Feest Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen

1. Auflage 2009
ISBN: 978-90-481-3540-0
Verlag: Springer-Verlag
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 320 Seiten

twentieth-century literature about the distinction between explanation and und- standing)? Second, can we do justice to a particular writer’s notion of that category by taking at face value what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a) intellectual history – like other kinds of history – has to be careful not to uncritically adopt actors’ categories, and (b) more generally, even the actors’ own thinking about a particular issue has to be contextualized vis-à-vis their other intellectual commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks to read some of the nineteen- century philosophical writings about Erklären and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem, which he terms the problem of the “unity of experience”.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Feest, Uljana

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Feest_Frontmatter;1
2;Feest_Ch01;6
2.1;Chapter 1;6
2.1.1;Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen: Introduction;6
2.1.1.1;1.1 Methodological Preliminaries;6
2.1.1.2;1.2 Overview of the Papers;9
2.1.1.3;1.3 Concluding Remarks and Acknowledgements;16
2.1.2;Bibliography;18
3;Feest_Ch02;19
3.1;Chapter 2;19
3.1.1;Epistemological Distinctions and Cultural Politics: Educational Reform and the Naturwissenschaft/Geisteswissenschaft Distinc;19
3.1.1.1;2.1 Knowledge and Bildung in the Gymnasium Debates;21
3.1.1.2;2.2 History, Natural Science and Method in the School Debates;25
3.1.1.3;2.3 Positive Knowledge, Realism, and Natural Science at Mid-century;32
3.1.1.4;2.4 Conclusion;34
3.1.2;References;36
4;Feest_Ch03;40
4.1;Chapter 3;40
4.1.1;Vestiges of the Book of Nature: Religious Experience and Hermeneutic Practices in Protestant German Theology, ca. 1900;40
4.1.1.1;3.1 Introduction;40
4.1.1.2;3.2 Secularizations;42
4.1.1.3;3.3 Meaning Comprises Explanation: Conservatives;44
4.1.1.4;3.4 Epistemological Complementarity and Inner Experience;48
4.1.1.5;3.5 Modes of Experience, Modes of Science;53
4.1.2;References;59
5;Feest_Ch04;63
5.1;Chapter 4;63
5.1.1;How Wilhelm Dilthey Influenced Popular Science Writing: Kurd Laßwitz’s “Homchen. Ein Tiermärchen aus der oberen Kreide”;63
5.1.1.1;4.1 Popular Science;64
5.1.1.2;4.2 Dilthey’s Concept of Geisteswissenschaften and Poetry: Understanding and the Lived Experience;65
5.1.1.3;4.3 Opaque Poetics: Kurd Laßwitz and Wilhelm Dilthey;67
5.1.1.4;4.4 Evolution Relived: The Example of “Homchen”;74
5.1.2;References;79
6;Feest_Ch05;82
6.1;Chapter 5;82
6.1.1;Explaining History. Hippolyte Taine’s Philosophy of Historical Science;82
6.1.1.1;5.1 Historical Psychology and Its Context;83
6.1.1.2;5.2 Taine’s Concept of Mental Laws in Historical Studies;88
6.1.1.3;5.3 The Display of Explanation in Historical Writing;92
6.1.1.4;5.4 Conclusion;98
6.1.2;References;98
7;Feest_Ch06;101
7.1;Chapter 6;101
7.1.1;Understanding and Explanation in France: From Maine de Biran’s Méthode Psychologique to Durkheim’s Les Formes Élémentaires de ;101
7.1.1.1;6.1 Introduction;101
7.1.1.2;6.2 The Méthode Psychologique and Dilthey’s First Views on the Method of Verstehen;102
7.1.1.3;6.3 Normativity and the Cultural Sciences;108
7.1.1.4;6.4 Hermeneutics and the Method of Interpretation;112
7.1.1.5;6.5 Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life;113
7.1.1.6;6.6 Conclusion;118
7.1.2;References;118
8;Feest_Ch07;121
8.1;Chapter 7;121
8.1.1;Instead of Erklären and Verstehen: William James on Human Understanding;121
8.1.1.1;7.1 Introduction;121
8.1.1.2;7.2 The Scientific and Philosophical Context of James’s Thought;121
8.1.1.3;7.3 The Personal and Literary Context of James’s Thought;122
8.1.1.4;7.4 James’s Vision of a World of Possibility and Probability;124
8.1.1.5;7.5 James’s Views on Human Understanding;127
8.1.1.6;7.6 Description and Explanation in James’s Thought;130
8.1.1.7;7.7 The Personal and Intellectual Relations Between James and Dilthey;134
8.1.1.8;7.8 Conclusion;136
8.1.2;References;139
9;Feest_Ch08;141
9.1;Chapter 8;141
9.1.1;Erklären, Verstehen, and Embodied Rationalities: Scientific Praxis as Regional Ontology;141
9.1.1.1;8.1 Mach and the Cultural Implication of Phenomena;144
9.1.1.2;8.2 Menger’s Economics as Phenomenology of Needs;148
9.1.1.3;8.3 Riegl and the Hermeneutics of Art History;154
9.1.1.4;8.4 Conclusion: Modeling a Unified Epistemology of Science;158
9.1.2;References;159
10;Feest_Ch09;160
10.1;Chapter 9;160
10.1.1;British Thought on the Relations Between the Natural Sciences and the Humanities, c. 1870–1910;160
10.1.2;References;181
11;Feest_Ch10;185
11.1;Chapter 10;185
11.1.1;Accounting for the Unity of Experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and Ward;185
11.1.2;References;203
12;Feest_Ch11;205
12.1;Chapter 11;205
12.1.1;Individuality and Interpretation in Nineteenth-Century German Historicism;205
12.1.1.1;11.1 Historicism: A Disputed Concept;206
12.1.1.2;11.2 Humboldt: Individuality and Idealist Organicism;207
12.1.1.3;11.3 Ranke: Individuality and Empiricism;210
12.1.1.4;11.4 Droysen: Individuality and Methodical Interpretation;212
12.1.1.5;11.5 Conclusion;215
12.1.2;References;216
13;Feest_Ch12;219
13.1;Chapter 12;219
13.1.1;Shaping Disciplinary Boundaries: Scientific Practice and Politics in the Methodenstreit Between the German Historical Schoo;219
13.1.1.1;12.1 The German Historical School and Its Institutional Setting;220
13.1.1.2;12.2 Historicity as a Criterion of Demarcating the Geisteswissenschaften: The Older School of Economics;222
13.1.1.3;12.3 The Politics of the Younger School;225
13.1.1.4;12.4 The Road Towards Specialization: The Austrian School of Economics;227
13.1.1.5;12.5 The Methodenstreit and Its Repercussions;230
13.1.1.6;12.6 Economics as a Purely Formal Science;232
13.1.1.7;12.7 Historicity and the Theoretical Sciences of Society: The Unbridgeable Gap;234
13.1.1.8;12.8 Concluding Remarks;236
13.1.2;References;237
14;Feest_Ch13;239
14.1;Chapter 13;239
14.1.1;From Mill via von Kries to Max Weber: Causality, Explanation, and Understanding;239
14.1.1.1;13.1 The Different Aims of the Natural and Social Sciences;240
14.1.1.2;13.2 Mill on Causality and German Legal Practice;242
14.1.1.3;13.3 Johannes von Kries and “Adequate Causation”;246
14.1.1.4;13.4 Weber’s “Causal Analysis of History” in von Kries’ Manner;252
14.1.1.5;13.5 Two Kinds of Explanations in Natural and Social Science;253
14.1.1.6;13.6 Ideal Type and “Interpretative Understanding” in Weber;256
14.1.1.7;13.7 Consequences for the Social Sciences;259
14.1.2;References;262
15;Feest_Ch14;264
15.1;Chapter 14;264
15.1.1;Social Science Between Neo-Kantianism and Philosophy of Life: The Cases of Weber, Simmel, and Mannheim1;264
15.1.1.1;14.1 Introduction;264
15.1.1.2;14.2 Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason and Rickert’s Philosophy of Values: Two Versions of a General Theory of Kno;265
15.1.1.2.1;14.2.1 Dilthey and Holism;266
15.1.1.2.2;14.2.2 Rickert’s Dualism;268
15.1.1.3;14.3 Sociology Between Neo-Kantianism and Philosophy of Life: Three Case Studies;272
15.1.1.3.1;14.3.1 Weber’s Wissenschaftslehre;273
15.1.1.3.2;14.3.2 Simmel’s Theory of Historical Knowledge;277
15.1.1.3.3;14.3.3 Mannheim’s Theory of Cultural Sociology;281
15.1.2;References;285
16;Feest_Ch15;288
16.1;Chapter 15;288
16.1.1;Opposition to Verstehen in Orthodox Logical Empiricism;288
16.1.1.1;15.1 Orthodox Logical Empiricism and Verstehen: An Overview;288
16.1.1.2;15.2 The Rejection of Verstehen by Carnap 1928–1932;290
16.1.1.3;15.3 Hempel, the Deductive-Nomological Model of Scientific Explanation and Empathetic Understanding;293
16.1.1.4;15.4 Abel on the Operation called Verstehen;296
16.1.1.5;15.5 Rudner on Verstehen and the Unity of Science;298
16.1.1.6;15.6 Discussion of the Orthodox Logical Empiricist Critique and Some Counter-Critiques;299
16.1.1.7;15.7 Hempel on Ideal Types and Rational Explanation in Social Science;302
16.1.2;References;305
17;Feest_Backmatter;307