Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare

1. Auflage 2014
ISBN: 978-1-4832-9457-5
Verlag: Elsevier Science & Techn.
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, Band Volume 11, 236 Seiten, Web PDF

Reihe: Advanced Textbooks in Economics

This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus philosophical aspects from ethics and the theory of justice.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Sen, A. K.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Front Cover;1
2;Collective Choice and social Welfare;4
3;Copyright Page;5
4;Table of Contents;8
5;Dedication;7
6;Introduction to The Series;6
7;Preface;10
8;Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION;14
8.1;1.1. Preliminary Remarks;14
8.2;1.2. Ingredients of Collective Choice;15
8.3;1.3. The Nature of Individual Preferences;18
9;Chapter 1*. PREFERENCE RELATIONS;20
9.1;1*1. Binary Relations;20
9.2;1*2 Maximal Elements and Choice Sets;22
9.3;1*3. A Set of Results for Quasi-Orderings;23
9.4;1*4. Subrelations and Compatibility;26
9.5;1*5. Choice Functions and Quasi-Transiiivity;27
9.6;1*6. Preference and Rational Choice;29
10;Chapter 2. UNANIMITY;34
10.1;2.1. The Pareto Criterion;34
10.2;2.2. Pareto-Inclusive Choice Rules;35
10.3;2.3. Consensus as a Basis of Collective Action;37
11;Chapter 2*. COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES ANDPARETO COMPARISONS;41
11.1;2*1. Choice and Pareto Relation;41
11.2;2*2. Compensation Tests;43
12;Chapter 3. COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY;46
12.1;3.1. The Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function;46
12.2;3.2. Arrowian Social Welfare Function;48
12.3;3.3. The General Possibility Theorem;50
12.4;3.4. A Comment on the Significance of Arrow's Results;51
13;Chapter 3*. SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS;54
13.1;3*1. The Impossibility Theorem;54
14;Chapter 4. CHOICE VERSUS ORDERINGS;60
14.1;4.1. Transitivity, Quasi-Transitivity, and Acyclicity;60
14.2;4.2. Collective Choice and Arrow's Conditions;62
14.3;4.3. Rationality and Collective Choice;63
15;Chapter 4*. SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS;65
15.1;4*1. Possibility Theorems;65
16;Chapter 5. VALUES AND CHOICE;69
16.1;5.1. Welfare Economics and Value Judgments;69
16.2;5.2. Content of Welfare Economics: A Dilemma;71
16.3;5.3. Basic and Nonbasic Judgments;72
16.4;5.4. Facts and Values;74
16.5;5.5. Individual Orderings and Choice Rules;77
16.6;5.6. Conditions on Choice Rules;80
17;Chapter 5*. ANONYMITY, NEUTRALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS;84
17.1;5*1. Conditions for Majority Rule;84
17.2;5*2. Pareto-Extension Rules;87
18;Chapter 6. CONFLICTS AND DILEMMAS;91
18.1;6.1. Critique of Anonymity and Neutrality;91
18.2;6.2. Liberal Values and an Impossibility Result;92
18.3;6.3. Critique of Acyclicity;94
18.4;6.4. Critique of Liberal Values;95
18.5;6.5. Critique of the Pareto Principle;96
18.6;6.6. Critique of Unrestricted Domain;98
19;Chapter 6*. THE LIBERAL PARADOX;100
19.1;6*1. Liberalism versus the Pareto Principle;100
19.2;6*2. Extensions;101
20;Chapter 7. INTERPERSONAL AGGREGATION AND COMPARABILITY;102
20.1;7.1. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives;102
20.2;7.2. Comparability, Cardinality and Discrimination;105
20.3;7.3. Uses of von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinalization;107
20.4;7.4. Partial Comparability;112
20.5;7.5. Adding Ordinal-Type Welfare;116
21;Chapter 7*. AGGREGATION QUASI-ORDERINGS1;118
21.1;7*1. Comparability and Aggregation;118
21.2;7*2. Partial Comparability;121
21.3;7*3. Regularity and Symmetry;123
21.4;7*4. Addition of Noncardinal Welfare;128
22;Chapter 8. CARDINALITY WITH OR WITHOUT COMPARABILITY;131
22.1;8.1. Bargaining Advantages and Collective Choice;131
22.2;8.2. Cardinality and Impossibility;136
23;Chapter 8*. BARGAINS AND SOCIAL WELFAREFUNCTIONALS;139
23.1;8*1. The Bargaining Problem of Nash;139
23.2;8*2. Social Welfare Functional;141
24;Chapter 9. EQUITY AND JUSTICE;144
24.1;9.1. Universalization and Equity;144
24.2;9.2. Fairness and Maximin Justice;148
24.3;9.3. Impersonality and Expected Utility Maximization;154
24.4;9.4. Grading Principles of Justice;159
24.5;9.5. Grading Principle, Maximin, and Utilitari;164
25;Chapter 9*. IMPERSONALITY AND COLLECTIVE QUASI-ORDERINGS;165
25.1;9*1. Grading Principles of Justice;165
25.2;9*2. Suppes and Pareto;167
25.3;9*3. Identity Axioms and the Grading Principles;169
25.4;9*4. The Maximin Relation of Justice;169
25.5;9*5. Justice and Aggregation;172
26;Chapter 10. MAJORITY CHOICE AND RELATED SYSTEMS;174
26.1;10.1. The Method of Majority Decision;174
26.2;10.2. Probability of Cyclical Majorities;176
26.3;10.3. Restricted Preferences;179
26.4;10.4. Conditions on Collective Choice Rules and Restricted Preferences;184
27;Chapter 10*. RESTRICTED PREFERENCES AND RATIONAL CHOICE;186
27.1;10*1. Restricted Domain;186
27.2;10*2. Value Restriction and Limited Agreement;189
27.3;10*3. Extremal Restriction;192
27.4;10*4. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice;196
27.5;10*5. The Special Case of Anti-Symmetric Preferences;198
28;Chapter 11. THEORY AND PRACTICE;200
28.1;11.1. Systems of Collective Choice;200
28.2;11.2. Institutions and Framework;203
28.3;11.3. Expression of Individual Preferences;205
28.4;11.4. Efficiency and Pareto Optimality;209
28.5;11.5. Concluding Observations;211
29;BIBLIOGRAPHY;214
30;NAME INDEX;234
31;SUBJECT INDEX;236