Charemza / Gronicki Plans and Disequilibria in Centrally Planned Economies

Empirical Investigations for Poland
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9747-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 159, 198 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Contributions to Economic Analysis

The purpose of this study is to investigate interrelations between planning mechanisms and disequilibria in a case where the planning decisions are centralized and are exogenously given to enterprises. The first introductory chapter is intended to provide an understanding of Poland's economic situation during the period under research. In the next five chapters the basic model, describing the households-planners relations in terms of consumption, labour, money and plans are derived, estimated, used for calculation of excess demands, for simulation of some monetary policies, and, finally, for providing optimal control experiments in which consumption excess demand is minimized on a reasonable level of the consumption volume. In the next two chapters the basic model is gradually extended, and the last chapter summarizes the results by formulating a more effective macroeconomic policy.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Charemza, W.

Gronicki, M.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Plans and Disequilibria in Centrally Planned Economies: (Empirical Investigation for Poland);4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Introduction to the Series;6
6;Preface;10
7;Part 1: Foundations;14
7.1;Chapter 1. Background: Facts and figures from Polish economic history;16
7.2;Chapter 2. The theoretical model;22
7.2.1;2.1. Households' behaviour and expectations;22
7.2.2;2.2. State sector behaviour;32
7.2.3;2.3. Disequilibrium indicators;39
8;Part 2: Consumption-Labour-Money Analysis;48
8.1;Chapter 3. Econometric model and its estimation;50
8.1.1;3.1. Structural form and statistical data;50
8.1.2;3.2. Respecification and preliminary estimation;56
8.1.3;3.3. Final estimation;62
8.1.4;3.4. Linearization;68
8.2;Chapter 4. Estimates of disequilibria and their effects;76
8.2.1;4.1. Estimates of unconditional disequilibria;76
8.2.2;4.2. Measures of repressed inflation;83
8.2.3;4.3. Excess demand decomposition and estimates of conditional disequilibria;87
8.3;Chapter 5. Internal monetary policies;96
8.3.1;5.1. Policy simulations: Some theoretical and technical questions;96
8.3.2;5.2. A simple PW policy;100
8.3.3;5.3. Planning distance and expectations errors;103
8.3.4;5.4. PW(B) policy and labour hoardings;109
8.3.5;5.5. Change of currency: Was it a solution?;112
8.4;Chapter 6. Searching for an optimal monetary policy;118
8.4.1;6.1. Disequilibrium neutralization as an optimal control problem;118
8.4.2;6.2. Households' optimal income and money policies;120
8.4.3;6.3. Optimal policies and plans;126
9;Part 3: Extensions;134
9.1;Chapter 7. Disequilibria and investments: Some inward policies;136
9.1.1;7.1. Production and investments: First extension of the model;136
9.1.2;7.2. Inward effects of the PWH(B) policy: Consumption volume and planners' tensions;143
9.1.3;7.3. Direct interventions in investment: Smoothing and private economy problem;148
9.1.4;7.4. Under- and overinvestment in a long-run;153
9.2;Chapter 8. Disequilibria and foreign trade : Some external policies;158
9.2.1;8.1. Foreign trade: A further extension of the model;158
9.2.2;8.2. Constant foreign debt isolated policy;163
9.2.3;8.3. Constant foreign debt and CMEA acitve policy;167
9.3;Chapter 9. Summary and conclusions: The best ex-post scenario?;174
10;Appendix;178
11;References;184
12;List of Tables;193
13;Author Index;195
14;Subject Index;198