Eronen Reduction in Philosophy of Mind

A Pluralistic Account
1. Auflage 2013
ISBN: 978-3-11-033213-1
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band 24, 189 Seiten

Reihe: Epistemische Studien / Epistemic StudiesISSN

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Eronen, Markus I.

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Moderne Philosophische Disziplinen Philosophie des Geistes, Neurophilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Introduction;11
2;PART I: Reduction in Philosophy of Science;15
2.1;Introduction;17
2.2;1. Reduction: From Derivations of Theories to Ruthless Metascience;19
2.3;2. Mechanistic Explanation;29
2.4;3. The Interventionist Account of Causation;39
2.5;4. Levels;45
2.6;Conclusions: Reductionism vs. Explanatory pluralism;57
3;PART II: Rethinking Reduction in Philosophy of Mind;59
3.1;Introduction;61
3.2;5. Traditional Approaches to Reduction in Philosophy of Mind;63
3.2.1;5.1. British Emergentism;63
3.2.2;5.2. Logical Behaviorism and Identity Theory;69
3.2.3;5.3. Multiple Realizability;72
3.2.4;5.4. The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis;78
3.2.5;5.5. Functionalism;81
3.2.6;5.6. The Dream of Nonreductive Physicalism;86
3.3;6. Functional Reduction;91
3.3.1;6.1. The Causal Exclusion Argument and the Functional Model;91
3.3.2;6.2. Kim vs. Nagel;96
3.3.3;6.3. Dissecting the Functional Model;98
3.3.3.1;6.3.1. Functionalization;99
3.3.3.2;6.3.2. Realization;102
3.3.3.3;6.3.3. Causation;106
3.3.4;6.4. Functional Reduction as Mechanistic Explanation;110
3.4;7. Phenomenal Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap;113
3.5;8. New Type Physicalism;123
3.6;Conclusions: Rethinking Reduction in Philosophy of Mind;135
4;PART III: A New Framework for Philosophy of Mind;137
4.1;Introduction;139
4.2;9. Explanatory Pluralism for Philosophy of Mind;141
4.3;10. From Explanatory Pluralism to Pluralistic Physicalism;147
4.4;11. Pluralistic Physicalism and Causal Exclusion Worries;157
4.5;12. Dimensions of Explanatory Power;165
4.6;Conclusions and Directions for Further Research;173
5;References;177