Parker Contractual Politics and the Institutionalization of Bureaucratic Influence

1. Auflage 2018
ISBN: 978-1-4384-6795-5
Verlag: De Gruyter
Format: EPUB
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, 330 Seiten, Format (B × H): 152 mm x 229 mm

Analyzes long-term interest group/party alliances, with a focus on the part played by federal advisory committees.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Parker, Glenn R.

Parker, Suzanne L.

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Zentralregierung
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten

Inhaltsverzeichnis

List of Tables and Figures
Preface

1. Introduction: A Contractual Perspective on Interest Group Politics

2. The Political Utility of Advisory Committees

3. The Institutional Underpinnings of Political Contracts

4. A Theory of Political Contracts

5. Defusing Contractual Hazards

6. Interest Group Demand and the Spread of Advisory Committees

7. Advisory Committees as Instruments of Bureaucratic Influence

8. The Efficiency of Contracts in Governing Political Exchange

9. Conclusions

Appendix to Chapter 4: A Formal Representation of Contractual Politics
Appendix to Chapter 7: Predicting the Linkage between Agency Budgets and Implementation of Advisory Committee

Recommendations
Notes
References
Index of Names
Index of Subjects

Über Autor(innen)

Now retired, Glenn R. Parker was Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Purdue University and is the author of many books, including Capitol Investment$: The Marketability of Political Skills. Suzanne L. Parker, also now retired, was Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Together they have coauthored Factions in House Committees.