Karsten / Prof. Dr. Contemporary Concert Diplomacy

A New Mechanism for Great Power Crisis Management in the Post-Cold War World
1. Auflage 2016
ISBN: 978-3-8288-6578-5
Verlag: Tectum
Format: PDF
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM (»Systemvoraussetzungen)

E-Book, Englisch, Band 20, 857 Seiten

Reihe: Bonner Studien zum globalen Wandel

Two centuries after the Congress of Vienna formed the ‚Concert of Europe‘, the great powers of the world once again assembled in Austria‘s capital in June 2015: This time they were negotiating an end to the nuclear standoff with Iran. These so-called EU-3+3 negotiations signify a broader trend: From Iran to North Korea, from the former Yugoslavia to Israel and Palestine, the great powers increasingly opt for exclusive and informal ad hoc formats in crisis management. Though lacking in aristocratic grandeur and festive surroundings, these context-specific, self-selected forums for policy-coordination in many ways resemble the nineteenth-century ‚Concert of Europe‘.
Why do the key actors in the contemporary international system consciously shun the standards of accountability and legitimacy represented by the post-war liberal institutional order? Why are they in favor of a more casual form of diplomacy that is not constrained by an inclusive membership, strict rules of procedure, and modern standards of transparency? This study rationalizes the popularity and assesses the viability of Contemporary Concert Diplomacy as a means for crisis management in the post-Cold War world. Drawing on a system-level analysis as well as four extensive case studies (the Yugoslavia Contact Group, the Middle East Quartet, the Six Party Talks with North Korea, and the EU-3+3 negotiations with Iran), it examines and explains the emergence, operation, and outcomes of Contemporary Concert Diplomacy. In doing so, it sheds light on a highly significant – but vastly understudied – instrument of crisis management. It thus proves valuable to both, the student and practitioner of international affairs.

Autoren/Hrsg.

Karsten, Jung

Prof. Dr., Wolfram Hilz

Fachgebiete

• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Internationale Beziehungen
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politikwissenschaft Allgemein Politische Theorie, Politische Philosophie
• Sozialwissenschaften Politikwissenschaft Politische Systeme Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

Inhaltsverzeichnis

1;Cover;1
2;Table of Contents;10
3;1 Introduction;18
3.1;1.1 Concert Diplomacy Then and Now;20
3.1.1;1.1.1 The Policy and Practice of the Concert of Europe;21
3.1.2;1.1.2 The Rise and Fall of the Liberal Multilateral Order;24
3.1.3;1.1.3 A Return of the Concert?;29
3.2;1.2 The Puzzle of Contemporary Concerts;32
3.2.1;1.2.1 The State of Research;33
3.2.2;1.2.2 The Argument;39
3.2.2.1;1.2.2.1 The Theoretical Framework;40
3.2.2.2;1.2.2.2 The Case Studies;43
3.2.3;1.2.3 A Note on Methodology;48
4;2 Imagining Contemporary Concerts;54
4.1;2.1 Crisis Management in the Post-Cold War Era;54
4.1.1;2.1.1 Threats and Challenges;55
4.1.2;2.1.2 Interests and Alignments;57
4.1.3;2.1.3 Capabilities and Commitments;58
4.2;2.2 Structural Realities and Institutional Structures;60
4.2.1;2.2.1 Situational Multipolarity;61
4.2.2;2.2.2 The Failure to Adapt;64
4.3;2.3 The Promise of Contemporary Concerts;67
4.3.1;2.3.1 Limited Scope;71
4.3.2;2.3.2 Limited Membership;74
4.3.3;2.3.3 Limited Institutionalization;80
4.4;2.4 Limitations of the Concert Approach;83
5;3 The Yugoslavia Contact Group;86
5.1;3.1 The Emergence;86
5.1.1;3.1.1 The Context of the Crisis;86
5.1.2;3.1.2 The Exhaustion of Alternatives;90
5.1.3;3.1.3 The Self-Selection Process;109
5.1.4;3.1.4 The Design;113
5.1.4.1;3.1.4.1 Scope;113
5.1.4.2;3.1.4.2 Membership;116
5.1.4.3;3.1.4.3 Institutionalization;124
5.2;3.2 The Operation;130
5.2.1;3.2.1 Bosnia;130
5.2.1.1;3.2.1.1 The Contact Group Plan;131
5.2.1.2;3.2.1.2 The Road to Dayton;137
5.2.1.3;3.2.1.3 The Contact Group’s Country;149
5.2.2;3.2.2 Kosovo;155
5.2.2.1;3.2.2.1 The Road to Rambouillet;156
5.2.2.2;3.2.2.2 The Air Campaign and Aftermath;173
5.2.2.3;3.2.2.3 The Status Talks and Independence;178
6;4 The Middle East Quartet;186
6.1;4.1 The Emergence;186
6.1.1;4.1.1 The Context of the Crisis;186
6.1.2;4.1.2 The Exhaustion of Alternatives;189
6.1.3;4.1.3 The Self-Selection Process;202
6.1.4;4.1.4 The Design;207
6.1.4.1;4.1.4.1 Scope;208
6.1.4.2;4.1.4.2 Membership;211
6.1.4.3;4.1.4.3 Institutionalization;223
6.2;4.2 The Operation;229
6.2.1;4.2.1 The Road Map Process;229
6.2.1.1;4.2.1.1 Putting Together the Plan;230
6.2.1.2;4.2.1.2 Implementing the Plan;242
6.2.2;4.2.2 Evacuations and Elections;251
6.2.2.1;4.2.2.1 Disengagement;253
6.2.2.2;4.2.2.2 Hamas in Power;263
6.2.3;4.2.3 The Search for a Role;277
6.2.3.1;4.2.3.1 Annapolis;278
6.2.3.2;4.2.3.2 Obama’s Unilateralism;285
6.2.3.3;4.2.3.3 A ‘Palestinian Spring’?;292
6.2.3.4;4.2.3.4 No Peace, No Process;299
7;5 The Six Party Talks;310
7.1;5.1 The Emergence;310
7.1.1;5.1.1 The Context of the Crisis;310
7.1.2;5.1.2 The Exhaustion of Alternatives;316
7.1.3;5.1.3 The Self-Selection Process;333
7.1.3.1;5.1.3.1 North Korea;335
7.1.3.2;5.1.3.2 The United States;337
7.1.3.3;5.1.3.3 China;343
7.1.3.4;5.1.3.4 South Korea;354
7.1.3.5;5.1.3.5 Japan;360
7.1.3.6;5.1.3.6 Russia;364
7.1.4;5.1.4 The Design;369
7.1.4.1;5.1.4.1 Scope;370
7.1.4.2;5.1.4.2 Membership;372
7.1.4.3;5.1.4.3 Institutionalization;379
7.2;5.2 The Operation;389
7.2.1;5.2.1 An Insurmountable Deadlock;389
7.2.1.1;5.2.1.1 The First Round;390
7.2.1.2;5.2.1.2 The Second Round;396
7.2.1.3;5.2.1.3 The Third Round;404
7.2.2;5.2.2 A Breakthrough and Many Disappointments;411
7.2.2.1;5.2.2.1 The Fourth Round;413
7.2.2.1.1;5.2.2.1.1 Phase One;419
7.2.2.1.2;5.2.2.1.2 Phase Two;424
7.2.2.2;5.2.2.2 The Fifth Round;431
7.2.2.2.1;5.2.2.2.1 Phase One;432
7.2.2.2.2;5.2.2.2.2 Provocations;436
7.2.2.2.3;5.2.2.2.3 Phase Two;457
7.2.2.2.4;5.2.2.2.4 Phase Three;459
7.2.2.3;5.2.2.3 The Sixth Round;465
7.2.2.3.1;5.2.2.3.1 Phase One;470
7.2.2.3.2;5.2.2.3.2 Phase Two;473
7.2.2.4;5.2.2.4 A Final Push by Bush;476
7.2.3;5.2.3 The Never-Ending Hiatus;489
7.2.3.1;5.2.3.1 Overtures and Affronts;489
7.2.3.2;5.2.3.2 Attempts to Revive the Six Party Talks;497
7.2.3.3;5.2.3.3 Denouement;509
8;6 The EU-3+3;518
8.1;6.1 The Emergence;518
8.1.1;6.1.1 The Context of the Crisis;518
8.1.1.1;6.1.1.1 The Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic;520
8.1.1.2;6.1.1.2 The Nuclear Crisis;524
8.1.2;6.1.2 The Exhaustion of Alternatives;527
8.1.2.1;6.1.2.1 Bilateral initiatives;528
8.1.2.2;6.1.2.2 Multilateralism in Disarray;532
8.1.3;6.1.3 The Self-Selection Process;537
8.1.3.1;6.1.3.1 The Road to Tehran: The E-3;538
8.1.3.2;6.1.3.2 From Tehran to Paris: The EU-3;545
8.1.3.3;6.1.3.3 From Paris to New York: The EU-3+3;553
8.1.3.3.1;6.1.3.3.1 The United States;557
8.1.3.3.2;6.1.3.3.2 Enter: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad;561
8.1.3.3.3;6.1.3.3.3 Russia;564
8.1.3.3.4;6.1.3.3.4 The End of the Road;569
8.1.4;6.1.4 The Design;571
8.1.4.1;6.1.4.1 Scope;572
8.1.4.2;6.1.4.2 Membership;576
8.1.4.3;6.1.4.3 Institutionalization;581
8.2;6.2 The Operation;587
8.2.1;6.2.1 The Security Council Coalition;587
8.2.1.1;6.2.1.1 Last-Ditch Diplomacy;588
8.2.1.2;6.2.1.2 Towards Sanctions;593
8.2.1.3;6.2.1.3 Increasing the Pressure;603
8.2.1.4;6.2.1.4 The 2008 Proposal;610
8.2.2;6.2.2 The Sanctions Initiatives;619
8.2.2.1;6.2.2.1 Changing Dynamics;620
8.2.2.1.1;6.2.2.1.1 US Engagement;621
8.2.2.1.2;6.2.2.1.2 European Assertiveness;626
8.2.2.1.3;6.2.2.1.3 New Players;628
8.2.2.2;6.2.2.2 Tightening the Noose;632
8.2.2.2.1;6.2.2.2.1 The Limits of Compromise;633
8.2.2.2.2;6.2.2.2.2 Unilateral Sanctions;637
8.2.2.2.3;6.2.2.2.3 Clandestine Operations;643
8.2.2.2.4;6.2.2.2.4 Diplomatic Deadlock;646
8.2.2.2.5;6.2.2.2.5 Escalation;650
8.2.3;6.2.3 Negotiating a Settlement;657
8.2.3.1;6.2.3.1 New Momentum;659
8.2.3.1.1;6.2.3.1.1 Istanbul;662
8.2.3.1.2;6.2.3.1.2 Baghdad;665
8.2.3.1.3;6.2.3.1.3 Moscow;667
8.2.3.2;6.2.3.2 Downgrading;669
8.2.3.2.1;6.2.3.2.1 Istanbul;671
8.2.3.2.2;6.2.3.2.2 Almaty;674
8.2.3.3;6.2.3.3 The Back Room;678
8.2.3.3.1;6.2.3.3.1 First Contact;680
8.2.3.3.2;6.2.3.3.2 A Fresh Start;683
8.2.3.4;6.2.3.4 Return to Track I;685
8.2.3.4.1;6.2.3.4.1 Geneva;687
8.2.3.4.2;6.2.3.4.2 Lausanne;694
8.2.3.4.3;6.2.3.4.3 Vienna;707
9;7 Conclusion;718
9.1;7.1 The Emergence of Concert Diplomacy;720
9.1.1;7.1.1 The Lack of Viable Alternatives;720
9.1.2;7.1.2 The Self-Selection Process;723
9.2;7.2 The Operation of Concert Diplomacy;726
9.2.1;7.2.1 Crisis-Induced Pragmatism;727
9.2.2;7.2.2 The Conflict of Objectives;729
9.3;7.3 The Outcomes of Concert Diplomacy;734
9.3.1;7.3.1 Containment;735
9.3.2;7.3.2 Resolution;736
9.4;7.4 The Viability of Concert Diplomacy;743
9.4.1;7.4.1 A Viable Niche;743
9.4.2;7.4.2 A Useful Contribution;745
9.4.3;7.4.3 Prospects and Perspectives;747
10;8 List of Abbreviations;750
11;9 Works Cited;754
11.1;9.1 Sources;754
11.1.1;9.1.1 Official Documents & Statements;754
11.1.2;9.1.2 Memoirs & Commentary;783
11.1.3;9.1.3 Author Interviews;788
11.2;9.2 Secondary Literature;789
11.2.1;9.2.1 Monographs;789
11.2.2;9.2.2 Articles in Edited Volumes;796
11.2.3;9.2.3 Articles in Scholarly Journals;806
11.2.4;9.2.4 Research Reports & Think Tank Publications;817
11.2.5;9.2.5 Online Magazines & Newspapers;824
11.2.6;9.2.6 Miscellaneous Online Material;844