Ijiri / Whinston Quantitative Planning and Control

Essays in Honor of William Wager Cooper on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday
1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-5936-9
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 376 Seiten

Quantitative Planning and Control: Essays in Honor of William Wager Cooper on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday features a collection of papers prepared by students and associates of William Wager Cooper to honor him on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday. The book centers on the theme of Quantitative Planning and Control, the theme to which much of Professor Cooper's research effort has been devoted. The theme covers diverse fields of inquiry as reflected in the articles in this book, which are organized in four parts: (1) mathematical programming and decision models; (2) economic development and firm growth; (3) manpower planning and design; and (4) accounting and control. At the core of all of the articles in this book lies a belief that analytical approaches can help solve all managerial problems, a philosophy that is deeply rooted in Professor Cooper's thinking. This book demonstrates how this fundamental view on management can be reflected in dealing with problems in various fields of management. In particular, the book focuses on three main areas of application of this view, economic development, manpower planning, and accounting and control, along with the subject of developing tools that are necessary for solving managerial problems analytically.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Ijiri, Yuji

Whinston, Andrew B.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Quantitative Planning and Control: Essays in Honor of William Wager Cooper on the Occasion of
His 65th Birthday;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;List of Contributors;12
6;Preface;14
7;A Yankee from Chicago;18
8;Adventures in Invention;26
9;The Great
Teacher;30
10;Part I: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
AND DECISION MODELS;34
10.1;Chapter 1. Gradient States for Some Dualities with the C2
Extremal Principle;36
10.1.1;INTRODUCTION;36
10.1.2;1. THE C2 EXTREMAL PRINCIPLE;37
10.1.3;2. GRADIENT CHARACTERIZATION OF SOME CONVEX
FUNCTION INFIMA;38
10.1.4;3. CONCLUSION;41
10.1.5;REFERENCES;41
10.2;Chapter 2. Branch and Round: An Enumerative Algorithm
for Integer Programs;42
10.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY;42
10.2.2;2. THE RUDIMENTARY BRANCH AND ROUND ALGORITHM;43
10.2.3;3. THE LINEAR PROGRAMMING
PROBLEM;46
10.2.4;4. MULTIPLE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE LINEAR
PROGRAMMING PROBLEM;49
10.2.5;5. A VARIATION OF THE RUDIMENTARY ALGORITHM:
CUTS, SEQUENTIAL BRANCHING, AND PARTITIONING;51
10.2.6;6. COMMENTS;54
10.2.7;REFERENCES;55
10.3;Chapter 3. A Minimax Procedure for a Class
of Stochastic Programs;56
10.3.1;1. SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS;57
10.3.2;2. TWO-STAGE STOCHASTIC PROGRAMMING;62
10.3.3;3. SIMPLE RECOURSE MODEL WITH NONLINEAR
PENALTY FUNCTIONS;63
10.3.4;4. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE;67
10.3.5;REFERENCES;67
10.4;Chapter 4.
A Linguistic Model for 3-D Constructions;70
10.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;70
10.4.2;2. OVERVIEW AND INITIAL DEFINITIONS;72
10.4.3;3. PRIMITIVES;73
10.4.4;4. REFERENCE POINTS AND P-FUNCTIONS;77
10.4.5;5. TRANSFORMING FUNCTIONS;79
10.4.6;6. SCULPTING FUNCTIONS;80
10.4.7;7. COMPOSITION OPERATORS;82
10.4.8;8. ITERATIONS;86
10.4.9;9. CONCLUDING REMARKS;90
10.4.10;REFERENCES;90
10.5;Chapter 5. Decision-Making with Multiple Objectives—Some
Analytic Approaches;92
10.5.1;INTRODUCTION;92
10.5.2;1. A MYTH OF MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING;93
10.5.3;2. THE DECISION FRAMEWORK;94
10.5.4;3. EXPLICITLY DEFINED CONSTRAINTS;96
10.5.5;4. CHOOSING THE BEST OF A SET OF ALTERNATIVES;99
10.5.6;5. CONCLUSION;101
10.5.7;REFERENCES;101
11;Part II: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND FIRM GROWTH;102
11.1;Chapter 6. Economic Development on a Distant
Planet;104
11.1.1;REFERENCES;109
11.2;Chapter 7. A Linear Programming Approach to Agricultural
Land Use Policy in India;110
11.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;110
11.2.2;2. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM;111
11.2.3;3. EXTENSIONS;115
11.2.4;4. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS;120
11.2.5;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;135
11.2.6;REFERENCES;135
11.3;Chapter 8. Time
Preference, Firm Growth, and Programming Models;136
11.3.1;INTRODUCTION;136
11.3.2;1. A SIMPLE ONE PERIOD MODEL;138
11.3.3;2. GROWTH OF THE FIRM;139
11.3.4;3. SUMMARY;142
11.3.5;REFERENCES;142
11.4;Chapter 9.
Inflation and the Capital Budgeting Decision;144
11.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;144
11.4.2;2 SOME BASIC RELATIONS;144
11.4.3;3. THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON DEMAND;146
11.4.4;4. THE RATE OF INTEREST;148
11.4.5;5. THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON COSTS;150
11.4.6;6. SOME OTHER EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON THE CAPITAL
BUDGETING DECISION;151
11.4.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;153
11.4.8;APPENDIX;154
11.4.9;REFERENCES;154
12;Part III:
MANPOWER PLANNING AND DESIGN;156
12.1;Chapter 10. A Network
Transshipment Model for Manpower Planning and Design;158
12.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;158
12.1.2;2. THE MODEL;159
12.1.3;3. AN EXAMPLE;163
12.1.4;4. DUAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS;165
12.1.5;5. EFFECTIVENESS VERSUS COST TRADEOFF ANALYSIS;169
12.1.6;6. CAREER ANALYSIS;170
12.1.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;172
12.1.8;REFERENCES;173
12.2;Chapter 11. A Study of Alternative Relaxation Approaches
for a Manpower Planning Problem;174
12.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;174
12.2.2;2. PROBLEM RELAXATION;179
12.2.3;3. RELAXATIONS AND PRIMAL STRATEGIES;182
12.2.4;4. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES TESTED;183
12.2.5;5. CONCLUSIONS;195
12.2.6;REFERENCES;196
12.3;Chapter 12. A Demographic Turnpike for Long-Range Manpower
Planning in Developing Economies;198
12.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;198
12.3.2;2. DEFINITION OF LABOR DEMAND AND SUPPLY;200
12.3.3;3. MODEL DEVELOPMENT;202
12.3.4;4. A CLOSED DEMOGRAPHIC TURNPIKE;205
12.3.5;5. AN OPEN DEMOGRAPHIC TURNPIKE;208
12.3.6;6. PLANNING POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONS;211
12.3.7;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;214
12.3.8;REFERENCES;214
12.4;Chapter 13. Aspects of Control for the Organization Design
and Manpower Planning Functions;218
12.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;218
12.4.2;2. MONITORING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN TERMS
OF THE MANPOWER PLANNING FUNCTION;222
12.4.3;3. INDICES OF CHANGE IN MANPOWER SYSTEMS;227
12.4.4;4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE;230
12.4.5;5. CONCLUSION;238
12.4.6;REFERENCES;238
12.5;Chapter 14.
Manpower Goals Planning and Accountability;240
12.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;240
12.5.2;2. MANPOWER ANALYSES AND PLANNING;241
12.5.3;3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL;244
12.5.4;4. INTEGRATED SYSTEMS;252
12.5.5;5. CONCLUSION;257
12.5.6;REFERENCES;259
13;Part IV:
ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL;262
13.1;Chapter 15. Dynamic Break-Even and Trade-Off Analysis
under Transient Cost Behavior;264
13.1.1;1. INTRODUCTION;264
13.1.2;2. TRANSIENT COST BEHAVIOR THROUGH
AGGREGATE LEARNING;264
13.1.3;3. TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS;268
13.1.4;4. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL
STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION;269
13.1.5;5. EMPIRICAL CONSTRUCTION OF COST SURFACE;274
13.1.6;6. TRANSIENT BEHAVIOR OF THE MODEL;277
13.1.7;7. DYNAMIC BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS;281
13.1.8;8. DYNAMIC TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS;285
13.1.9;9. CONCLUSIONS: FINDINGS AND FURTHER POLICY
IMPLICATIONS;288
13.1.10;ACKNOWLEDGMENT;289
13.1.11;REFERENCES;289
13.2;Chapter 16.
Convergence of Cash Recovery Rate;292
13.2.1;1. INTRODUCTION;292
13.2.2;2. THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CONVERGENCE;293
13.2.3;3. CONVERGENCE OF RECOVERY RATE;295
13.2.4;4. THE GENERAL CASE;298
13.2.5;REFERENCES;300
13.3;Chapter 17.
A Theoretical Basis for Inflation Accounting;302
13.3.1;1. INTRODUCTION;302
13.3.2;2. THEORETICAL MODEL;304
13.3.3;3. EXTENSIONS TO THE COMPUTATION OF REPLACEMENT
COST INDICES;310
13.3.4;4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS;319
13.3.5;APPENDIX. THE CONSTANT ELASTICITY OF TRANSFORMATION AND SUBSTITUTION (CET-CES)
PRODUCTION FUNCTION;321
13.3.6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;323
13.3.7;REFERENCES;323
13.4;Chapter 18. Accounting Disclosures for User Decision Processes;324
13.4.1;1. INTRODUCTION;324
13.4.2;2. RESEARCH DESIGN;326
13.4.3;3. EMPIRICAL STUDY PROBLEMS;327
13.4.4;4. RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND COLLECTION OF
PROTOCOLS;330
13.4.5;5. LOAN OFFICER B AND PREPARATION OF SUPPLEMENTS;331
13.4.6;6. RESULTS;331
13.4.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;338
13.4.8;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;341
13.4.9;REFERENCES;341
13.5;Chapter 19. An Examination of Alternative Forms of Regulatory
Mechanisms: The Case of the Health Care Industry;344
13.5.1;1. INTRODUCTION;344
13.5.2;2. BACKGROUND;345
13.5.3;3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE NEED FOR REGULATION
OF THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY;346
13.5.4;4. ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REGULATORY MECHANISMS;349
13.5.5;5. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE
REGULATORY MECHANISMS;351
13.5.6;6. A CASE FOR SELF-REGULATION;353
13.5.7;7. CONCLUSIONS;359
13.5.8;APPENDIX A;360
13.5.9;APPENDIX B;360
13.5.10;REFERENCES;361
13.6;APPENDIX: Bibliography of the Works
of William Wager Cooper;362
13.6.1;BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS;362
13.6.2;ARTICLES AND REVIEWS;363

Leseproben

A Yankee from Chicago
HERBERT A. SIMON By the time the “shrewd Yankee” of the eighteenth century had become the embodiment of “Yankee ingenuity” in the nineteenth, he had lost most of his regional roots and could be found anywhere in America. One such Yankee, born in 1914 and named William Wager Cooper, grew up on the west side of the city of Chicago. I am delighted to have this opportunity to provide some recollections of the adventures this Yankee’s ingenuity led him into during a period of his life when I was eyewitness and sometimes coconspirator. Of necessity, my account will have more of the first person than good taste might recommend, for some of Bill Cooper’s projects have had major impact on my own life. I shall just mention the most salient of these, and then go on to matters of wider significance. Some forty years ago he persuaded a girl named Dorothea Pye to accept me as partner on a double date; six months later, Dot and I were married. Nearly ten years later, he convinced me that I would find it stimulating to attend with him the seminars of the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, then at the University of Chicago, almost converting me into a full-time economist. Some three years after that, he persuaded me that I should leave my position in Chicago to join a hare-brained venture in business education just starting at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (now Carnegie-Mellon University), where I have now made my home for almost thirty years. Bill Cooper can be very persuasive, with the persuasiveness of the true entrepreneur. It was Schumpeter, I believe, who defined an entrepreneur as someone who risks someone else’s money. Put less pejoratively and more informatively, an entrepreneur is a broker who brings about marriages between ideas and resources. He dreams imaginative dreams, and persuades others that those dreams are attainable, persuades them to place their bets on him. Classically, entrepreneurs were supposed to belong to the world of business. Even today, examples are easily found there, especially in burgeoning industries like electronics. But brokerage of ideas and resources is not confined to business; it is at least as much at home in academia. In a typical major American university one-third of the annual expenditures are funded by entrepreneurial faculty members who write their dreams of undiscovered truths in research project proposals addressed persuasively to foundations and government agencies. For the academic entrepreneur, the stakes are even higher than dollars because the resources at risk are human careers. An academic entrepreneur publishes a paper arguing that a particular domain of knowledge is a gold mine of secrets, thereby attracting a swarm of prospectors. He urges some colleagues into a joint venture of exploration by describing the intellectual treasures to be found. He persuades a graduate student to direct his life into a particularly alluring line of inquiry. Entrepreneurship in science is a Roman gamble; the winnings are more often glory than riches, and the losses—just life-long futility. Bill Cooper has been a highly successful academic entrepreneur, whose successes have paid off not only for himself, but for those who have invested in him. Bill arrived on the University of Chicago campus in 1934. I have no recollection of how we met there, but we became friends soon after he came. A few students at Chicago were apolitical, even at the bottom of the Great Depression, but most of us had declared where we stood (from extreme left to center; the right was almost nonexistent), and were more or less involved in some kind of political activity. Apparently Bill and I were adjacently located on the political spectrum (somewhere left of center), for when he decided, about 1938, to form a new liberal organization on the campus, the Progressive Club, he persuaded Dot and me to join him. Why did the Chicago campus need another splinter group, side by side with all those already competing for student loyalties? Because in those days of the Popular Front, any club that called itself liberal was promptly infiltrated and taken over by the card-carrying Communists, whose energy in such matters was unlimited, and was made uninhabitable for other liberals. And what was the entrepreneurial dream that would safeguard the Progressive Club against this fate? A constitution that specifically denied the privilege of membership to Communists, and faculty sponsorship by Professor (later Senator) Paul Douglas, well known then as a Socialist, but certainly no Communist. A naïve dream, you will say. Naïve, perhaps, but it worked. Whether it worked because Communist students balked at taking the pledge, or worked because the club never grew to the point where it was worth infiltrating is an open question. Life cannot be lived as a controlled experiment; and in writing history, post hoc, propter hoc is as good a rule as any. Moreover, whether by imitation or by independent invention (almost certainly the latter), American labor unions were soon successfully using the same non-Communist pledge in their constitutions for the same purpose. And Bill Cooper gained credibility with me as an entrepreneurial dreamer. Just how Bill Cooper came to Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1947 I do not know. He probably has told me, but I have forgotten, so he will have to tell that story himself. Now entrepreneurs not only make things happen; things happen to them. What happened to Bill, and to his department head, Lee Bach, was that five million (1949) dollars were offered to them—that is, to Carnegie Tech—to start a graduate business school for students holding undergraduate science and engineering degrees. The donor was William Larimer Mellon, founder of the Gulf Oil branch of that family, who saw the need for young men with combined technical and business training in high-techno logy industries. I am really being unfair to Bill and Lee, and to Carnegie Tech’s Provost, Elliott Dunlap Smith, in suggesting that they were struck by lightning. In fact, they had entrepreneurially attracted the bolt by devising an imaginative undergraduate curriculum in industrial management to replace the old-fashioned programs in industrial engineering and commercial arts that Carnegie was then offering. It was this new program they had carried to Mr. Mellon as the description of their dreams; and it was this program, also, that provided some of the basic curricular ideas for the new graduate school. I arrived in Pittsburgh in the autumn of 1949 to help Lee and Bill get the new school, Graduate School of Industrial Administration (GSIA), under way. The three of us, under the watchful guidance (and sometimes vigorous intervention) of Provost Smith, served as a sort of triumvirate in providing administrative and academic leadership for the venture. Triumvirates, as even the Romans knew, are not monolithic structures, nor was ours. Differences of opinion and struggles for power were not unknown to us, but we shared and wove enough of a common vision so that we could spend most of our energy in building, and only a little in maneuvering. Bill Cooper’s imagination and his indifference to the conventional was a critical ingredient in the effort. Indifference to the conventional was also the cause of a difficult personal problem for Bill at that time. He was writing a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University where his offbeat approach to accounting and its relation with economics was a source of great perplexity to some members of his thesis committee. For several years his colleagues at Carnegie urged him vigorously to make such compromises and clarifications in the thesis document as would satisfy the committee, for we were concerned lest the lack of a union card endanger his academic progress. But Bill’s entrepreneurial luck (or talent) held out here too. After a very short time, his contributions to the economics and management science literature became so well recognized that the question of a degree never came up at promotion time. Most people, by then, just supposed he had one; and in any event, it did not matter a whit whether he had or not. When, in 1970, Ohio State University awarded Bill an honorary doctorate, I am sure he felt honored, as all people do in such circumstances; but I am sure also that in the intervening years he did not feel that he lacked any credentials for the job he was doing. Bill’s example probably accounted for the flexibility that the GSIA faculty later sometimes exhibited in deciding what constituted a thesis in industrial administration—awarding the degree, for example, to Allen Newell and to others for research in artificial intelligence. Bill Cooper was never one to think slots should not be as flexible in shape as people. The bolts of lightning that struck Bill Cooper and GSIA during the early 1950s were not all made of dollars. A technological revolution, which even Bill could not have anticipated more than dimly in his dreams, began at this moment to change in fundamental ways the whole world of management and management education. The revolution was caused, of course, by the discovery of the new management science tools—queuing theory, linear programming, and all the rest that followed—and the subsequent introduction to the business scene of the modern digital computer. GSIA was, from the outset, dedicated to erecting business education on a foundation of basic analytic tools and social science knowledge. From...