Hess / Bliss / Intriligator The Economics of Organization

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-5689-4
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 21, 292 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Advanced Textbooks in Economics

Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 21: The Economics of Organization focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the study of various topics in economics, mathematical economics, and econometrics. The publication first ponders on the general resource allocation problem, particularly noting that a theory of resource allocation is formed by studying the deliberate and purposeful choices of individuals to provide a model for human behavior in the economic realm. The theory of exchange emphasizes that coordination and equilibrium must be formed to explain social linkages. The text then explains market allocation, and a number of propositions are discussed to show the dynamics of this field. The manuscript elaborates on transaction costs, markets and uncertainty, and behavior in the face of uncertainty. The publication also takes a look at the terms of authority, measuring of information, value of communication in teams, cost of communication, and budget planning. The formal organization of decision-making, hierarchical supervision and loss of control, alternative requirements of formal organization, and expedience and incentives are also underscored. The text is a valuable reference for researchers interested in the economics of organization.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Hess, James D.

Bliss, C. J.

Intriligator, M. D.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;The Economics of Organization;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Introduction to the series;6
6;Acknowledgements;7
7;Chapter 1. Introduction;10
8;Chapter 2. The general resource allocation problem;16
9;Chapter 3. Market allocation;26
9.1;Proposition 3.1;33
9.2;Proposition 3.2;34
9.3;Proposition 3.3;34
9.4;Proposition 3.4;35
9.5;Proposition 3.5;35
9.6;Proposition 3.6;36
9.7;Proposition 3.7;38
10;Chapter 4. Transaction costs;44
11;Chapter 5. Markets and uncertainty;60
12;Chapter 6. Behavior in the face of uncertainty;78
13;Chapter 7. Why are there bosses?;96
13.1;Theorem 7.1;104
14;Chapter 8. The terms of authority;108
15;Chapter 9. Measuring information;120
15.1;Theorem 9.1;125
15.2;Theorem 9.2;126
15.3;Theorem 9.3;127
15.4;Theorem 9.4;128
15.5;Theorem 9.5;128
16;Chapter 10. The value of communication in teams;140
16.1;Theorem 10.1;143
16.2;Theorem 10.2;145
16.3;Theorem 10.3;146
16.4;Theorem 10.4;149
17;Chapter 11. Cost of communication;160
17.1;Theorem 11.1;164
17.2;Theorem 11.2;165
17.3;Theorem 11.3;167
17.4;Theorem 11.4;171
18;Chapter 12. Budget planning: Transfer prices or quotas;176
19;Chapter 13. Principals and agents ;194
19.1;Theorem 13.1;205
19.2;Theorem 13.2;207
19.3;Theorem 13.3;209
19.4;Theorem 13.4;212
20;Chapter 14. Hierarchical supervision and loss of control;216
21;Chapter 15. Formal organization of decision-making;228
22;Chapter 16. Alternative requirements of formal organization;248
22.1;Theorem 16.1;249
22.2;Theorem 16.2;249
22.3;Theorem 16.3;250
22.4;Theorem 16.4;257
22.5;Theorem 16.5;258
22.6;Theorem 16.6;260
23;Chapter 17. Expedience and incentives;266
23.1;Theorem 17.1;273
23.2;Theorem 17.2;275
23.3;Theorem 17.3;279
24;References;284
25;Author index;290
26;Subject index;292