Gloor A Non-Instrumentalist Approach to Collective Intentionality, Practical Reason, and the Self

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-3-8470-0227-7
Verlag: V&R unipress
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection

E-Book, Englisch, 255 Seiten

Taking into account the relevant and mostly contemporary ango-american debates concering collective intentionality, the author eximanes what it means to share reasons and other intentional states such as thoughts and emotions.The guiding question of the dissertation is in what way and to what extent morality and therefore self-consciousness can be understood as conditions of possibility for the sharing of mental states, especially reasons. The dissertation is a contribution mainly to fields of research in practical philosophy (normative ethics and moral psychology) and in social philosophy (collective intentionality analysis) and rational choice theory.

Juliette Gloor hat an der Universität Zürich und an der Universität von Edinburgh Philosophie, Englische Literaturwissenschaft und Volkswirtschaflehre studiert und an der Universität Basel promoviert. Ihre Forschungsinteressen umfassen u.a. Gebiete aus der normativen Ethik und Kollektiven Intentionalität.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Gloor, Juliette

Fachgebiete

• Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Ethik, Moralphilosophie

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Title Page;3
2;Copyright;4
3;Table of Contents;5
4;Body;9
5;Preface;9
6;Overview;11
7;Chapter 1: A Problematic Dichotomy – Setting the Methodological Frame;31
7.1;1.1 Introduction;31
7.2;1.2 Two Fundamental Problems of Instrumental Rationality with Collective Intentionality;32
7.3;1.3 A Problematic Dichotomy: Two Separate Realms of Behaviour;38
7.4;1.4 Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of the Final Good;51
7.4.1;1.4.1 The Function of Rational Animals;54
7.4.2;1.4.2 Normative Goodness;57
7.4.3;1.4.3 The Relation between the Good Human Life and the Human Good;63
7.5;1.5 Feeling Respect: “The Feeling of Us”;65
7.6;1.6 The Relation between Language and Self-Consciousness;70
7.6.1;1.6.1 Schmid's Criticism of Searle;71
7.6.2;1.6.2 We-Intentions and Sharing Intentions;74
7.7;1.7 Can Collective Intentionality Consist of Purely Cognitive Relations?;76
7.8;1.8 Conclusion;79
8;Chapter 2: Collective Intentionality and Animal Consciousness;81
8.1;2.1 Introduction;81
8.2;2.2 Collective Intentionality;84
8.2.1;2.2.1 Shareability and Actual Sharedness;89
8.3;2.3 The First Person Perspective, Sharing Mental Attitudes, and Reasons;90
8.3.1;2.3.1 The Age-Old Division between Perception or Affect and Thinking;96
8.4;2.4 Animal Mentality;98
8.4.1;2.4.1 The Peculiar Nature of Animal Consciousness;103
8.4.2;2.4.2 The Structural Openness of Animal Consciousness;105
8.5;2.5 Defending a Non-Instrumentalist Approach to Collective Intentionality;113
8.6;2.6 Self-Consciousness Revisited;119
8.6.1;2.6.1 The Non-Epistemological Knowledge-Relationship of the Self with Itself;121
8.6.2;2.6.2 Self-Consciousness and Reasons;126
8.7;2.7 Conclusion;130
9;Chapter 3: Practical Reasons and Other-Regardingness;131
9.1;3.1 Introduction;131
9.2;3.2 Epistemic Norms Are (not) of the Same Kind as Practical Norms;133
9.2.1;3.2.1 Epistemic Norms Are Constitutive Norms of Thought;135
9.3;3.3 Practical Norms;136
9.4;3.4 Practical Identities and the Moral Identity We Share;141
9.4.1;3.4.1 A Crucial Ambiguity in Korsgaard's Account of Normativity;146
9.5;3.5 Two Objections and Two Replies;152
9.6;3.6 Korsgaard's “Public Conception of Reasons”;159
9.6.1;3.6.1 Two Final Objections;164
9.7;3.7 Conclusion;167
10;Chapter 4: Self-Relation and Relation to Others;169
10.1;4.1 Introduction;169
10.2;4.2 Shareability and Communicability;170
10.2.1;4.2.1 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument;175
10.2.2;4.2.2 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument and Korsgaard's Notion of Publicity;177
10.3;4.3 Sharing Evaluative Perspectives and Plural Agency;181
10.4;4.4 Meeting the Challenge;186
10.5;4.5 The Normative Structure of the Self;191
10.5.1;4.5.1 Richardson's Objection from “Reflective Sovereignty”;191
10.5.2;4.5.2 Larmore's Objection from Self-Commitment;197
10.5.3;4.5.3 First Person Authority;201
10.6;4.6 Conclusion;207
11;Chapter 5: Why Human Self-Relation Cannot Be Instrumentally Normative – Results and Some Applications;209
11.1;5.1 Introduction;209
11.2;5.2 Can Instrumentalism Be Saved?;210
11.2.1;5.2.1 The Normativity of the Will;212
11.2.2;5.2.2 The Form of Rational Animals;213
11.2.3;5.2.3 The Instrumentalist's Worry and a Reply;220
11.3;5.3 Two Ways of Understanding Action;229
11.4;5.4 Human Desires Are Reason-Responsive;235
11.5;5.5 Subjectively Normative Reasons and Objectively Normative Reasons;241
11.6;5.6 The Milgram Experiment;244
11.7;5.7 Conclusion;248
12;Bibliography;249

Über Autor(innen)

Gloor, Juliette
Juliette Gloor hat an der Universität Zürich und an der Universität von Edinburgh Philosophie, Englische Literaturwissenschaft und Volkswirtschaflehre studiert und an der Universität Basel promoviert. Ihre Forschungsinteressen umfassen u.a. Gebiete aus der normativen Ethik und Kollektiven Intentionalität.