Moulin / Bliss / Intriligator The Strategy of Social Choice

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-5688-7
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 18, 226 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Advanced Textbooks in Economics

Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 18: The Strategy of Social Choice focuses on the social, economics, and political implications of social choice. The publication first surveys introduction, social choice functions and correspondences, and monotonicity and the arrow theorem. Discussions focus on efficiency, anonymity and neutrality, classifying voting methods, normative versus positive approach to voting, voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice, and development of the strategic theory of voting. The text then ponders on strategy-proofness and monotonicity and sophisticated voting. Topics include sophisticated implementation, voting by binary choices, strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and restricted domains. The manuscript examines cooperative voting and voting by veto, including the minority principle, proportional veto core, voting by integer veto, effectivity functions, maximal and stable effectivity functions, and implementation by Nash equilibrium. The text is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the process of social choice.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Moulin, H.

Bliss, C. J.

Intriligator, M. D.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;The Strategy of Social Choice;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES;6
6;Dedication;7
7;PREFACE;12
8;CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION;14
8.1;1. Prescriptive judgements or descriptive analysis;14
8.2;2. Normative versus positive approach to voting;15
8.3;3. The implementation problem;16
8.4;4. Classifying voting methods;17
8.5;5. Voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice;19
8.6;6. Development of the strategic theory of voting;20
8.7;7. Relation to the economics of incentives;24
8.8;References;26
9;CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND CORRESPONDENCES;30
9.1;1. Summary of the results;30
9.2;2. Basic definitions and notation;31
9.3;3. Efficiency;33
9.4;4. Anonymity and neutrality;35
9.5;5. The Condorcet winner and related s.c.c.;38
9.6;References;45
10;CHAPTER 3. MONOTONICITY AND THE ARROW THEOREM;46
10.1;1. Summary of the results;46
10.2;2. Monotonic s.c.c.;47
10.3;3. Strongly monotonic s.c.c.;52
10.4;4. Examples of a strongly monotonic s.c.c.;56
10.5;5. Strongly monotonic s.c.f.: Impossibility result;61
10.6;6. Social welfare functions: Arrow's theorem;65
10.7;References;70
11;CHAPTER 4. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND MONOTONICITY;72
11.1;1. Summary of the results;72
11.2;2. Strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms;72
11.3;3. The case of a binary choice;75
11.4;4. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem;78
11.5;5. Restricted domains;81
11.6;References;88
12;CHAPTER 5. SOPHISTICATED VOTING;90
12.1;1. Summary of the results;90
12.2;2. Sophisticated implementation;91
12.3;3. Voting by binary choices;100
12.4;4. A necessary condition;115
12.5;References;128
13;CHAPTER 6. VOTING BY VETO;130
13.1;1. Summary of the results;130
13.2;2. The minority principle;131
13.3;3. The proportional veto core;135
13.4;4. Proof of theorem 1;139
13.5;5. Voting by integer veto;148
13.6;6. General voting by veto;161
13.7;References;166
14;CHAPTER 7. COOPERATIVE VOTING;168
14.1;1. Summary of the results;168
14.2;2. Effectivity functions;169
14.3;3. Maximal effectivity functions;184
14.4;4. Stable effectivity functions;189
14.5;5. Implementation by strong equilibrium;201
14.6;6. Implementation by Nash equilibrium;213
14.7;References;224
15;INDEX;226