E-Book, Englisch, 239 Seiten, eBook
Reihe: Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
ISBN: 978-3-8349-6185-3
Verlag: Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Gabler
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Wasserzeichen (»Systemvoraussetzungen)
Zielgruppe
Research
Autoren/Hrsg.
Weitere Infos & Material
1;Foreword;6
2;Acknowledgements;8
3;Summary Contents;9
4;Detailed Contents;10
5;List of Figures;17
6;List of Abbreviations;18
7;List of Variables;20
8;1 Introduction;21
8.1;1.1 International Law and Economics;22
8.2;1.2 Structure;24
9;2 Foreign Direct Investment;26
9.1;2.1 Trends and Figures;26
9.2;2.2 Multinational Enterprises and FDI;28
9.3;2.3 FDI and Development;32
10;3 Economic and Legal Protection of FDI;37
10.1;3.1 Time Inconsistency and Expropriation Risk;37
10.1.1;3.1.1 Time Inconsistency;37
10.1.2;3.1.2 On the Relevance of Expropriation Risk;42
10.2;3.2 The Economics of FDI Protection;42
10.2.1;3.2.1 Static Devices;43
10.2.2;3.2.2 Dynamic Devices;53
10.2.3;3.2.3 Discussion;60
10.3;3.3 Legal FDI Protection;60
10.3.1;3.3.1 Domestic Regulation;61
10.3.2;3.3.2 Customary International Law;61
10.3.3;3.3.3 Multilateral Treaties;63
10.3.4;3.3.4 Investor-State Contracts;65
10.3.5;3.3.5 Bilateral Investment Treaties;65
11;4 The Economics of BITs;87
11.1;4.1 The (Perceived) Weakness of International Law;87
11.2;4.2 The Effect of BITs on FDI;89
11.2.1;4.2.1 Empirical Studies on the Effect of BITs on FDI;89
11.2.2;4.2.2 Discussion;92
11.3;4.3 Law and Economics of International Law;93
11.3.1;4.3.1 Theories of International Law;94
11.3.2;4.3.2 Rational Choice Approach;94
11.3.3;4.3.3 Methodological Individualism;95
11.3.4;4.3.4 The Three R's: Reputation, Reciprocity and Retaliation;96
11.4;4.4 The Functioning of BITs;98
11.4.1;4.4.1 The Costs of BITs;98
11.4.2;4.4.2 Commitment and Signalling;104
11.4.3;4.4.3 Commitment;105
11.4.4;4.4.4 Signalling;122
11.4.5;4.4.5 Beyond Commitment and Signalling;137
11.5;4.5 Empirical Studies and the Functioning of BITs;140
11.6;4.6 Discussion and Conclusions;141
12;5 BITs and Institutional Competition;144
12.1;5.1 Efficiency and BITs;144
12.2;5.2 Institutional Competition;147
12.2.1;5.2.1 BITs and the Prisoner’s Dilemma;147
12.2.2;5.2.2 The Economics of Institutional Competition;149
12.2.3;5.2.3 Discussion;155
12.3;5.3 BITs in the Context of Institutional Competition;156
12.3.1;5.3.1 BITs and Self-Interested Governments;157
12.3.2;5.3.2 BITs and the Prisoner's Dilemma Revisited;162
12.4;5.4 Provisions and Evidence;165
12.4.1;5.4.1 Non-Discrimination;165
12.4.2;5.4.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET);166
12.4.3;5.4.3 Indirect Expropriation;167
12.4.4;5.4.4 Evidence;168
12.5;5.5 Discussion and Conclusions;172
13;6 BITs and Institutional Quality;175
13.1;6.1 The Effect of BITs on Institutional Quality;175
13.1.1;6.1.1 Some Theory;175
13.1.2;6.1.2 Empirical Literature;178
13.2;6.2 Model and Data;180
13.2.1;6.2.1 Fixed-Effects Model;180
13.2.2;6.2.2 Variables;182
13.2.3;6.2.3 Summary Statistics 6.2.4 Regulatory Quality and the Rule of Law;186
13.2.4;6.2.5 Corruption;192
13.2.5;6.2.6 Outliers, Economic Freedom and OECD BITs;193
13.3;6.3 Caveats;193
13.3.1;6.3.1 Selection and Composition of Variables;194
13.3.2;6.3.2 Perception Based Indicators;194
13.4;6.4 Discussion and Conclusions;195
14;7 BITs and Transparency;197
14.1;7.1 Legal Background;197
14.2;In conclusion,;200
14.3;7.2 The Case for Transparency;201
14.3.1;7.2.1 International Law;201
14.3.2;7.2.2 International Investment Law;203
14.4;7.3 The Case for Confidentiality;204
14.4.1;7.3.1 Conventional Arguments for Confidentiality;205
14.4.2;7.3.2 Structural Arguments for Confidentiality;206
14.4.3;7.3.3 More Transparency?;216
14.5;7.4 Discussion and Conclusions;216
15;8 Summary and Outlook;219
15.1;8.1 Summary;219
15.2;8.2 Outlook;223
16;Appendices;224
16.1;Appendix A;224
16.2;Appendix B;226
16.3;Appendix C;230
16.4;Appendix D;235
17;Bibliography;239