Hamilton The Works of Alexander Hamilton: Volume 5

1. Auflage 2015
ISBN: 978-1-5183-1649-4
Verlag: Krill Press
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: 0 - No protection

E-Book, Englisch, 524 Seiten

Unfortunately, one of the best known aspects of Alexander Hamilton's (1755-1804) life is the manner in which he died, being shot and killed in a famous duel with Aaron Burr in 1804. But Hamilton became one of the most instrumental Founding Fathers of the United States in that time, not only in helping draft and gain support for the U.S. Constitution but in also leading the Federalist party and building the institutions of the young federal government as Washington's Secretary of Treasury.


Hamilton is also well remembered for his authorship, along with John Jay and James Madison, of the Federalist Papers. The Federalist Papers sought to rally support for the Constitution's approval when those three anonymously wrote them, but for readers and scholars today they also help us get into the mindset of the Founding Fathers, including the 'Father of the Constitution' himself. They also help demonstrate how men of vastly different political ideologies came to accept the same Constitution.


Hamilton was a prominent politician and a prolific writer who had his hand in everything from the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and President Washington's speeches, as well as an influential voice in policy and the formation of initial political parties. His works were compiled into a giant 12 volume series by Henry Cabot, which included everything from his speeches to his private correspondence.  This edition of Hamilton's Works: Volume 5 includes his writings on Foreign Relations, including discussions about the French Revolution and international diplomacy with European powers

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hamilton, Alexander

Leseproben

CABINET OPINION—HAMILTON AND KNOX
.................. REASONS FOR THE OPINION OF the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary at War, respecting the Brigantine “Sarah”1 July 8, 1793. I.—Because there can be no doubt, either upon principle or authority, that the permitting or suffering, or what is equivalent, the not taking effectual measures to prevent, when known, the fitting out of privateers in our ports by one of the belligerent powers to cruise against any of the others, is an unequivocal breach of neutrality. II.—Because the President, in conformity with a unanimous opinion of the heads of the departments, and the Attorney-General, founded upon the above principle, has caused his disapprobation of the practice to be signified to the Ministers both of Great Britain and France, accompanied with an express assurance to the former, that effectual measures would be taken to prevent a repetition of the practice. III.—Because consequently not to take such measures in the present instance would be to depart from the declaration of neutrality, and to contravene the positive assurance given to the Minister of Great Britain; an omission as dishonorable as it must be dangerous to the government, implying either a want of ability, or a want of consistency and good faith. And as it will indubitably furnish a just cause for complaint against the United States, so it is natural to expect that it may involve them in war. It becomes the more serious in consequence of the non-surrender of the prizes which were brought into our ports by the privateers “Sans Culottes” and “Citizen Genet,” fitted out at Charleston. IV.—Because the fitting out of this privateer is a transaction involving on the part of the agents of France a gross outrage upon, and undisguised contempt of, the government of the United States. It is aggravated by the circumstances of having been done under the immediate eye of the government, after an explicit and serious communication of its disapprobation—and after an expectation given that no similar attempt would be repeated. The Secretary of State reported to the President as the result of a conversation with the French Minister, on the subject of the two privateers before mentioned, what was equivalent to an apology for having done it, and to at least a tacit promise to forbear a repetition. Yet it is still done, and is even attempted to be justified. V.—Because it is impossible to interpret such conduct into any thing else than a regular plan to force the United States into the war. Its tendency to produce that effect cannot be misunderstood by the agents of France. The direct advantage of the measure to her is obviously too inconsiderable to induce the persisting in it contrary to the remonstrances of the government, if it were not with a view to the more important end just mentioned; a conduct the more exceptionable, because it is accompanied with the fallacious disavowal of an intention to engage us in the war. VI.—Because there is every evidence of a regular system in the pursuit of that object, to endeavor to control the government itself by creating, if possible, a schism between it and the people, and enlisting them on the side of France in opposition to their own constitutional authorities. This is deducible not only from a great variety of collateral incidents, but from direct written and verbal declarations of the French Minister.The memorial lately presented by him to the Secretary of State, the most offensive paper perhaps that was ever offered by a foreign minister to a friendly power with which he resided, announces unequivocally the system which is alleged to exist.Besides the exorbitant pretensions which that paper advances, of a right in defiance of the declared sense of the government to fit out armed vessels from the ports of the United States, and even to enlist our citizens in their own territories in the service of France; to hold courts within their jurisdiction for the condemnation of prizes unsanctioned by compact, contrary to the rights of neutrality, contrary even to the spirit of the regulations of France for her own consulate establishment, besides the loose and unfounded charges of breach of treaty rudely urged;—that paper more than insinuates the imputation on the President of ill will to France under the instigation of foreign influence, of having gone beyond his duty and his authority by the decision of matters not within his province, and sufficiently implies an appeal from him to Congress, if not to the people, whose disposition is at least indelicately put in contrast with his. Language of this sort, if even better founded than it is in the present instance, can never be used by a diplomatic character without a culpable violation of decorum. He has nothing to do but with the constitutional organ of the government. In his official communication he ought never to look beyond him—nor can he do it without disrespect to the government and to the nation.The declaration of the Minister of France to Mr. Dallas, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as related by him to the Governor of that Commonwealth and to the Secretary of State, is a further confirmation of the same system. That declaration, among other exceptionable things, expressed, “That he, the French Minister, would appeal from the President to the people.”It would be a fatal blindness not to perceive the spirit which inspires such language, and ill-omened passiveness not to resolve to withstand it with energy. VII.—Because to refuse an assurance that the privateer should remain in port, till the President could arrive to decide upon her situation, was an additional high-handed contempt of the government; which was in no shape palliated by the ambiguous intimations of a probability that she would not be ready to depart before his return,—intimations which, from experience in other cases, can in no degree be relied upon. VIII.—Because not to act with decision under such circumstances will be to prostrate the government, to sacrifice the dignity and essential interests of the nation. Indecision in such a case must necessarily tend to destroy at home and abroad a due respect for the government, to weaken its arm, to embolden the enterprises of an intriguing and daring foreign agent, to encourage and multiply those who are disposed to adhere factiously to him, and alternately to put the country in a condition of being dictated to by that foreign agent, and at war with all the enemies of the nation he represents. It is a truth the best founded and of the last importance, that nothing is so dangerous to a government as to be wanting either in self-confidence or self-respect. IX.—Because decision may even tend to preserve peace with France herself. If the enterprises of her Minister are not checked in their present stage, it may clearly be inferred from his character that they are likely to be carried to a length which will render a rupture between the two countries inevitable, should they not previously produce one with the powers who are opposed to France. X.—Because the measure which is recommended, is but a consequence of the instruction given to the different governors on the 24th of May last, addressed to them in their military capacity, expressly to be executed by the agency of the militia, and it included necessarily the use of military coercion when that should be found requisite to the end to be accomplished. It is, therefore, not to adopt a new principle, but to second the execution of an order already given by the President, founded upon mature deliberation and the unanimous opinion of the heads of departments, with the Attorney-General. It is therefore due to the known and declared pleasure of the President. A Governor who could not have recourse to the advice now asked, would fail in his duty not to employ in a similar case the means recommended, without further sanction.The Governor of Pennsylvania might justifiably do so in the existing instance; but the case having been previously drawn into consultation between him and the heads of departments, he has thought fit to ask their advice, and in giving it, conformably with the true spirit of the President’s instruction, they would only faithfully execute the trust reposed in them by him. XI.—Because the measure proposed is only provisional, and can have no other effect than to evince the determination of the government, unless the vessel attempts to depart contrary to the intimation of the Minister, as understood by the Secretary of State. In such an event the necessity will be attested by the occasion. XII.—If there be delicacy on one side, there is still greater delicacy on the other. France would have justly nothing to complain of in reference to an act which was merely a vindication of our own sovereignty in our own territory, against a manifest, deliberate, and outrageous violation of it by her agent. If she be at all reasonable or equitable, she will disavow the proceedings and the agent, and take no offence. An appeal to her justice and friendship ought for this purpose to follow a resistance to the encroachment. But if actual measures be not taken, the other powers will have just cause of complaint, not only upon principle, but upon the strength of positive assurance. If war is to be hazarded, ’t is certainly our duty to hazard it with that power which by injury and insult forces us to choose between opposite hazards, rather than with...