Tu The Accountability Paradox in the Chinese Bureaucracy

1. Auflage 2025
ISBN: 978-981-966392-7
Verlag: Springer Singapore
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: 1 - PDF Watermark

E-Book, Englisch, 309 Seiten

Reihe: Political Science and International Studies

This book explores the accountability paradox in the Chinese bureaucracy. The purpose of accountability is to foster compliance and responsiveness among bureaucrats, but instead, it causes bureaucrats’ coping tactics, blame-avoiding strategies, and defensive behavior, which constitutes a paradox or pathology of accountability. The accountability paradox is well documented in Western countries, but scarce attention has been paid to the accountability system in the Chinese context. It appears that the accountability paradox is also present in the Chinese context since a series of major transformations were initiated to overhaul the accountability system in China following the 18th National Party Congress in 2012, but exhibits characteristics that are unique to China. In a tightly argued book driven by comprehensive interviews and survey investigations, Dr. Tu sheds light on a subject of interest to sinologists, political scientists, and journalists.

Zielgruppe

Research

Autoren/Hrsg.

Tu, Wenyan

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Chapter 1: Introduction: The Accountability Paradox in the Chinese Bureaucracy.- Chapter 2: The Control of Bureaucracy.- Chapter 3: Accountability Transformation in the Chinese Bureaucracy.- Chapter 4: Accountability Intensity and Bureaucratic Shirking.- Chapter 5: The Accountability Cube and Blame Avoidance.- Chapter 6: Accountability Conflicts and Bureaucrats’ Working Effort.- Chapter 7: Fault-Tolerance Mechanism: A Compromise between Outcome-Based Accountability and Process-Based Accountability.- Chapter 8: Promoting Good Accountability: What Should Be Done.

Über Autor(innen)

Wenyan Tu is assistant professor of the Institute for Global Public Policy, Fudan University, China. Her research interests cover corruption studies, public accountability, and bureaucratic incentives. She has published in journals such as