Machlup / Shell Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-7143-9
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 582 Seiten, Web PDF

Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences covers the problems in the methodological aspects of economics and other social science disciplines. This book is organized into seven parts encompassing 26 chapters. The first parts review the nature and significance of methodology of economics, along with the models and theories in the field. The succeeding parts deal with the verification problems, operational concepts, and interpretation of reality in economics. Other parts explore the methodological aspects of other social sciences. The last parts discuss some aspects and applications of economic methodologies. This book will be of value to economists, social scientists, and researchers.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Machlup, Fritz

Shell, Karl

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Methodology of Economics and Other Social Sciences;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;6
5;PREFACE;10
6;ACKNOWLEDGMENTS;14
7;Part One: ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF METHODOLOGY;16
7.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE;18
7.2;Chapter 1. WHAT IS MEANT BY METHODOLOGY: A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE;20
7.2.1;THE DEBASING OF THE TERM;21
7.2.2;WHAT METHODOLOGISTS ACTUALLY WROTE;25
7.2.3;METHODOLOGY, LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY;68
7.3;Chapter 2. WHY BOTHER WITH METHODOLOGY?;78
8;Part Two: ON FACTS, MODELS, AND THEORIES IN ECONOMICS;86
8.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO;88
8.2;Chapter 3. A NOTE ON MODELS IN MICROECONOMICS;90
8.2.1;OLIGOPOLISTIC INDETERMINACY;100
8.3;Chapter 4. FACT AND THEORY IN ECONOMICS;116
8.3.1;EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, EVALUATION;131
8.3.2;MEASUREMENT;141
9;Part Three: ON VERIFICATION AND OPERATIONALISM;146
9.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE;148
9.2;Chapter 5. THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION IN ECONOMICS;152
9.2.1;I;152
9.2.2;II;156
9.2.3;III;163
9.2.4;IV;168
9.3;Chapter 6. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND MENTAL CONSTRUCTS IN MODEL AND THEORY FORMATION;174
9.3.1;I. THE CONCEPTS OF PHYSICS;175
9.3.2;II. EMPIRICAL LAWS AND PURE THEORY;185
9.3.3;III. CONSTRUCT AND MODEL;190
9.4;Chapter 7. OPERATIONALISM AND PURE THEORY IN ECONOMICS;204
9.4.1;THE TENETS OF OPERATIONALISM;206
9.4.2;PURE CONSTRUCTS AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS;208
9.4.3;EMPIRICAL THEORIES AND PURE THEORY;211
9.4.4;ILLUSTRATION: A THEORETICAL ARGUMENT AND THE CONCEPTS USED;212
9.4.5;THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS;216
9.4.6;OPERATIONAL THEORIES, SO-CALLED;217
10;Part Four: ON IDEAL TYPES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF REALITY;220
10.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR;222
10.2;Chapter 8. THE IDEAL TYPE: A BAD NAME FOR A GOOD CONSTRUCT;226
10.2.1;PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC OF CONCEPT FORMATION;226
10.2.2;CONSTRUCTS BASED ON SUBJECTIVE MEANINGS;227
10.2.3;TWO SETS OF DISTINCTIONS;229
10.2.4;PERSONAL IDEAL TYPES;230
10.2.5;MATERIAL IDEAL TYPES;233
10.2.6;IDEAL TYPES OF FEELINGS;233
10.2.7;WHAT'S IN A NAME?;235
10.3;Chapter 9. IDEAL TYPES, REALITY, AND CONSTRUCTION;238
10.3.1;A MENTAL CONSTRUCTION: VON THÜNEN;239
10.3.2;DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE TYPES: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, MODERN SCIENCE;241
10.3.3;EXACT IMAGINATION, SELECTIVE EXAGGERATION, LOGICAL ISOLATION: GOETHE, COMTE, MILL, COURNOT;242
10.3.4;REAL TYPES AND STRICT TYPES: CARL MENGER;245
10.3.5;ISOLATING ABSTRACTION AND MEANT MEANINGS: WUNDT, DILTHEY;247
10.3.6;GENERALIZING, INDIVIDUALIZING, UNDERSTANDING: WINDELBAND, RICKERT, SIMMEL;249
10.3.7;IDEAL TYPES CONSTRUCTED WITH UNDERSTANDING OF MEANT MEANINGS: WEBER;251
10.3.8;INCONSISTENT ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE IDEAL TYPE: OPPENHEIMER, SCHELTING, MISES, SOMBART;254
10.3.9;THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED: WEIPPERT, SPRANGER, SPIETHOFF;256
10.3.10;PERSONAL AND MATERIAL IDEAL TYPES OF VARYING DEGREES OF ANONYMITY: SCHUTZ;259
10.3.11;CONTRASTING REAL AND IDEAL TYPES OF VARYING DEGREES OF REALISM: EUCKEN;262
10.3.12;THE REAL TYPE: MENGER ONCE AGAIN;270
10.3.13;THREE TYPICAL EXAMPLES OF REAL TYPES IN ECONOMICS;271
10.3.14;THE RELATION BETWEEN REAL TYPES AND IDEAL TYPES;273
10.3.15;THE REAL IN THE REAL TYPE AND THE IDEAL IN THE IDEAL TYPE;274
10.3.16;OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PURE CONSTRUCTS;275
10.3.17;THE POSITIVISTIC PREJUDICE AGAINST CONSTRUCTION;277
10.3.18;POSTCRIPT;279
10.3.19;ANOTHER POSTCRIPT AFTER EIGHTEEN YEARS;279
10.4;Chapter 10. HOMO OECONOMICUS AND HIS CLASS MATES;282
10.4.1;PREFATORY NOTE;282
10.4.2;THE DISSECTION OF HOMO TOTUS;283
10.4.3;THIS ONE VERSUS ANY ONE;283
10.4.4;FOUR CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES;284
10.4.5;THE IDEAL TYPE OF THE "IDEAL TYPE";288
10.4.6;PRE-SCIENTIFIC COMMON-SENSE AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING;291
10.4.7;SELECTING THE RELEVANT TYPE;292
10.4.8;THE ROLE OF HOMO OECONOMICUS;295
10.5;Chapter 11. THE UNIVERSAL BOGEY: ECONOMIC MAN;298
10.5.1;A SAMPLE OF DENUNCIATIONS;299
10.5.2;THE GROUNDS OF THE OPPOSITION;301
10.5.3;THE HYPOTHETICAL NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE;302
10.5.4;POSITIVE TRUTH AND MERE SUPPOSITION;304
10.5.5;USEFUL FICTIONS;305
10.5.6;PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS;305
10.5.7;EGOISM, TUISM, AND SIMPLIFIED PSYCHOLOGY;307
10.5.8;THE OBJECTIVES OF ECONOMIC MAN;310
10.5.9;THE LOGICAL NATURE OF ECONOMIC MAN;312
10.5.10;THE FUNCTION OF ECONOMIC MAN;313
11;Part Five: ON COMPARISONS BETWEEN NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES;318
11.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART FIVE;320
11.2;Chapter 12. IF MATTER COULD TALK;324
11.2.1;A PARABLE;324
11.2.2;FRITZ MACHLUP;325
11.2.3;IF MATTER COULD TALK;326
11.2.4;A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE THEME;326
11.2.5;IF MATTER COULD TALK;328
11.2.6;THE ISSUE CLEARLY POSED;329
11.2.7;NO DIFFERENCE IN LOGIC;330
11.2.8;THE NATURE OF THE DIFFERENCE;331
11.2.9;TALES TOLD BY MOLECULES;334
11.2.10;TALES TOLD BY MEN;335
11.2.11;SILENT NATURE VERSUS TALKING MAN: ONLY ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES;337
11.2.12;OBSERVATION AND EXPLANATION IN ECONOMICS;339
11.2.13;UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, THEORY AND HISTORY;341
11.2.14;NAGEL ON PROPOSITIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES;344
11.2.15;HUNCHES;346
11.3;Chapter 13. THE INFERIORITY COMPLEX OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES;348
11.4;Chapter 14. ARE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES REALLY INFERIOR?;360
12;Part Six: SOME ASPECTS AND APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY;384
12.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART SIX;386
12.2;Chapter 15. WHY ECONOMISTS DISAGREE;390
12.2.1;DISAGREEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PRESCRIPTIONS;391
12.2.2;THE CHOICE OF POLICIES;391
12.2.3;FOUR CAUSES OF DISAGREEMENT;393
12.2.4;COMPARISONS WITH NATURAL SCIENTISTS;401
12.3;Chapter 16. THEORIES OF THE FIRM: MARGINALIST, BEHAVIORAL, MANAGERIAL;406
12.3.1;REFERENCES;436
12.4;Chapter 17. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS;440
12.4.1;THE MEANINGS OF "POSITIVE";441
12.4.2;THE MEANINGS OF "NORMATIVE;443
12.4.3;"POSITIVE" VERSUS "NORMATIVE";443
12.4.4;THE TRICHOTOMY AND THE CHOICE OF TERMS;444
12.4.5;GRAMMATICAL FORMS;445
12.4.6;THE LANGUAGE OF THE COOKBOOK;446
12.4.7;ART AND SCIENCE;447
12.4.8;NORMS, VALUES, RULES, PRECEPTS, ADVICE, PERSUASION, AND COMMAND;449
12.4.9;THE LOGICAL STATUS OF NORMATIVE STATEMENTS;450
12.4.10;"POSITIVE" VERSUS "NONOBSERVABLE";452
12.4.11;"POSITIVE" VERSUS "NONTESTABLE";453
12.4.12;THE ECONOMIST'S CONCERN WITH VALUES;454
12.4.13;THE ECONOMIST'S SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY;456
12.4.14;ADJUDICATING CHARGES OF BIAS;459
12.4.15;THE NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF WELFARE ECONOMICS;460
13;Part Seven: ON VARIOUS METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS;466
13.1;INTRODUCTION TO PART SEVEN;468
13.2;Chapter 18. JOSEPH SCHUMPETERS ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY;476
13.2.1;METHODOLOGICAL TOLERANCE;478
13.2.2;ECONOMIC SCIENCE;479
13.2.3;FUNCTIONAL VERSUS CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS;481
13.2.4;ASSUMPTIONS, MODELS, FACTS, AND VERIFICATIONS;482
13.2.5;QUANTITATIVE AND NUMERICAL ECONOMICS;483
13.2.6;ECONOMIC DYNAMICS;484
13.2.7;METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM;486
13.2.8;PURE SCIENCE VERSUS PRACTICAL AIMS;488
13.3;Chapter 19. GUNNAR MYRDAL ON CONCEALED VALUE JUDGMENTS;490
13.4;Chapter 20. PAUL SAMUELSON ON THEORY AND REALISM;496
13.4.1;REFERENCES;499
13.5;Chapter 21. THREE WRITERS ON SOCIAL THEORY: MADGE, ROSE, AND ZETTERBERG;500
13.6;Chapter 22. JOHN NEVILLE KEYNES' SCOPE AND METHOD;504
13.7;Chapter 23. TERENCE HUTCHISON'S RELUCTANT ULTRA-EMPIRICISM;508
13.8;Chapter 24. ADOLF LOWE'S INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS;520
13.8.1;THE INSTRUMENTAL INFERENCES;521
13.8.2;THE NEED FOR POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSES;523
13.8.3;THE CRITICAL BOUNDARY;524
13.9;Chapter 25. FRIEDRICH HAYEK ON SCIENTIFIC AND SCIENTISTIC ATTITUDES;528
13.9.1;HAYEK'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE;528
13.9.2;CRITIQUE OF SCIENTISM;529
13.9.3;EXPLANATION, PREDICTION, AND SPECIALIZATION;531
13.9.4;ACTION AND PERCEPTION;534
13.10;Chapter 26. SPIRO LATSIS ON SITUATIONAL DETERMINISM;536
13.10.1;REFERENCES;549
14;INDEX;550