;96
11.1.8.1;Maximizing Intertemporal Welfare;96
11.1.8.1.1;A.1. The case with discounting;96
11.1.8.1.2;A.2. The case with no discounting: .=0;97
11.2;4 The Economics of Fossil Fuels and Pollution;100
11.2.1;4.1 Introduction;100
11.2.2;4.2 The Framework with Nonrenewable Resource and a Ceiling on the Stock of Pollution;101
11.2.2.1;4.2.1 Abatement of Pollution;103
11.2.2.2;4.2.2 Nonstationary Demand;103
11.2.3;4.3 Ceiling with Fossil Fuels with Different Pollution Intensities;104
11.2.4;4.4 Conclusion;106
11.2.5;Acknowledgments;107
11.2.6;References;107
11.3;5 Integrated Groundwater Resource Management;110
11.3.1;5.1 Groundwater Management: From Sustainable Yield to Dynamic Optimization;110
11.3.2;5.2 Optimal Management of a Single Groundwater Aquifer;112
11.3.2.1;5.2.1 Transitional Dynamics;112
11.3.2.2;5.2.2 The Pearce Equation and Pricing for Optimal Extraction;113
11.3.3;5.3 Extensions and Exceptions to the Pearce Equation;114
11.3.3.1;5.3.1 Pearce Equation for Multiple Water Resources;114
11.3.3.2;5.3.2 Pricing and Finance of Watershed Services;115
11.3.3.3;5.3.3 Measuring Natural Capital;117
11.3.3.4;5.3.4 Pearce Equation with Endogenous Governance;117
11.3.4;5.4 Open Access and the Gisser–SÁnchez Effect;119
11.3.5;5.5 Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research;120
11.3.6;References;121
11.4;6 Optimal Joint Management of Interdependent Resources: Groundwater Versus Kiawe (Prosopis pallida);124
11.4.1;6.1 Introduction;125
11.4.2;6.2 Groundwater–Kiawe Management Framework;125
11.4.2.1;6.2.1 Groundwater Dynamics;126
11.4.2.2;6.2.2 Kiawe Dynamics;126
11.4.2.3;6.2.3 PV Maximization;126
11.4.2.4;6.2.4 The Optimal Steady State;128
11.4.3;6.3 An Application to the Kona Coast of Hawai’i;128
11.4.3.1;6.3.1 Hydrology;129
11.4.3.2;6.3.2 Groundwater Extraction and Desalination Costs;129
11.4.3.3;6.3.3 Demand for Water;129
11.4.3.4;6.3.4 Groundwater Uptake by Kiawe;130
11.4.3.5;6.3.5 Kiawe Removal Costs;130
11.4.4;6.4 Results;131
11.4.5;6.5 Conclusion;133
11.4.6;Acknowledgments;134
11.4.7;References;134
11.4.8;Appendix;136
11.5;7 Win–Win Solutions for Reforestation and Maize Farming: A Case Study of Nan, Thailand;138
11.5.1;7.1 Introduction;138
11.5.2;7.2 Maize Farming in Nan Province;141
11.5.3;7.3 Value of Community Forest Products;144
11.5.4;7.4 Farmers’ Incentive to Convert Forest to Maize Farm;145
11.5.4.1;7.4.1 Perfect Foresight View;145
11.5.4.2;7.4.2 Shortsighted View;146
11.5.4.2.1;7.4.2.1 Myopia;146
11.5.4.2.2;7.4.2.2 Financial constraints;147
11.5.5;7.5 Limitations of Current Government Policies;149
11.5.6;7.6 Alternative Win–Win Policies;150
11.5.6.1;7.6.1 Green Subsidy;150
11.5.6.2;7.6.2 Irrigation;151
11.5.7;7.7 Conclusion;153
11.5.8;References;154
12;3 Institutions, Governance, and Political Economy;156
12.1;8 The Role of Institutions in Natural Resource Use;158
12.1.1;8.1 Introduction;158
12.1.2;8.2 Institution, Resource Use, and Resource Scarcity: Debates in the Literature;159
12.1.2.1;8.2.1 Game Theory Studies on Common Property Resource Management;159
12.1.2.2;8.2.2 Effects of Trade on Resource Use in a Resource-Abundant Economy;160
12.1.3;8.3 Optimal Institutions Given the Cost of Institutional Change;161
12.1.3.1;8.3.1 Steady State Analysis;161
12.1.3.2;8.3.2 Institutional Change on the Transition Path;162
12.1.4;8.4 Institutional Choice in Equilibrium;163
12.1.5;8.5 Research Opportunities on Resource Governance;164
12.1.5.1;8.5.1 Transitions Across Different Forms of Institutions;165
12.1.5.2;8.5.2 General Equilibrium Effects;165
12.1.5.3;8.5.3 The Role of Government and Its Interaction with Resource Users;165
12.1.5.4;8.5.4 Institutions and Economic Development;166
12.1.6;Acknowledgments;167
12.1.7;References;168
12.2;9 Public Choice and the Generalized Resource Curse;170
12.2.1;9.1 Introduction;171
12.2.2;9.2 Other Boom Sources;171
12.2.3;9.3 Mechanisms by Which Abundance Can Become a Curse;173
12.2.3.1;9.3.1 Crowding Out Manufacturing;174
12.2.3.2;9.3.2 Political Economy Curses: Distortionary Tariffs and the Transmission Effect;174
12.2.4;9.4 Modeling the Curse of Abundance;175
12.2.4.1;9.4.1 The Three-Sector Australian Model;175
12.2.4.1.1;9.4.1.1 Crowding out of manufactured importables;177
12.2.4.1.2;9.4.1.2 Distortionary tariff after the boom;178
12.2.4.2;9.4.2 The Augmented Dutch Disease: The Four-Sector Model;178
12.2.4.2.1;9.4.2.1 Crowding out of manufactured exportables;178
12.2.4.2.2;9.4.2.2 Distortionary tariff and the distribution of gains and losses;179
12.2.5;9.5 Rent-Seeking Effects on Public Policies;181
12.2.5.1;9.5.1 Modeling Rent-Seeking and the Political Economy Effects of the Boom;181
12.2.5.2;9.5.2 Learning by Lobbying;187
12.2.6;9.6 All That Curses Is Not Gold: Implication for the Philippines;188
12.2.7;9.7 Conclusion;189
12.2.8;Acknowledgments;190
12.2.9;References;191
12.3;10 Governing Commercial Agriculture in Africa: The Challenges of Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors;194
12.3.1;10.1 Introduction;195
12.3.2;10.2 Capturing the Productivity Growth Potential Through Commercial Agriculture;196
12.3.2.1;10.2.1 Small Versus Large Farms?;198
12.3.2.2;10.2.2 The Challenges of Governing Large-Scale Commercial Farming;201
12.3.3;10.3 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for Better Governance of Commercial Agriculture;203
12.3.3.1;10.3.1 Coordinating Investments and Selecting Investors for “Value” Discovery;203
12.3.3.2;10.3.2 Institutional Arrangements for Public and Private Coordination;207
12.3.3.3;10.3.3 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils;207
12.3.3.4;10.3.4 Industry-level Public–Private DIALOGUE and Coordination;208
12.3.3.5;10.3.5 Coordinating Public–Private Investments Within Spatial Development Plans;209
12.3.4;10.4 Coordinating with Communities and Local Stakeholders in Governing Commercial Agriculture;212
12.3.5;10.5 Governance Beyond Governments;213
12.3.5.1;10.5.1 Voluntary Industry Standards;213
12.3.5.2;10.5.2 Civil Society Organizations and Standards for Transparency and Good Governance;214
12.3.5.3;10.5.3 International Development Institutions;215
12.3.6;10.6 Conclusion;216
12.3.7;References;217
12.4;11 Land Confiscations and Land Reform in Natural-Order States;222
12.4.1;11.1 Introduction;222
12.4.2;11.2 Confiscations in Early Modern Europe and Its Offshoots;225
12.4.2.1;11.2.1 Confiscations of Church Lands by Established Governments;225
12.4.2.1.1;11.2.1.1 Henry VIII’s monastic confiscations;225
12.4.2.1.2;11.2.1.2 Joseph II’s monastic confiscations;226
12.4.2.2;11.2.2 Confiscation of Lands by Revolutionary Parliaments;226
12.4.2.2.1;11.2.2.1 The interregnum confiscations in Great Britain;226
12.4.2.2.2;11.2.2.2 The loyalist confiscations in North America;227
12.4.2.2.3;11.2.2.3 Confiscations during the early French revolution;227
12.4.2.2.4;11.2.2.4 Confiscations by ruling chiefs in Hawai’i;228
12.4.3;11.3 Origins of Early Modern Confiscations;228
12.4.4;11.4 Redistribution and Sale of Confiscated Lands;229
12.4.5;11.5 Conclusion;230
12.4.6;Acknowledgments;231
12.4.7;References;232
12.5;12 Regional Integration and Illicit Economy in Fragile Nations: Perspectives from Afghanistan and Myanmar;234
12.5.1;12.1 Economic Framework for Illicit Activities and Its Cross-Border Context;234
12.5.2;12.2 Afghanistan;237
12.5.3;12.3 Myanmar;239
12.5.4;12.4 A Way Forward for Policy Analysis;242
12.5.5;References;244
12.5.6;Appendix: Notes on Harmful Drugs;245
12.6;13 Corruption, Transactions Costs, and Network Relationships: Governance Challenges for Thailand;248
12.6.1;13.1 Introduction;248
12.6.2;13.2 The Setting: Political and Administrative Reforms and the Asian Economic Crisis;249
12.6.3;13.3 Network Relationships, Transactions Costs, and Corruption;252
12.6.3.1;13.3.1 Connected Dealings: Cases from Thailand;255
12.6.4;13.4 Reducing Connected Dealings and Improving Procurement in Thailand;264
12.6.4.1;13.4.1 Improving the Legal Infrastructure;265
12.6.4.2;13.4.2 Targeting Corruption-Friendly Economic Policies;265
12.6.4.3;13.4.3 Upgrading of the Database;266
12.6.4.4;13.4.4 Increased Social Mobilization for Enhanced Transparency;266
12.6.5;13.5 Conclusion;267
12.6.6;References;267
12.6.7;Further Reading;268
13;4 The Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Agricultural Development Policy;270
13.1;14 The Role of Agricultural Economists in Sustaining Bad Programs;272
13.1.1;References;278
13.2;15 Agricultural R&D Policy and Long-Run Food Security;280
13.2.1;15.1 Introduction;280
13.2.2;15.2 Returns to Agricultural R&D;281
13.2.3;15.3 A New World Order for Agricultural R&D Spending;282
13.2.4;15.4 Prices and Productivity: Longer Term Patterns and Prospects;284
13.2.5;15.5 Implications of Alternative Productivity Paths for the World’s Poor;286
13.2.6;15.6 Implications of Alternative Productivity Paths: Quantitative Illustration;289
13.2.7;15.7 Conclusion;292
13.2.8;Acknowledgments;293
13.2.9;References;293
13.3;16 Energy and Agriculture: Evolving Dynamics and Future Implications;294
13.3.1;16.1 Introduction;295
13.3.2;16.2 Key Linkages Between Energy and Agriculture;295
13.3.3;16.3 Key Examples of Energy–Agriculture Linkages;299
13.3.3.1;16.3.1 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Groundwater;299
13.3.3.2;16.3.2 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Fertilizer;301
13.3.3.3;16.3.3 Energy and Agriculture Linkages in the Case of Biofuels;301
13.3.4;16.4 Empirical Illustrations of Energy–Agriculture Linkages;303
13.3.4.1;16.4.1 The IMPACT Model;303
13.3.4.2;16.4.2 Linkages Between Energy, Fertilizers, and Agriculture;304
13.3.4.2.1;16.4.2.1 Long-term trends of fertilizer and fossil fuel prices;304
13.3.4.2.2;16.4.2.2 Impact of fertilizer prices on cereal production;308
13.3.5;16.5 Policy Implications of Food–Energy Interactions;312
13.3.6;16.6 Conclusion;315
13.3.7;References;316
13.3.8;Technical Annex A: Derivations of Conceptual Models;319
13.3.8.1;Groundwater Example;319
13.3.8.2;Fertilizer Example;320
13.3.8.3;Biofuels Example;321
13.4;17 Trends and Fluctuations in Agricultural Price Distortions;326
13.4.1;17.1 Background;327
13.4.2;17.2 Indicators of National Distortions to Agricultural Prices;328
13.4.3;17.3 National Distortions to Farmer Incentives: Trends Since the Mid-1950s;329
13.4.4;17.4 Government Responses to Fluctuations and Spikes in International Food Prices;333
13.4.5;17.5 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks;338
13.4.6;Acknowledgments;340
13.4.7;References;341
13.5;18 Getting the Price of Thai Rice Right: Episode II;344
13.5.1;18.1 Introduction;345
13.5.2;18.2 Origins of the PMS;345
13.5.2.1;18.2.1 International Rice Markets;345
13.5.2.2;18.2.2 Precursor of the PMS;346
13.5.2.3;18.2.3 Overview of the PMS;346
13.5.2.4;18.2.4 Analysis of the PMS;347
13.5.3;18.3 Price Elasticity of Demand for the Export of Thai Rice;348
13.5.4;18.4 PMS Outcomes;350
13.5.4.1;18.4.1 Increased Famers’ Income;350
13.5.4.2;18.4.2 Increased World Price of Rice;351
13.5.4.3;18.4.3 Stabilized Farm Gate Price;353
13.5.5;18.5 Challenges to the PMS;353
13.5.5.1;18.5.1 External Factors;353
13.5.5.2;18.5.2 Internal Factors: Corruption and Inefficiency;354
13.5.6;18.6 Negative Outcomes of the PMS;355
13.5.6.1;18.6.1 Losses from Selling Rice Below Cost;355
13.5.6.2;18.6.2 Depletion of Rice Diversity;356
13.5.6.3;18.6.3 Erosion of Traditional Market Mechanisms;356
13.5.6.4;18.6.4 Loss of Exporter Leadership;357
13.5.7;18.7 Domestic Politics;358
13.5.8;18.8 Policy Recommendations;359
13.5.8.1;18.8.1 An Exit Strategy for the PMS;359
13.5.8.2;18.8.2 Regional Rice Market Arrangement;359
13.5.9;18.9 Conclusion;360
13.5.10;References;361
13.6;19 Philippine Rice Self-Sufficiency Program: Pitfalls and Remedies;362
13.6.1;19.1 Rice Self-Sufficiency and Food Security;362
13.6.2;19.2 Why Countries Pursue Self-Sufficiency in Rice;364
13.6.2.1;19.2.1 Rice Price Volatility;364
13.6.2.2;19.2.2 Thin Rice Trade;365
13.6.2.3;19.2.3 Export Restrictions;368
13.6.3;19.3 Philippine Rice Self-Sufficiency Plan;369
13.6.4;19.4 Pitfalls of the Program;372
13.6.4.1;19.4.1 Likelihood of Success;372
13.6.4.2;19.4.2 Governance;375
13.6.4.3;19.4.3 High Cost of the Program;375
13.6.5;19.5 Conclusion;378
13.6.6;References;380
13.7;20 Production Specialization and Market Participation of Smallholder Agricultural Households in Developing Countries;382
13.7.1;20.1 Introduction;382
13.7.2;20.2 Literature Review;383
13.7.3;20.3 Conceptual Framework and Empirical Model;386
13.7.4;20.4 Data and Description of Production and Marketing Environment;388
13.7.5;20.5 Econometric Results;390
13.7.6;20.6 Conclusion;398
13.7.7;References;399
14;5 Development, Vulnerability, and Poverty Reduction;402
14.1;21 Deviant Behavior: A Century of Philippine Industrialization;404
14.1.1;21.1 Introduction;405
14.1.2;21.2 The Philippines and the Competition: Catching Up Since 1870;406
14.1.2.1;21.2.1 The Industrial Output Data;407
14.1.2.2;21.2.2 Regional Growth Rates: When and Where Did Industrial Growth Begin?;407
14.1.2.3;21.2.3 When Did Rapid Industrial Growth Become Widespread?;409
14.1.3;21.3 Unconditional Industrial Convergence;412
14.1.3.1;21.3.1 Unconditional Convergence;412
14.1.3.2;21.3.2 Was There Persistence?;414
14.1.4;21.4 Understanding the Philippines’ Deviant Behavior;414
14.1.4.1;21.4.1 Institutions: Political Instability and Threatened Property Rights?;418
14.1.4.2;21.4.2 Trade Liberalization?;421
14.1.4.3;21.4.3 Real Currency Overvaluation?;422
14.1.4.4;21.4.4 Overseas Labor Migration?;424
14.1.4.5;21.4.5 Real Exchange Rate and Trade Regime Interactions?;425
14.1.5;21.5 Deviant Behavior and Path Dependence;427
14.1.6;21.6 Future Research;428
14.1.7;References;430
14.1.8;Appendix 1;433
14.1.9;Appendix 2;433
14.2;22 Bundling Drought Tolerance and Index Insurance to Reduce Rural Household Vulnerability to Drought;434
14.2.1;22.1 Introduction;434
14.2.2;22.2 Drought Risk, Vulnerability, and Development Interventions;435
14.2.3;22.3 DT and Drought II: Prospects and Complementarity;437
14.2.3.1;22.3.1 Drought Tolerance;437
14.2.3.2;22.3.2 Index Insurance;440
14.2.3.3;22.3.3 The DT–Drought II Complementarity;441
14.2.4;22.4 Calibrating and Evaluating a DT–II Bundle for Maize in Ecuador;442
14.2.5;22.5 Conclusion;446
14.2.6;References;446
14.3;23 Have Natural Disasters Become Deadlier?;448
14.3.1;23.1 Introduction;449
14.3.2;23.2 Issues;449
14.3.3;23.3 Data;450
14.3.3.1;23.3.1 Frequency and Deadliness of Natural Disasters;451
14.3.3.2;23.3.2 Recent Patterns in Natural Disasters;457
14.3.3.3;23.3.3 Determinants of Disasters and Their Deadliness;458
14.3.3.4;23.3.4 Mortalities;459
14.3.4;23.4 Discussion;461
14.3.4.1;23.4.1 Catastrophic Risks, Insurance, and Reconstruction;463
14.3.4.1.1;23.4.1.1 Strategic considerations and priorities in disaster risk prevention and mitigation;463
14.3.5;23.5 CONCLUSION;465
14.3.6;Acknowledgments;466
14.3.7;References;466
14.3.7.1;Reliability of Data on Natural Disasters;475
14.4;24 The Growth–Poverty Nexus: Multidimensional Poverty in the Philippines;478
14.4.1;24.1 Introduction;478
14.4.2;24.2 Empirical Approach;480
14.4.3;24.3 Household Data and Deprivation Dimensions;483
14.4.4;24.4 What Has Been Happening to Poverty in Recent Years?;485
14.4.5;24.5 Poverty Profile from the Lens of MPI;491
14.4.6;24.6 Conclusion;496
14.4.7;Acknowledgments;497
14.4.8;References;497
14.4.9;Annex Tables;499
14.5;25 Poverty Reduction and the Composition of Growth in the Mekong Economies;502
14.5.1;25.1 Introduction;503
14.5.2;25.2 Economic Growth;503
14.5.3;25.3 Poverty Reduction;504
14.5.4;25.4 The Growth–Poverty Nexus;507
14.5.4.1;25.4.1 Conceptual Background;507
14.5.4.2;25.4.2 Poverty and Aggregate Growth;509
14.5.4.3;25.4.3 Poverty and Sectoral Growth;510
14.5.5;25.5 Estimation Results;510
14.5.5.1;25.5.1 Poverty and Aggregate Growth;510
14.5.5.2;25.5.2 Poverty and Sectoral Growth;511
14.5.6;25.6 Conclusion;512
14.5.7;Acknowledgments;512
14.5.8;References;512
14.5.9;Appendix;514
14.5.9.1;A. Decomposing Changes in Poverty Incidence;514
14.5.9.2;B. Poverty and Aggregate Growth;514
14.5.9.3;C. Poverty and Sectoral Growth;515
15;Index;516